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Hasan Kanbolat –\u00a0<\/span> Kamil A\u011facam<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n \u00c7in, 21.y\u00fczy\u0131lda s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 olmaya y\u00f6nelmektedir. Bu nedenle tek kutuplu d\u00fcnya olu\u015fumuna kar\u015f\u0131 Rusya ile stratejik ortakl\u0131k kurmu\u015ftur. \u00c7in, Kuzey ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in ayr\u0131 politikalar uygulamaktad\u0131r. Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun do\u011fu b\u00f6lgeleri d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda Rusya topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinde \u00f6zel bir \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131 olmayan \u00c7in, Kuzey Kafkasya \u00fczerinde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n belirledi\u011fi \u00e7izgi d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda bir politika geli\u015ftirmemektedir. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n etkinli\u011finin azald\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve Bat\u0131\u2019ya kayan G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya \u00c7in\u2019in ilgisi giderek artmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n China heads toward becoming a superpower in the 21st century. It has formed a strategic partnership with Russia as a reaction to unipolar world system. It implements different policies for northern and southern Caucasus. China that has no special interest in Russian territories except its eastern part does not pursue a different policy for the Northern Caucasus from Russia. However, China\u2019s interest in southern Caucasus has been increasing where Russian influence is waning and Western influence is gaining more ground.<\/p>\n 20.y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n son \u00e7eyre\u011finde ekonomik dev haline gelen \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti, b\u00fcy\u00fcyen ekonomik g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc n\u00fcfus ve co\u011frafyas\u0131n\u0131n sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7 ile de birle\u015ftirerek, 21. yy i\u00e7inde siyasi g\u00fcce d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmeye haz\u0131rlanmaktad\u0131r. (1) S\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 olmaya y\u00f6nelen \u00c7in, g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcz\u00fcn tek s\u00fcper g\u00fcc\u00fc olan ABD\u2019nin olu\u015fturmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 tek kutuplu d\u00fcnyaya ve Amerikan de\u011ferler sistemine kar\u015f\u0131 durmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00c7in, ABD\u2019nin ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekti\u011fi k\u00fcreselle\u015fme ak\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 dengesiz ve e\u015fitsiz bulmakta, k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ve azgeli\u015fmi\u015f devletlerin k\u00fcreselle\u015fme ak\u0131m\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda geli\u015fme ve ya\u015fama hakk\u0131 bulamad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia etmektedir.<\/p>\n \u00c7in, ABD\u2019nin s\u00fcreklili\u011fini sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201cAmerikan de\u011ferlerinin kabul edildi\u011fi, hukuksal, ekonomik, siyasal ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel boyutlar\u0131 Amerikan de\u011ferlerine g\u00f6re \u00e7izilmi\u015f tek kutuplu d\u00fcnyan\u0131n yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f ortam\u0131\u201d<\/em>\u00a0 olarak \u00f6zetlenebilecek Pax Americana<\/em> (2)d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesine kar\u015f\u0131 durabilmek i\u00e7in, SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 sonras\u0131 s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 kimli\u011fini kaybeden Rusya Federasyonu ile stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011fa y\u00f6nelmektedir.<\/p>\n B\u00f6ylece, en \u00f6nemli ticari orta\u011f\u0131 olan ABD\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 bir denge politikas\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. (3) Tek kutuplu d\u00fcnyadan \u00e7ok kutuplu d\u00fcnyaya y\u00f6nelmek isteyen -ve bundan dolay\u0131 BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi (UNSC)\u2019nin daimi \u00fcyelerinden biri oldu\u011funu her platformda vurgulayan- \u00c7in, bir d\u00fcnya devleti olabilmek i\u00e7in Rusya ile geli\u015ftirdi\u011fi stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgeleri ile ticari ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmekte ve b\u00f6lgesel projelerin yap\u0131m\u0131na da talip olmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u201c\u00c7in, ABD\u2019nin s\u00fcreklili\u011fini sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u2018Amerikan de\u011ferlerinin kabul edildi\u011fi, hukuksal, ekonomik, siyasal ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel boyutlar\u0131 Amerikan de\u011ferlerine g\u00f6re \u00e7izilmi\u015f tek kutuplu d\u00fcnyan\u0131n yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f ortam\u0131\u2019 olarak \u00f6zetlenebilecek Pax Americana fikrine kar\u015f\u0131 durabilmek i\u00e7in, SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 sonras\u0131 s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 kimli\u011fini kaybeden Rusya Federasyonu ile stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011fa y\u00f6nelmektedir.\u201d\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00c7in – Rusya \u0130li\u015fkileri 19.y\u00fczy\u0131ldan ba\u015flayarak Rusya-\u00c7in ili\u015fkileri k\u00fclt\u00fcrel farkl\u0131l\u0131k, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 g\u00fcvensizlik ve s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 gerginlik i\u00e7inde olmu\u015ftur. (4) II. D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 ABD\u2019nin anti-kom\u00fcnist politikas\u0131, 1 Ekim 1949\u2019da kurulan \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti ile SSCB aras\u0131nda i\u015fbirli\u011finin geli\u015fmesine neden olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda olu\u015fturulan Savunma Pakt\u0131 1950-1961 aras\u0131nda ge\u00e7erli olmu\u015ftur. (5) Ancak, 1950\u2019lerin sonlar\u0131nda ortak s\u0131n\u0131r ve ideolojik kaynakl\u0131 sorunlar nedeniyle iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiler gerginle\u015fmi\u015ftir. (6) 1959\u2019da iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda y\u00fckselmeye ba\u015flayan gerilim, Mart 1969\u2019da ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan s\u0131n\u0131r \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 ile doru\u011fa ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (7)<\/p>\n Bu durum, anti-kom\u00fcnist bir politikadan anti-sovyet politikaya y\u00f6nelen ABD ile \u00c7in ili\u015fkilerinin geli\u015fmesine ve ABD\u2019nin SSCB\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 \u201c\u00c7in kart\u0131\u201d<\/em><\/strong>n\u0131 <\/em> kullanmaya ba\u015flamas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. B\u00f6ylece, 1949-1971 aras\u0131ndaki ABD-\u00c7in d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yerini, 1971-1989 aras\u0131ndaki Anti-Sovyet Stratejik Ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/em><\/strong>\u2019na b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n ABD\u2019nin \u201c\u00c7in Kart\u0131\u201dndan rahats\u0131z olan Sovyet liderleri 1980\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda \u00c7in ile ili\u015fkilerin normalle\u015ftirilmesine karar vermi\u015flerdi. 