![](\"http:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/cc-turkiye\/z-2013-Images-2\/067.JPG\")
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Kamil A\u011facan G\u00fcney Kafkasya alt sistemi, Rusya Federasyonu, T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran gibi \u00fc\u00e7 b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7le \u00e7evrelenmi\u015f ir g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm arz etmektedir.<\/p>\n Tarihin \u00f6nemli bir kesitini, s\u00f6z konusu \u00fc\u00e7 b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fcc\u00fcn selefi olan imparatorluklar\u0131n egemenli\u011fi alt\u0131nda ge\u00e7iren Kafkasya, 1991 sonras\u0131 da bu \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclke aras\u0131nda rekabete sahne olmaya devam etmektedir. ABD ve AB gibi b\u00f6lge d\u0131\u015f\u0131 k\u00fcresel g\u00fc\u00e7lerin de kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu rekabette \u0130ran \u00f6nemli oyunculardan birisidir.<\/p>\n Son d\u00f6nemde, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olma \u00e7abas\u0131na ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak bir gerginlik ya\u015fanmaktad\u0131r. Bu gerginli\u011fin nas\u0131l sonu\u00e7lanaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u015fimdiden kestirmek \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7t\u00fcr. Ama ister n\u00fckleer bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olsun, ister n\u00fckleer \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 durdurulmu\u015f olsun, her iki halde de \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n gelece\u011fi Kafkasya\u2019da ya\u015fanan bu rekabeti ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla b\u00f6lgenin gelece\u011fini do\u011frudan etkileyecektir.<\/p>\n Kafkasya\u2019daki yans\u0131malar\u0131ndan \u00e7ok, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131n genel \u00e7er\u00e7evesine odaklanmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u00d6ncelikle Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn \u0130ran i\u00e7in do\u011furdu\u011fu f\u0131rsatlar ve tehditler \u00fczerinde durulacak, ard\u0131ndan \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131n odakland\u0131\u011f\u0131 Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019la ili\u015fkilerinin genel seyri ele al\u0131nacakt\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n kapsam d\u0131\u015f\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131, bu \u00fclkenin \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir yer tutmamas\u0131ndan ileri gelmektedir. S\u0131n\u0131rda\u015f olmayan bu iki \u00fclke ili\u015fkileri s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 d\u00fczeyde, e\u015fitler aras\u0131 ili\u015fki olarak s\u00fcrmektedir.<\/p>\n F\u0131rsatlar Penceresi<\/strong><\/p>\n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc \u0130ran a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan k\u0131smen olumlu k\u0131smen olumsuz, ama her hal\u00fckarda \u00f6nemli sonu\u00e7lar do\u011furmu\u015ftur. Her \u015feyden \u00f6nce, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n son \u00fc\u00e7 y\u00fczy\u0131ll\u0131k tarihinde, Tahran\u2019\u0131n tehdit kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda gelen Rusya ile do\u011frudan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 ortadan kalkm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (1) Rusya\u2019n\u0131n yerini s\u0131n\u0131r kom\u015fusu olarak, \u0130ran\u2019la k\u0131yaslanamayacak kadar k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00fclkeler olan, bat\u0131dan do\u011fuya olmak \u00fczere Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkmenistan alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc ayn\u0131 zamanda materyalizmle m\u00fccadelede dinin zaferi olarak Tahran\u2019da memnuniyetle kar\u015f\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Dini rehber Humeyni\u2019nin adeta bu zaferi kutlarcas\u0131na Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019a g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi ve materyalizmi yeren, dinin de\u011ferini anlatan mektubu bu memnuniyetin en \u00fcst d\u00fczeyde ifadesi idi.