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Nearly one hundred fifty years passed since the tragic end of the
Russian-Caucasus War and the mass emigration of the majority of
Circasssian from their mother land. Their country was fragmented
to disperse political entities lacking sovereignty and solid
political or cultural identity. Since then, Circassians did not
have a viable opportunity to change their status quo and restore
their national and cultural identity. This could be related to the
regional and international political circumstances that surrounded
the North Caucasus region, but also might be related to the
weakness and dispersed status of the Circassian nation, in
addition to the lack of political consciousness of their issues.
However, the current regional and international political and
economic circumstances surrounding the Caucasus region provide
Circassians with an unprecedented historic opportunity to rebuild
their nation and restore its cultural and political identity. But
the most important question is: Are Circassians aware of those
changing circumstances, and do they possess the required political
consciousness and thinking ability to construct an integrated
strategy to utilize those circumstances to serve their national
aspirations?
No doubt, the recent political, economic, and social events that
swept over the Caucasus region – the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Chechen first and second war, and the Georgian- Abkhaz first and
recent war – restored some kind of hope to Circassian national
aspirations whether in the home land or in the Diaspora. But at
the same time it instigated a controversial debate among
Circassians on the best strategy to deal with Circassian issues.
The main strategies orbit around two major contending political
trends, a radical trend calling for confrontation with Moscow, and
a pragmatic trend calling for rapprochement and open dialogue
mixed with measured international and internal pressure not
escalating to confrontation.
The radical trend is divided into two major trends. The first
operating on an Islamic Jihadist ideology and much influenced by
the Chechen Islamic resistance module and other Jihadist movements
in the Islamic world. This trend, as other Islamic Jihadist
trends, does not possess a definite or comprehensive state project
and mainly rely on sparkling and broad Islamic slogans such as
applying the Islamic laws (Sharia’a) without presenting a definite
or practical mechanism for implementation. The struggle against
the Russian is seen as infinite religious war between the nation
of Islam and the infidels. However, this trend is mostly internal
and operates within the North Caucasus Circassian republics and
has no grass roots among Circassian in the Diaspora. The only
external avenue for this trend is paneled through the Chechen
Islamic network whether in Europe or in the Middle East.
The second radical trend is a nationalist trend and advocating the
liberation of the historic land of Circassia from Russia. This
trend draws its support mainly from the anti Russian conservative
wings in the West which seek to undermine Russia influence in
Eurasia and specifically in the Southern Caucasus. This trend is
composed of “elitist” groups and individuals in the Diaspora,
mainly concentrated in Turkey, across Europe, USA, and Jordan.
Despite the lack of a grass root base, this trend is vocal
especially in the Western countries due to the support it draws
from the media and the academic centers in the West.
Regardless of the ideological disparity between both the Islamic
and nationalist radical trends; the national trend exploits and
politicizes Russian security response especially to the radical
Islamist threat by generating a public and international sense
against Russia’s violations of civil and human rights as a plot
directed towards undermining Circassian national aspirations. In
the same manner, this trend also exploits Russia’s government
corruption and its negative impact on the North Caucasus region’s
economies to build a sense of Russian conspiracy directed towards
undermining the development of the region.
Indeed Russia suffers from concerning issues such as economic
inefficiency - mostly related to government corruption,
bureaucracy, over reaching state control - , issues related to civil
and human right, in addition to minority rights and other
economic, social and political issues. However, the radical
national trend does not operate from an internal reform
perspective rather than exploiting those issues internationally
through the Western media and academic panels to justify its
demands of separation from Russia. This policy placed the radical
trend as a prey in the hand of the Western radical conservative
which pushes towards containment policy against Russia to diminish
its sphere of influence in the Southern Caucasus region and
Ukraine in order to preserve Western energy flow from the Caspian
Basin to Europe. In addition to that, this policy places Circassians in confrontation with Russia and undermines all
ongoing efforts to restore our national rights, especially the
repatriation demands.