1982\u2019de Brejnev\u2019in \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnden \u00f6nce s\u0131n\u0131r ticaret ve s\u0131n\u0131r sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmesi i\u00e7in iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Temmuz 1986\u2019da Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un Vladivostok\u2019da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada, \u00c7in ile SSCB aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin normalle\u015fmesini istedi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131, iki \u00fclkenin yeniden yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (8) 1978\u2019de \u00c7in Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Deng \u015eiaoping\u2019in ekonomik reformlar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girmesiyle \u00fclkeye giren Bat\u0131 kaynakl\u0131 yabanc\u0131 sermayenin, 1989 Tiananmen Meydan\u0131 olaylar\u0131 sonras\u0131 askeri teknoloji konusunda i\u015fbirli\u011fini durdurmas\u0131 \u00c7in-SSCB ili\u015fkilerini daha da yak\u0131nla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. May\u0131s 1989\u2019da Gorba\u00e7ov Beijing (Pekin)\u2019e giderek ortak s\u0131n\u0131r sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmesi ve silahs\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00fczerine g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (9) 1989\u2019da Deng\u2019in \u201cge\u00e7mi\u015fin bitirilip gelece\u011fe a\u00e7\u0131n\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d<\/em> a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 ile devam eden bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 i\u00e7inde, Haziran 1990\u2019da \u00c7in Genelkurmay Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Amiral Liu Huaqing\u2019in Moskova\u2019y\u0131 ziyareti sonras\u0131 1990-1992 y\u0131llar\u0131nda Sovyet a\u011f\u0131r silahlar\u0131 \u00c7in taraf\u0131ndan sat\u0131n al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (10) SSCB\u2019nin 1991\u2019de da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 ile Moskova\u2019n\u0131n s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 kimli\u011fini de yitirmesini ve Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan, Tacikistan\u2019\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile 4.300 km. uzunlu\u011fundaki \u00c7in-SSCB s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n k\u0131salmas\u0131n\u0131 de\u011ferlendiren \u00c7in, ABD kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na yak\u0131nla\u015farak bir denge politikas\u0131na y\u00f6nelmi\u015f ve ABD\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 \u201cRus kart\u0131\u201d<\/strong>n\u0131 kullanmaya haz\u0131rlanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n 1989\u2019da \u00c7in Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 olan ve 2002\u2019ye kadar bu g\u00f6revini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecek olan Jiang Zemin, \u00c7in\u2019in de\u011fi\u015fen Moskova politikas\u0131n\u0131 \u201cge\u00e7mi\u015fi bitirip gelece\u011fe bakmak gerekir\u201d s\u00f6zleri ile ifade etmi\u015ftir. Kas\u0131m 1992\u2019de G\u00fcney Kore ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda Yeltsin,\u201cBat\u0131 Avrupa ve ABD n\u00fcfuzu i\u00e7inde bulunan Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesine y\u00f6nelik Rus siyasetinin ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (11) Aral\u0131k 1992\u2019de ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen Yeltsin\u2019in ilk \u00c7in ziyaretinde de \u201cbirbirine dost, bar\u0131\u015f i\u00e7inde ya\u015famak\u201d d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesi bir kural olarak kabul edilirken, Yeltsin \u00c7in\u2019e silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7in de s\u00f6z vermi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Bu s\u00f6z \u00fczerine, A\u011fustos 1992\u2019de \u00c7in Savunma Bakan\u0131 Qin Jiwel Moskova\u2019y\u0131 ziyaret etmi\u015f ve iki ay sonra Ekim\u2019de Rusya Savunma Bakan\u0131 Birinci Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Andrey Koko\u015fin Beijing\u2019de \u201c\u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Aras\u0131nda Askeri Teknoloji \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u201dn\u0131 imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (12)<\/p>\n Ocak 1994\u2019de Yeltsin\u2019in \u201cyap\u0131c\u0131 ortakl\u0131k <\/strong>fikrinin 21. yy.\u2019da gerekli oldu\u011funu\u201d\u00a0 belirtti\u011fi mektubu Beijing\u2019e g\u00f6t\u00fcren D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 A. Kozirev, \u201ckar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 g\u00fcven, BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nde i\u015fbirli\u011fi, ortak ticaret hacminin b\u00fcy\u00fclt\u00fclmesi ve ekonomik i\u015fbirli\u011fi temellerine dayanan yap\u0131c\u0131 ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n kurulmas\u0131n\u0131\u201d istiyordu. (13) 1994\u2019de iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda \u201cN\u00fckleer F\u00fczeleri Birbirlerine Kar\u015f\u0131 Hedef Yapmama ve N\u00fckleer G\u00fcc\u00fc \u0130lk Kullanan \u00dclke Olmama\u201d \u00fczerine iki anla\u015fma da imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Eyl\u00fcl 1994\u2019de Zemin\u2019in Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ilk defa ziyaretinden sonra, Nisan 1996\u2019da Yeltsin tekrar \u00c7in\u2019i ziyaret etmi\u015f ve bu ziyaret s\u0131ras\u0131nda yap\u0131c\u0131 ortakl\u0131k i\u00e7inde bulunan iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda stratejik ortakl\u0131k<\/strong> kurulmas\u0131na karar verilmi\u015ftir. (14) Taktik de\u011fil stratejik bir birliktelik olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclen stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n ard\u0131ndan iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda 100\u2019\u00fcn \u00fczerinde anla\u015fma imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (15) Zemin\u2019in \u201ctarihi anlam\u0131 olan bir karar\u201d olarak nitelendirdi\u011fi stratejik ortakl\u0131k\u00a0 s\u00fcreci i\u00e7inde, ilk \u00f6nce SSCB d\u00f6neminde iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki en b\u00fcy\u00fck sorun olan -Mo\u011folistan\u2019\u0131n do\u011fusu ile bat\u0131s\u0131nda bulunan- ortak s\u0131n\u0131r \u00fczerindeki anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne y\u00f6nelinmi\u015ftir. Yeni devletlerin (Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan, Tacikistan) ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 ile k\u0131salan ortak s\u0131n\u0131r, potansiyel \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma alanlar\u0131n\u0131n da daralmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. (16) Kas\u0131m 1997\u2019de ortak s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n do\u011fu kesimi ve 1998\u2019de s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n bat\u0131 kesimi, imzalanan anla\u015fmalarla kesinle\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. S\u0131n\u0131r sorununun ortadan kalkmas\u0131yla, 1996 anla\u015fmas\u0131yla \u00e7er\u00e7evesi belirlenen ve stratejik ortakl\u0131k temeline oturtulan \u00c7in-Rusya ili\u015fkileri politik, k\u00fclt\u00fcrel, e\u011fitim, turizm, y\u00fcksek teknoloji, ekonomi, askeri, n\u00fckleer enerji alanlar\u0131nda i\u015fbirli\u011fine y\u00f6nelinerek ad\u0131m ad\u0131m geli\u015fmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f ve 7 milyar dolar olan ortak d\u0131\u015f ticaret hacminin 20 milyar dolara \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 hedeflenmi\u015ftir. (17)<\/p>\n \u201cNisan 1996\u2019da Yeltsin\u2019in \u00c7in\u2019i ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda yap\u0131c\u0131 ortakl\u0131k i\u00e7inde bulunan iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda stratejik ortakl\u0131k kurulmas\u0131na karar verilmi\u015ftir.\u201d<\/p>\n Mart 2000\u2019de Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 olan Putin\u2019de iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki stratejik ortakl\u0131k ili\u015fkisinin s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclmesini ve geli\u015ftirilmesini desteklemi\u015ftir. Bu nedenle, Eyl\u00fcl 2000\u2019de \u00c7in Meclis Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Lipeng\u2019in Moskova ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda \u00c7in-Rusya aras\u0131ndaki stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 vurgulayan dostluk anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fmaya g\u00f6re, \u201c\u00c7in ile Rusya aras\u0131ndaki ideolojik ve sistem farkl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131, ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015ftirilmesi i\u00e7in bir engel olmayacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n Her t\u00fcrl\u00fc ikili ili\u015fkiler e\u015fitlik, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 yarar, bar\u0131\u015f i\u00e7inde birlikte ya\u015fama temelinde geli\u015ftirilecektir. \u00c7\u0131kar \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 olmayan iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda anla\u015fmazl\u0131k \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 durumunda, anla\u015fmazl\u0131k g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler s\u00fcreciyle, bar\u0131\u015f yoluyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenecektir. \u0130ki \u00fclkede n\u00fckleer silahlar\u0131 ilk kullanan taraf olmayacaklard\u0131r. BM G\u00fcvenlik Kurulu\u2019nun iki \u00fcyesi olan \u00c7in ve Rusya, ortak \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkilerde ortak hareket edecek ve d\u00fcnya bar\u0131\u015f\u0131na katk\u0131da bulunacakt\u0131r\u201d. (18) S\u00f6z konusu anla\u015fmada, \u00c7in-Rusya stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n m\u00fcttefiklik ili\u015fkisi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve askeri y\u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fcn bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131, sadece iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin ele\u015ftirilmesine y\u00f6nelik oldu\u011fu vurgulanmakla birlikte, iki \u00fclkenin ortak \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkilerde ortak hareket edilece\u011finin ve d\u00fcnya bar\u0131\u015f\u0131na katk\u0131da bulunulaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n vurgulanmas\u0131, ABD\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 alanda tek ba\u015f\u0131na hareket etmesini k\u0131s\u0131tlamak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesinin var oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesini uyand\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. 1999\u2019da ABD\u2019nin \u00f6nc\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde NATO\u2019nun Kosova\u2019ya m\u00fcdahalesine ve Yugoslavya\u2019y\u0131 bombalamas\u0131na \u00c7in ile Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tepki g\u00f6stermesi ve iki \u00fclkenin ortak a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131nda \u201cABD\u2019nin kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 f\u00fcze savunma sistemine kar\u015f\u0131 olundu\u011funun ve tek kutuplu d\u00fcnya yarat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n kabul edilemeyece\u011finin belirtilmesi\u201d ABD\u2019nin potansiyel tehdit olarak alg\u0131land\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 do\u011frulamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u00c7in-Rusya \u0130li\u015fkilerinin Kuzey Kafkasya Boyutu K\u00fcreselle\u015fmenin \u201ddemokratikle\u015fme\u201dye \u00f6nem vermesi ve bu boyut kapsam\u0131nda insan haklar\u0131n\u0131n etnik boyutuna ayr\u0131 bir de\u011fer vermesi, ulus devletlerin egemenlik haklar\u0131n\u0131n giderek k\u0131s\u0131tlanmas\u0131, Do\u011fu T\u00fcrkistan (Sinjiang-Uygur), Tibet, \u0130\u00e7 Mo\u011folistan ve Tayvan ile sorunlar\u0131 bulunan \u00c7in\u2019i rahats\u0131z etmektedir. Bat\u0131 kaynakl\u0131 insan haklar\u0131 anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 birle\u015ftirici de\u011fil par\u00e7alay\u0131c\u0131 bulan \u00c7in\u2019e g\u00f6re, \u201c\u0130nsan haklar\u0131 bireysel de\u011fil kolektiftir. Birey ile devlet kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya gelirse, kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131lan olay bireyseldir, b\u00fct\u00fcn toplumu kapsayamaz. \u0130nsan haklar\u0131n\u0131n evrensel boyutlar\u0131 yan\u0131nda yerel boyutlar\u0131 da vard\u0131r. Her \u00fclke i\u00e7in insan haklar\u0131n\u0131n farkl\u0131 yorumlar\u0131 olabilir. Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n insan haklar\u0131n\u0131 bir devletin egemenli\u011finin \u00fcst\u00fcnde tutularak o \u00fclkenin i\u00e7i\u015flerine kar\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 kabul edilemez bir yakla\u015f\u0131md\u0131r\u201d (19) Ayr\u0131ca, \u00c7in D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Qian Qi\u00e7en Eyl\u00fcl 1992\u2019de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir Parti i\u00e7i konu\u015fmas\u0131nda, \u201cABD\u2019nin hegemonik e\u011filimleri ve di\u011fer devletlerin i\u00e7i\u015flerine kar\u0131\u015fmaya yeltenmesi Sosyalist \u00c7in i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck bir tehlikedir. Washington, \u00c7in\u2019in Japonya, Rusya, G\u00fcney Kore ve di\u011fer kom\u015fular\u0131yla ili\u015fkilerini bask\u0131 alt\u0131nda tutmaktad\u0131r\u201d demi\u015ftir. (20)<\/p>\n \u201c\u0130nsan haklar\u0131n\u0131 kendi bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan de\u011ferlendiren \u00c7in, II.\u00c7e\u00e7enya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131 ve \u00c7e\u00e7en soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 \u201cher \u00fclke i\u00e7in insan haklar\u0131n\u0131n farkl\u0131 yorumlanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi\u201d ilkesi i\u00e7inde yorumlamakta, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n i\u00e7i\u015fi olarak g\u00f6rmekte ve bu soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 insan haklar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan sorgulamamaktad\u0131r.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n \u0130nsan haklar\u0131n\u0131 kendi bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan de\u011ferlendiren \u00c7in, II.