Off course, this discourse by the radical trend is not
unprecedented and was previously exploited by France, Britain, and
the Ottoman Empire to undermine the Russian imperial ambitions in
late 18th and the 19th century. The great Russian-Caucasus war
that lasted nearly one hundred years (1770-1864) played a major
role in blocking Russia’s imperial expansion towards the Middle
East which threatened Britain's Indian trade, diminished Russia’s
influence in Crimea and Black Sea, which latter played a role in
excluding Russia from the future Western colonial plans in
undermining and dividing the Ottoman Empire. In return, Russia was
granted a free hand in the North Caucasus. The tragedy did not end
there; the Ottoman Empire adopted a religious and national
propaganda to attract Circassian to the Ottoman Empire, without a
proper preparation, to backup its military defeats in the Balkans.
After the Ottoman defeat in the Balkans, Circassians were also
transferred to Arabia to further protect the Ottoman
interests.
The late Georgian-Abkhaz war in 2008 is hard evidence to the
limits of support Circaasian can expect from the West. The West’s
blindly supported Georgia’s geographic integrity and turned a
blind eye towards Saakashvili’s reckless policies in resorting to
military power to resolve the territorial conflict in Abkhazia and
Southern Ossetia. The conflict clearly showed that the North
Caucasus is not a sphere of rivalry between the West and Russia.
The West realizes that the North Caucasus is not a matter of
geopolitical compromise in accordance to the Russian National
security. Instead, the West seeks to turn the North Caucasus to a
buffer zone to diminish and contain Russia’s influence thus
eliciting concessions in the Southern Caucasus. This can be
achieved only in creating political and security instability in
the North Caucasus by provoking radical nationalists and religious
separatist propensities within ethnic groups in the North
Caucasus. This strategy will entangle Russia in an internal war
across the North Caucasus thus undermine its influence in the
Southern Caucasus. Off course, other moderate trends in the West,
especially in Europe, reject this policy and call instead to
engage Russia and to advance cooperation and create common
interest in resolving the region’s conflicts. Unfortunately, the
radical conservative trend is still dominating the Western foreign
policies and constructing it in a cold war mentality pushing
towards containment policies and geopolitical struggle.
The Circassian moderate trend is the prevailing trend among
Circassian and has two power centers, one in the Caucasus and the
second in Turkey. This trend started to formulate in the early
sixties in Jordan and the late sixties in Turkey around the idea
of repatriation and Circassian national identity. Unfortunately,
the sociopolitical and intellectual environment in Jordan did not
allow this trend to institutionally develop or to advance a
proactive strategy. Instead, Circassian’s institutions in Jordan
remained focused on cultural and local social issues and
maintained only an emotional attachment to the mother land
confined to past memories and tales and does not relate to its
present issues. In Turkey, and despite the coercive Turkification
policies to assimilate ethnic minorities, the sociopolitical and
intellectual environment allowed this trend to flourish into
social institution capable in transforming its thoughts into
practical programs that deals with present realities whether in
the Diaspora or the mother land.
Recently, and after the collapse of the soviet Union, the moderate
trend began to develop a political dimension through establishing
a direct contact with the Circasian Republics in the Russian
Federation and to proactively engage in various political,
economic, and cultural issues on all levels. This trend has a
pragmatic stance towards issues facing Circassians and works
around the economic, political, and cultural issues in the mother
land from an internal reform perspective with respect to the
specificity and peculiarity of Russian Federation’s internal
politics. This policy allows this trend to proactively engage in
internal policies and apply positive pressure on Moscow in regard
to Circassian’s demands without provoking confrontation or
intimidation.
Objectively viewing Russia’s policies in the North Caucasus away
from the past’s heritage will allow Circassians to realize
Russia’s perspective of its national security thus its concern and
what it might offer to Circassians. Russia perceives stability in
the North Caucasus as part of its national security and a key
stone to maintain its sphere of influence in the Southern region.
Accordingly, Russia gave more than indication to involve in a
proactive policy towards the issue of the North Caucasus region in
return for stability and preventing external intervention. Russia
learned that it cannot resort to military option to resolve the
ethnic diversity in its federation, thus it has to listen to the
demands of ethnic minorities and engage them equally in its
national project while maintaining the political and geographic
integrity of the federation. In regard to Circassians, whether in
the mother land or in the Diaspora, the national interest requires
a historic rapprochement with Moscow and to engage in dialogue to
resolve various issues including the rights and demands of
Circassians living in the Diaspora.
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