\u00c7e\u00e7enya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131 ve \u00c7e\u00e7en soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 \u201cher \u00fclke i\u00e7in insan haklar\u0131n\u0131n farkl\u0131 yorumlanmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi\u201d ilkesi i\u00e7inde yorumlamakta, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n i\u00e7i\u015fi olarak g\u00f6rmekte ve bu soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 insan haklar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan sorgulamamaktad\u0131r. Bu nedenle \u00c7in, Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131 Rusya Federasyonu i\u00e7inde de\u011ferlendirmekte ve bu b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik bir politika geli\u015ftirmemektedir.<\/p>\n Temmuz 2000\u2019de yap\u0131lan \u00c7in-Rusya g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinde de silahs\u0131zlanma, BM reformlar\u0131, insan haklar\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fclm\u00fc\u015f, radikal dini ak\u0131mlara, uluslararas\u0131 ter\u00f6rizme ve b\u00f6l\u00fcc\u00fc ak\u0131mlara kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131k\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ortak hareket edilmesi karar\u0131 al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece, iki \u00fclkede topraklar\u0131nda olan veya olabilecek ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k hareketlerini \u201cdinci, ter\u00f6rist, b\u00f6l\u00fcc\u00fc\u201d olarak su\u00e7layabilecek yeni bir zemin olu\u015fturmu\u015flard\u0131r. \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti, stratejik orta\u011f\u0131 olan Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fcn korunmas\u0131 \u00fczerine politikalar\u0131n\u0131 belirlemi\u015f, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131na destek veren ve \u00c7e\u00e7enya sorununda Rus yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir tav\u0131r i\u00e7ine giren bir politika benimsemi\u015ftir. \u00c7in\u2019in bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131na g\u00f6re, \u00c7e\u00e7enya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun par\u00e7alanmas\u0131, Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n ABD n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131 i\u00e7ine girmesine yol a\u00e7ar ve bu geli\u015fme \u00c7in\u2019in aleyhine olacakt\u0131r. \u00c7e\u00e7enleri Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun istikrar\u0131n\u0131 bozan, radikal dinci, organize su\u00e7lara destek veren bir ba\u015fa\u011fr\u0131s\u0131 halk olarak g\u00f6ren \u00c7in, \u201cKafkasya\u2019n\u0131n (21) b\u00fcy\u00fck devletlerin d\u00fcnyay\u0131 yeniden stratejik payla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n XXI.y\u00fczy\u0131l merkezi oldu\u011funu\u201d d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmektedir.<\/p>\n Pekin h\u00fck\u00fcmetine yak\u0131n bir gazete olan \u00c7in Gen\u00e7leri<\/strong>\u2019nin 25 Ekim 1999 tarihli yorumuna g\u00f6re, \u201c\u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti, Do\u011fu, Avrupa, \u0130slam ve Slav uygarl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n bulu\u015ftu\u011fu yer olan ve d\u00fcnyan\u0131n s\u0131cak \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma b\u00f6lgesi Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131, Avrasya k\u0131tas\u0131n\u0131n kalbi ve Avrupa\u2019y\u0131 Asya\u2019ya ba\u011flayan d\u00fcnya ge\u00e7iti olarak g\u00f6rmektedir. \u00c7in\u2019e g\u00f6re, Kafkasya\u2019ya egemen olan b\u00fct\u00fcn d\u00fcnyaya egemen olacakt\u0131r. Bu nedenlerden dolay\u0131 Kafkasya, \u0130ran ve Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun b\u00f6lgedeki n\u00fcfuzunu azaltmaya y\u00f6nelik bir politika i\u00e7inde olan ABD\u2019nin ilgisini \u00e7ekmi\u015f ve ABD\u2019nin d\u0131\u015f siyasetini belirleyen en \u00f6nemli b\u00f6lgelerden biri durumuna gelmi\u015ftir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de, ABD ile Rusya b\u00f6lgede g\u00fc\u00e7 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 i\u00e7indeyken Kafkasya ile olan tarihi, geleneksel, k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ili\u015fkilerini ve co\u011frafi avantajlar\u0131n\u0131 kullanarak h\u0131zl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde kendi g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc artt\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece T\u00fcrkiye, Kafkasya\u2019da Osmanl\u0131 devrindeki g\u00fcc\u00fcne kavu\u015fmay\u0131 ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. Avrupa Birli\u011fi devletleri de b\u00f6lge devletleri ile ekonomik ili\u015fkileri geli\u015ftirmeyi ve enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n boru hatlar\u0131yla Avrupa\u2019ya aktar\u0131m\u0131 \u00fczerinde durmaktad\u0131r. \u00c7e\u00e7enya, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n birli\u011fine tehdit olu\u015fturmu\u015ftur ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n gerek Kafkasya ve gerek Orta Asya\u2019daki n\u00fcfuzunu etkilemeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcn gayretine ra\u011fmen, Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019da n\u00fcfuzunun sars\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nleyememi\u015ftir ve Rusya i\u00e7in yeni bir tehlike olmu\u015ftur. Da\u011f\u0131stan, \u0130ngu\u015fetya ve \u00c7e\u00e7enya\u2019da ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131l\u0131k faaliyetlerini y\u00fcr\u00fcten ve \u0130slami radikalizmin g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi i\u00e7in \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan Vahabi tarikat\u0131 b\u00f6lgeyi tamamen Rusya\u2019dan koparmay\u0131 ve \u0130slami bir devlet kurmay\u0131 ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. Da\u011f\u0131stan olaylar\u0131 ve \u00c7e\u00e7enya sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n tekrar\u0131 bu b\u00f6lgede sava\u015flar\u0131n bitmeyece\u011fini ve devam edece\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir. Da\u011f\u0131stan\u2019\u0131n kaybedilmesi ve \u00c7e\u00e7enya\u2019daki sava\u015ftan daha da vahimdir. Domino teorisinde oldu\u011fu gibi Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015febilir\u201d. (22)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00c7in-G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u0130li\u015fkileri \u00c7in, Kuzey ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in ayr\u0131 politikalar uygulamaktad\u0131r. Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun do\u011fu b\u00f6lgeleri d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda Rusya topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinde \u00f6zel bir \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131 olmayan \u00c7in, Kuzey Kafkasya \u00fczerinde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n belirledi\u011fi \u00e7izgi d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda bir politika geli\u015ftirmemektedir. Ancak, Kuzey Kafkasya ile ilgilenmeyen \u00c7in\u2019in G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya ilgisi giderek artmaktad\u0131r. Bunun ba\u015fl\u0131ca iki nedeni vard\u0131r:<\/p>\n \u201cBat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n -ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin- G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan\u2019a \u00f6ncelik vermesinden dolay\u0131 \u00c7in, b\u00f6lgede Rusya ile birlikte Ermenistan ve \u0130ran\u2019a \u00f6ncelik vermektedir.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n 19 Nisan 2000\u2019de \u00c7in Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Jiang Zemin\u2019in T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi ziyarette, \u00c7in\u2019in Yeni G\u00fcney Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131n ayak izlerine rastlamak m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmu\u015ftur. \u00c7in ve T\u00fcrkiye \u00e7e\u015fitli konular yan\u0131nda, Kars-Tiflis Demiryolu projesi \u00fczerine de i\u015fbirli\u011fi yap\u0131lmas\u0131 ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00c7in\u2019den 100 adet lokomotif sat\u0131n almas\u0131 \u00fczerine anla\u015fma imzalam\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. (23)<\/p>\n \u00c7in, Ermenistan ile ekonomik ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in ad\u0131mlar atmaktad\u0131r. Bu ama\u00e7la, 26 Nisan 2000\u2019de \u00c7in\u2019in Erivan B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi Jao \u015eun Ermenistan Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Aram Sargisyan ile bir toplant\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. S\u00f6zkonusu toplant\u0131da, BDT\u2019nin en b\u00fcy\u00fck kau\u00e7uk-lastik \u00fcretim tesislerine sahip olan Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Nairit firmas\u0131 ile \u00c7in\u2019in kimya sanayisi temsilcilerinin i\u015fbirli\u011fi talepleri ele al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (24) \u00c7in ayn\u0131 ay i\u00e7inde, Kafkasya\u2019daki b\u00f6lgesel projelere talip olmaya devam etmi\u015ftir. Erivan\u2019a giden \u00c7in\u2019in Uanbao Engineering firmas\u0131 Ermenistan Enerji, Maliye ve Ekonomi Bakanlar\u0131 ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler de \u0130ran-Ermenistan\u00a0 aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lmas\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclen do\u011falgaz boru hatt\u0131n\u0131 120 milyon dolar krediyi temin ederek in\u015fa etmek istedi\u011fini belirtmi\u015ftir. (25) \u00c7in, May\u0131s 1999\u2019da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n izni ve yard\u0131m\u0131yla Ermenistan\u2019a 60-80 km menzilli 8 adet \u201cTayfun\u201d f\u00fczesi de satm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (26) 3 Haziran\u2019da Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n bu durumu nota ile protesto etmesi sonras\u0131, \u00c7in Halk Kongresi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Lee Pen\u2019in Do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkelerini kapsayan 11-26 Haziran 2000 tarihli gezisi kapsam\u0131nda, 22 Haziran\u2019da\u00a0 ziyaret etti\u011fi Azerbaycan\u2019da \u201c\u00c7in\u2019in\u00a0 Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ve toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnden yana oldu\u011funu ve Azerbaycan\u2019la aktif i\u015fbirli\u011fini istediklerini\u201d belirterek Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 k\u00fcst\u00fcrmemeye \u00f6zen g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. (27)<\/p>\n Ancak, Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n deste\u011fini alan ve BDT i\u00e7inde Moskova\u2019n\u0131n bulunmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 tek \u00f6rg\u00fctlenme olan GUUAM\u2019a (G\u00fcrcistan, Ukrayna, \u00d6zbekistan, Azerbaycan, Moldova) kar\u015f\u0131 G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Ermenistan ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 desteklemesi politikas\u0131n\u0131, \u00c7in ve Yunanistan\u2019\u0131n da benimsedi\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. (28)\u00a0 \u00c7in\u2019in G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n tamamen Bat\u0131 kontrol\u00fcne girmesinden rahats\u0131z olmas\u0131 ve Yunanistan\u2019\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki artan etkinli\u011fini k\u0131rmak ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi \u00e7evrelemek politikas\u0131na \u00f6nem vermesi, bu iki \u00fclkeyi G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da Rusya ile ayn\u0131 cephede bulu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u00c7in D\u0131\u015f Ticaret ve Ekonomi Bakan\u0131 Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Keren Ju, 12 Haziran 2000\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda E. \u015eevardnadze ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 toplant\u0131da \u201c\u00c7in\u2019in G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n kalk\u0131nmas\u0131 i\u00e7in gereken \u00e7abay\u0131 g\u00f6stermeye haz\u0131r oldu\u011funu, Kaheti vilayetinde yap\u0131lmas\u0131 planlanan hidroelektrik baraj\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6ncelikle in\u015fa edilmesine, \u015eevardnadze\u2019nin iste\u011fi \u00fczerine Avrupa\u2019ya ihracat\u0131 hedefleyecek \u015fekilde bir ayd\u0131nlatma-ampul entegre tesisinin kurulmas\u0131na s\u0131cak bakt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a 375 bin dolar yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. G\u00fcrcistan Ba\u015fbakan\u0131 Giorgi Arseni\u015fvili ile de g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fen Ju, \u201ck\u00f6m\u00fcr sanayisi \u00fczerine i\u015fbirli\u011fini, ileti\u015fim ve ula\u015f\u0131m alanlar\u0131nda ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015ftirilmesini\u201d ele alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (29)<\/p>\n Ju\u2019nun ziyareti sonras\u0131, A\u011fustos\u2019ta G\u00fcrcistan Parlamento Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Zurab Jvanya ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda bir milletvekili heyeti \u00c7in\u2019e gitmi\u015f ve Eyl\u00fcl\u2019de Tsai U. Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndaki \u00c7in Kom\u00fcnist Partisi Uluslararas\u0131 ili\u015fkiler b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnden bir heyet G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 ziyaret etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n \u00c7in\u2019in G\u00fcney Kafkasya politikas\u0131 Rusya ile paralel olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, Rusya\u2019dan farkl\u0131 olarak G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc desteklemektedir. Bu da Abhazya ile olan sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 BM arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile \u00e7\u00f6zmek isteyen G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7in \u00f6nemlidir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc \u00c7in, ayn\u0131 zamanda BM G\u00fcvenlik Konseyinin be\u015f daimi \u00fcyesinden biridir. (30)<\/p>\n \u00c7in, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019la ili\u015fkilerini\u00a0 daha \u00e7ok ekonomik alanda geli\u015ftirmeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmektedir. Keren Ju, Z. Jvaniya, Tsai U.\u2019nun ziyaretinde daha \u00e7ok ekonomik alanda i\u015fbirli\u011fi yap\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ticaretin geli\u015ftirilmesi vurgulanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Z. Jvaniya \u00c7in ziyaretini de\u011ferlendirirken \u201cikili\u00a0 ticaret ili\u015fkilerine olumlu etkisini umut etti\u011fini\u201d dile getirmi\u015ftir. (31) Tsai U. Tifis\u2019de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada \u201chem b\u00f6lgeyle, hem de Avrupa Pazar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik ortak giri\u015fimlerle ilgili olduklar\u0131n\u0131, ayr\u0131ca G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden yap\u0131lacak petrol ta\u015f\u0131mac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131na da kat\u0131lmak arzusunu ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131\u201d dile getirmi\u015ftir (32)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sonu\u00e7<\/strong><\/p>\n SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131ndan sonra belirginle\u015fen ABD\u2019nin yaratmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 Pax Americana\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131, 1990\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndan ba\u015flayarak \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu \u00f6zellikle \u00fclkeleri i\u00e7in stratejik \u00f6nemde olan b\u00f6lgelerde g\u00fc\u00e7 birli\u011fine y\u00f6nelmektedirler. S\u00f6z konusu bu y\u00f6neli\u015fle birlikte iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda olu\u015fan stratejik ortakl\u0131k, Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde ve eski SSCB n\u00fcfuzu alt\u0131nda olup g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Bat\u0131\u2019ya do\u011fru kayan Do\u011fu ve G\u00fcneydo\u011fu Avrupa (Balkanlar ve Kafkasya)\u2019da g\u00fcvenlik ve istikrar\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131nda iki \u00fclkenin birbirine yard\u0131mc\u0131 olmas\u0131 \u015feklinde geli\u015fmektedir. Nitekim bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 i\u00e7inde, \u00c7in i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde Rusya \u00c7in\u2019e destek verirken, Rusya i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan G\u00fcneydo\u011fu Avrupa\u2019da \u00c7in Rusya\u2019ya destek vermeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde g\u00fc\u00e7lenmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan \u00c7in\u2019e askeri teknoloji ve silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131; \u00c7in\u2019in Balkanlarda NATO\u2019nun Kosova m\u00fcdahalesine ve Yugoslavya\u2019y\u0131 bombalamas\u0131na Rusya ile birlikte kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131, II. \u00c7e\u00e7enya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n i\u00e7i\u015fi olarak de\u011ferlendirmesi, G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n artan etkinli\u011fi ve azalan Rus n\u00fcfuzuna kar\u015f\u0131 Rusya ile birlikte Ermenistan ve \u0130ran ile ili\u015fkilerini \u00f6ncelikli olarak geli\u015ftirme \u00e7abalar\u0131 \u00c7in-Rusya stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n yans\u0131malar\u0131 olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (33)<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201c\u00c7in-Rusya stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan dolay\u0131, \u00c7in madalyonun iki y\u00fcz\u00fc gibi Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n kuzey ve g\u00fcneyi i\u00e7in farkl\u0131 politikalar benimsemektedir.\u201d<\/p>\n \u00c7in-Rusya stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan dolay\u0131, \u00c7in madalyonun iki y\u00fcz\u00fc gibi Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n kuzey ve g\u00fcneyi i\u00e7in farkl\u0131 politikalar benimsemektedir. Yak\u0131n d\u00f6nemde, \u00c7in\u2019in Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131 Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun i\u00e7i\u015fleri g\u00f6rmeye devam etmesi, G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da ekonomik i\u00e7erikli projelere talip olmas\u0131, ticari ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmek istemesi ve Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n artan etkinli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 Ermenistan ve \u0130ran ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda somut ad\u0131mlar atmas\u0131 beklenmemelidir. Uzun d\u00f6nemde ise, Rusya do\u011fu b\u00f6lgelerinin ekonomik, etnik ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel olarak s\u00fcrekli olarak \u00c7in\u2019e do\u011fru kaymas\u0131na sonsuza kadar seyirci kalamayacakt\u0131r. Bu nedenle, \u00c7in\u2019in Rusya\u2019n\u0131n do\u011fu b\u00f6lgelerinde artan etkinli\u011finin \u00c7in-Rus ili\u015fkilerini tekrar gerginle\u015ftirmesi halinde, s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 aday\u0131\u00a0 \u00c7in\u2019in Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131 tekrar g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irmesi beklenmelidir.<\/p>\n D\u0130PNOTLAR<\/p>\n 1) \u00c7in, 1,236 milyar n\u00fcfusu (1997) ile d\u00fcnya n\u00fcfusunun % 22\u2019sine, 9.561.000 km y\u00fcz\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcm\u00fc ile d\u00fcnya y\u00fcz\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn % 6,4\u2019\u00fcne sahiptir. D\u00fcnyan\u0131n en kalabal\u0131k \u00fclkesi olan \u00c7in, Rusya ve Kanada\u2019dan sonra d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck y\u00fcz\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcm\u00fcne sahiptir. \u00c7in Kom\u00fcnist Partisi 1992\u2019de 14. Ulusal Kongresi\u2019nde \u201cSosyalist Piyasa Ekonomisi\u201d<\/em>ne ge\u00e7i\u015fi kabul etmi\u015ftir. IMF\u2019e g\u00f6re, 1994-1998 aras\u0131nda d\u00fcnya ekonomisi % 3,6 oran\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fcrken, \u00c7in ekonomisi % 9,86 b\u00fcy\u00fcm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Ayr\u0131ca, The World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers\u2019e (1996) g\u00f6re, 1991-1995 aras\u0131nda \u00c7in\u2019in askeri harcamalar\u0131 y\u0131lda % 2,8 oran\u0131nda artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 1 Temmuz 1997\u2019de Hong-Kong\u2019un \u00c7in\u2019e dahil olmas\u0131ndan sonra \u00c7in\u2019in d\u00fcnya ekonomisi \u00fczerindeki etkisi daha da artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde sanayi devrimi ya\u015fayan \u00c7in\u2019in GSY\u0130H\u2019s\u0131 902 milyar $ (1997), ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na GSY\u0130H 733 $ (1997), ihracat\u0131 (1998) 183,8 milyar $, ithalat\u0131 (1998) 140,2 milyar $\u2019dir.<\/p>\n (http:\/\/www.igeme.org.tr\/TUR\/foyler\/ulke\/cin\/Cin1.htm; \u00c7in<\/em>, Yeni Y\u0131ld\u0131z Yay\u0131nevi, ISBN 7-80102-728-0, Pekin 1997, s. 1; T. Clifton Morgan-Glenn Pamer, Chinese Foreign Policy in the 21st<\/sup> Century: Insight from the Two-Good Theory, http: \/\/ www.rice.edu\/projects\/baker\/Pubs\/BakerPub\/publications, s. 9, 11). (http:\/\/www.igeme.org.tr\/TUR\/foyler\/ulke\/cin\/cin4.htm; \u00c7in\u2019in \u2018ayr\u0131cal\u0131kl\u0131 \u00fclkesi\u2019 olduk, 20.04.2000, H\u00fcrriyet<\/em>, \u0130stanbul). The Caucasus Racing for arms, The Economist Web Sitesi:<\/em><\/p>\n http:\/\/ www.economist.com\/archive\/view.cgi?action=viewarticle&filenan Hasan Kanbolat – Kamil Ağacam Çin, 21.yüzyılda süper güç olmaya yönelmektedir. Bu nedenle tek kutuplu dünya oluşumuna karşı Rusya ile stratejik ortaklık kurmuştur. Çin, Kuzey ve Güney Kafkasya için ayrı politikalar uygulamaktadır. Rusya Federasyonu’nun doğu bölgeleri dışında Rusya toprakları üzerinde özel bir çıkarı olmayan Çin, Kuzey Kafkasya üzerinde Rusya’nın belirlediği çizgi dışında bir politika geliştirmemektedir. 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\n2) T. Clifton Morgan-Glenn Pamer, Chinese Foreign Policy in the 21st<\/sup> Century: Insight from the Two-Good Theory, s. 3.
\n3) \u00c7in, Japonya\u2019n\u0131n arkas\u0131ndan ABD\u2019nin ikinci b\u00fcy\u00fck ithalat\u00e7\u0131 \u00fclkesidir. ABD\u2019nin \u00c7in\u2019den ithalat\u0131 1996\u2019da % 17 b\u00fcy\u00fcyerek 39,5 milyar dolara ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (Stanley B. Weeks, Charles A. Meconis, The Armed Forces of the USA in the Asia-Pasific Region<\/em>, I.B. Tauris Publishers, ISBN 1 86064 498 8, 1999, London, s. 48).
\n4) Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>International Inst\u0131tute For Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 315,1997, Londra, ISBN 0-19-829427-1,s. 7.
\n4) \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti ile SSCB aras\u0131ndaki Savunma Pakt\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde Temmuz 1960\u2019da binlerce Sovyet teknisyeni ve uzman\u0131 \u00c7in\u2019e gitmi\u015ftir (Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India, <\/em>http: \/\/ www.idsa-india.org\/ an-Jul-100.html.)
\n6) \u00c7in Halk Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin \u00e7ok az say\u0131da m\u00fcttefiki olmu\u015ftur. 1961\u2019de Kuzey Kore ile Savunma Pakt\u0131 ve 1960\u2019da Guineya, Afganistan, Burma ile, 1961\u2019de Ga8na ile, 1965\u2019de Tanzaniya ile, 1978\u2019de Japonya ile \u0130kili Tarafs\u0131zl\u0131k Pakt\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girmi\u015ftir. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Hindistan tehditi alt\u0131ndaki Pakistan ile Vietnam tehditi alt\u0131ndaki Laos \u00c7in\u2019in yeni m\u00fcttefikleri olarak ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. 1950\u2019lerin ortalar\u0131nda ba\u015flayan SSCB-Hindistan yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131 ve 1965 ile 1971 Hindistan-Pakistan sava\u015flar\u0131 Pakistan\u2019\u0131 \u00c7in\u2019e do\u011fru y\u00f6neltmi\u015ftir (T. Clifton Morgan-Glenn Pamer, Chinese Foreign Policy in the 21st<\/sup> Century: Insight from the Two-Good Theory, s. 10,11; Jyotsna Bakshi, Russian Policy Towards South Asia, <\/em>http: \/\/ www.idsa-india.org\/ an-nov9-9.html.)
\n7) Japon Denizi\u2019ne d\u00f6k\u00fclen Ussuri nehiri \u00fczerindeki 175 km2 b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcndeki \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck Ussuri\u201d<\/em> adas\u0131, Mart 1969\u2019da iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda\u00a0 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya neden olmu\u015ftur. \u00c7in-SSCB geriliminden dolay\u0131, 1965-1985 aras\u0131nda SSCB, Orta Asya, Sibirya ve Uzak Do\u011fu\u2019da bulunan Sovyet askerlerinin say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 170 binden 500 bine \u00e7\u0131karm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca n\u00fckleer f\u00fcze ve u\u00e7aklar\u0131 i\u00e7eren pasifik donanmas\u0131n\u0131 b\u00f6lgede bulundurmu\u015ftur. Ancak bu durum, SSCB\u2019nin ekonomik \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn nedenlerinden biri olmu\u015ftur. (Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 14, 43; Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India<\/em>).
\n8) Gorba\u00e7ov, SSCB\u2019nin \u00c7in s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 yak\u0131n\u0131nda ve Japon Denizi k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131nda bulunan Vladivostok\u2019da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin normalle\u015ftirilmesi i\u00e7in 1) Afganistan ve Mo\u011folistan\u2019da bulunan Sovyet askerlerinin azalt\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131, 2) \u00c7in-Vietnam ili\u015fkilerinin normalle\u015ftirilmesini destekleyece\u011fini, 3) \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki s\u0131n\u0131r sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 hukuk \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmesini kabul etti\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 14).
\n9) Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un Beijing g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri sonras\u0131 SSCB D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 E. \u015eevardnadze 120 bini do\u011frudan \u00c7in\u2019i hedef alan toplam 250 bin Sovyet askerinin uzak do\u011fu s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131ndan \u00e7ekilece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. !990\u2019dan ba\u015flayarak \u00c7in s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131ndan \u00e7ekilen birlikler do\u011fu Avrupa ve Urallara kayd\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (You Ji, The Armed Forced of <\/em>China, I.B. Tauris Publishers, ISBN 1 86064 499 6, 1999, London, s. 205; Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 14).
\n10) Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India; <\/em>Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 13.
\n11) Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 18.
\n12) Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131nda nazlanmamas\u0131n\u0131n nedenlerinden biri de Rusya\u2019da bulunan 1.600 savunma sanayi tesisinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan 2 milyon ki\u015fiye i\u015f olana\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamakt\u0131r. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131, 1950\u2019li y\u0131llar\u0131n Sovyet silah teknolojisine sahip olan kaplan\u0131n \u00f6zg\u00fcrlemesine<\/em><\/strong> neden olmaktad\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda Ekim 1992\u2019de imzalanan \u201cAskeri Teknoloji \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u201d, Rus silahlar\u0131n\u0131n lisans anla\u015fmas\u0131 ile \u00c7in\u2019de \u00fcretilmesini, \u00c7in savunma personelinin Rusya\u2019da e\u011fitimini, Rus savunma uzmanlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019de \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 da kapsamaktad\u0131r. Bu anla\u015fma \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde 4000\u2019in \u00fczerinde Rus savunma uzman\u0131 ve teknisyeni \u00c7in\u2019de \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. \u00c7in savunma personelinin de Rusya\u2019da e\u011fitimi ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f, n\u00fckleer enerji ve denizalt\u0131 teknolojisi alanlar\u0131nda da i\u015fbirli\u011fine gidilmi\u015ftir. 1991-2000 aras\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n de\u011feri 7 milyar dolard\u0131r. 1999\u2019da Rusya, 1\u00a0 milyar dolar kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Tifon s\u0131n\u0131f\u0131 iki n\u00fckleer denizalt\u0131y\u0131 \u00c7in\u2019e satm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India).<\/em>
\n13) Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 18.
\n14) J. Anderson\u2019a g\u00f6re \u201ciki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki strtejik ortakl\u0131k, Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde yeni bir g\u00fcvenlik mekanizmas\u0131 olu\u015fturmay\u0131 ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede artan etkinli\u011fine kar\u015f\u0131 bir g\u00fc\u00e7 birli\u011fi olu\u015fturmak iste\u011fi iki \u00fclkeyi birbirine yak\u0131nla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Stratejik ortakl\u0131k sonras\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7in\u2019e askeri teknoloji ve silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n nedeni de Asya-pasifik b\u00f6lgesinde istikrar ve g\u00fcvenli\u011fin \u00c7in ve Rusya taraf\u0131ndan sa\u011flanmak iste\u011fidir\u201d (Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 10.).
\n15) Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 7.
\n16) 1991 ve 1992 y\u0131llar\u0131nda s\u0131n\u0131r sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlenmesi i\u00e7in ilk anla\u015fmalar imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u015eubat 1992\u2019de \u201c4+1\u201d<\/em> olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan \u00c7in ile eski Sovyet s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturan Rusya, Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan ve Tacikistan aras\u0131nda ortak s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n silahs\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00fczerine g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 15).
\n17) Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India<\/em>; Uluslararas\u0131 Stratejik Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc\u2019nden General Cao\u2019nun \u201c21. Y\u00fczy\u0131lda \u00c7in-Rus Stratejik Ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u201d<\/em> \u00fczerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fma, 20.09.2000, ASAM, Ankara
\n18) General Cao, \u201c21. Y\u00fczy\u0131lda \u00c7in-Rus Stratejik Ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u201d.<\/em>
\n19) Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia-China Military-Technical Cooperation: \u0130mplications For India<\/em>; Uluslararas\u0131 Stratejik Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc\u2019nden Ara\u015ft\u0131rmac\u0131 L\u00fc Dehun\u2019un \u201cK\u00fcreselle\u015fme ve \u0130nsan Haklar\u0131\u201d<\/em> \u00fczerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fma, 19.09.2000, ASAM, Ankara).
\n20) Jennifer Anderson, The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership, <\/em>s. 19.
\n21) \u00c7ince de Kuzey Kafkasya \u201c\u0130\u00e7 Kafkasya\u201d<\/em>, G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u201cD\u0131\u015f Kafkasya\u201d<\/em> olarak nitelendirilmektedir.
\n22) Ma-y\u00fc-j\u00fcn (\u00c7in \u00c7a\u011fda\u015f Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkileri Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Kurumu uzman\u0131), Ar \u015fi yi \u015fi ji jiao li Gao jia suo, (XXI. Y\u00fczy\u0131lda Kafkasya\u2019da \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar), Jung-guo \u00e7ing-nian bao (\u00c7in Gen\u00e7leri gazetesi),<\/em> 25.10.1999, Pekin).
\n23) \u00c7in-T\u00fcrkiye ili\u015fkileri 1990\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llarda alt\u0131n y\u0131llar\u0131n\u0131 ya\u015famaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki d\u0131\u015f ticaret hacmi 1988\u2019de 330.558 $ iken 1998\u2019de 884.234 $\u2019a \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak, 1998\u2019de T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin 38.043 $ ihracat\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n, \u00c7in\u2019den 846.191 $ ithalat\u0131 g\u00f6z\u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131n\u0131rsa T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00c7in mallar\u0131n\u0131n pazar\u0131 durumuna geldi\u011fi g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir. Bu nedenle iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ya\u015fanan alt\u0131n y\u0131llar yaln\u0131zca \u00c7in i\u00e7in ge\u00e7erlidir.<\/p>\n
\n24) MEDIAMAX, Erivan, 27.04.2000.
\n25) Ermenistan ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda 1992 ve 1995\u2019de imzalanan anla\u015fmalarla iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda do\u011falgaz boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n yap\u0131lmas\u0131 kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Me\u011fri\u2019den (Ermenistan) Kajaran\u2019a (\u0130ran) kadar d\u00f6\u015fenecek olan toplam 140 km olan bu do\u011falgaz hatt\u0131n\u0131n 100 km.\u2019si \u0130ran ve 40 km.\u2019si Ermenistan\u2019dan ge\u00e7ecektir. Yunanistan\u2019da bu projenin yap\u0131m\u0131nda yer almak istemektedir. MED\u0130AMAX, Erivan, 21.04.2000, 18.05.2000, 15.06.2000.
\n26) http:\/\/www.president.az\/azerbaijan\/nk\/conf3.htm;<\/p>\n
\n27) G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da G\u00fcrcistan, Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n 280 km. menzilli, 985 kg. a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 Rus yap\u0131m\u0131 Scud-B <\/em><\/strong>f\u00fczeleri bulunmaktad\u0131r. \u00c7in\u2019in Ermenistan\u2019a f\u00fcze sat\u0131\u015f\u0131, G\u00fcney Kafkasya Cumhuriyetleri aras\u0131ndaki f\u00fcze dengesini Ermenistan lehine bozmaktad\u0131r. (Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic <\/em>Stability, The \u0130nternational \u0130nstitute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 334, 2000, Londra, ISBN 0-19-929004-0, Appendix 1, s. 75, 76;http:\/\/www.president.az\/azerbaijan\/nk\/conf3.htm.
\n28) Ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bilgi i\u00e7in bkz: Hasan Kanbolat \u2013 G\u00f6k\u00e7en Ekici, 21. Y\u00fczy\u0131l Ba\u015f\u0131nda Kafkasya\u2019da \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Aray\u0131\u015flar\u0131 ve Ekonomik Boyutlar\u0131, Jeo Ekonomi,<\/em> Cilt: 2, Say\u0131: 2-3, Yaz-Sonbahar 2000, ISSN: 1302-261X, Ankara, s. 31-37.
\n29) Sarke Ajans\u0131<\/em>, Tiflis, 13.06.2000; The Georgian Times<\/em>, 20.06.2000, Tiflis.
\n30) G\u00fcrcistan Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 E. \u015eevardnadze, bu konuyu \u00c7in Kom\u00fcnist Partisi heyetinin Eyl\u00fcl 2000\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda yapt\u0131klar\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeden sonra dile getirmi\u015ftir. (The Georgian Times<\/em>, 25.09.2000).
\n31) The Georgian Times<\/em>, 21.08.2000, Tiflis
\n32) http:\/\/194.190.223.241\/shtml\/html\/news\/content.htm?newsid=632&lang=2
\n33) Revaz Ga\u00e7e\u00e7iladze, The Making of The New Georgia: Development Factors-Pluses and M\u0131nuses, <\/em>Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol.3, Issue 1, 1998, http:\/\/ poli.vub.ac.be\/puli\/crs\/eng\/0301-03.htm. Tiflis \u00dcniversitesi profes\u00f6r\u00fc ve 1998\u2019den beri G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n \u0130srail B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi olan R. Ga\u00e7e\u00e7iladz<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"