<\/p>\n \u0130ran, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya\u2019da yeni devletlerin ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u201culuslararas\u0131 yaln\u0131zl\u0131ktan kurtulmak i\u00e7in bir f\u0131rsat\u201d (2) olarak g\u00f6rmenin \u00f6tesinde, n\u00fcfuzunu artt\u0131rabilece\u011fi yeni etkinlik alan\u0131 olarak alg\u0131lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (3) Fars milliyet\u00e7isi \u00e7evrelerin heyecan\u0131 ise daha b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fc. Bu \u00e7evreler, \u201cRusya taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgal edilerek \u0130ran\u2019dan kopar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f\u201d bu b\u00f6lgelerin yeniden \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelece\u011fi ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fcfuzuna girece\u011fi beklentisindeydi. (4) \u0130hti\u015faml\u0131 Fars \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu hayallerini \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131\u015ft\u0131ran \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck \u0130ran\u201d (\u0130ran-i bozorg) terimi yeniden kullan\u0131lmaya ba\u015fland\u0131. (5) Bu \u00f6zlem sadece, bas\u0131nla, kimi \u00e7evrelerle s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalmad\u0131. Ayn\u0131 zamanda baz\u0131 \u0130ranl\u0131 yetkililer de bu heyecana kap\u0131larak, \u201ctarihi \u0130ran topra\u011f\u0131\u201d olan Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin \u0130ran\u2019la birle\u015fmesini\/birle\u015ftirilmesini g\u00fcndeme getirdiler. (6)<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019da etkin olma arzular\u0131n\u0131 besleyen ve Tahran i\u00e7in avantaj gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnen \u00fc\u00e7 temel etken vard\u0131. Bu etkenler; \u0130slam, tarih ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel miras\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n co\u011frafi konumu idi. Kom\u00fcnizmin iflas\u0131 b\u00f6lgede ideolojik bo\u015fluk do\u011furmu\u015ftu. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yeni kazanan M\u00fcsl\u00fcman toplumlarda \u0130slam dininin bu bo\u015flu\u011fu dolduraca\u011f\u0131 kanaati hem \u0130ran\u2019da hem de Bat\u0131\u2019da g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fcyd\u00fc. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019daki yeni siyasal olu\u015fumlara kar\u015f\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u201ck\u00f6kten dincilik\u201d karalamas\u0131 da bu kanaatlerin olu\u015fumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren bir unsur oldu. K\u0131smen bu propagandan\u0131n etkisiyle, \u0130ran\u2019daki baz\u0131 yetkililer Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019ne kar\u015f\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019da s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclen m\u00fccadelenin dinsel bir nitelik ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131yordu. (7) \u00dcstelik Azerbaycan n\u00fcfusunun y\u00fczde 65\u2019i \u015eii idi. \u0130ran bu olguyu bir f\u0131rsat olarak de\u011ferlendirip devrim ihrac\u0131na y\u00f6nelik yo\u011fun bir propaganda ba\u015flatt\u0131. Tahran\u2019da haz\u0131rlanm\u0131\u015f, \u0130slam Devrimi\u2019ni \u00f6ven gazete, dergi, kitap ve di\u011fer propaganda malzemeleri Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n de\u011fi\u015fik b\u00f6lgelerinde da\u011f\u0131t\u0131lmaya ba\u015fland\u0131. Hatta, Tahran bununla da yetinmeyerek Baku\u2019de birka\u00e7 gazete ve dergi \u00e7\u0131karmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. (8)<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n teokratik rejimiyle, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yeni kazanan M\u00fcsl\u00fcman devletler i\u00e7in model olu\u015fturaca\u011f\u0131 endi\u015fesini ta\u015f\u0131yan Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkeler, buna engel olmak i\u00e7in laik \u201cT\u00fcrkiye modelini\u201d \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131kararak bunu desteklediler. Zaten k\u0131sa s\u00fcrede Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n mezhep taassubunu a\u015fm\u0131\u015f sek\u00fcler bir toplum oldu\u011fu anla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131. \u00dcstelik \u0130ran kaynakl\u0131 dini propagandan\u0131n fazla taraftar bulmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc. Ancak \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n faaliyetlerini bu da durdurmad\u0131. \u0130ran g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde yukar\u0131da hedefleri \u00f6zetlenen \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmektedir. Fakat, ge\u00e7en zaman zarf\u0131nda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n etkili oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenemez.<\/p>\n Bug\u00fcn Azerbaycan \u00f6zelinde, \u201c\u0130slam\u2019\u0131n y\u00fckseli\u015fi\u201d retori\u011fini g\u00f6zlemlemek m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. B\u00f6yle bir y\u00fckseli\u015fin boyutlar\u0131 tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 olmakla birlikte, s\u00f6z konusu trentte \u0130ran kaynakl\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n rol\u00fc s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan\u2019da \u0130slam\u2019\u0131n y\u00fckseli\u015fi olarak de\u011ferlendirilen olgunun \u00e7ekirde\u011fini dine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn ola\u011fan s\u00fcreci olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. S\u00fcreci g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren ve siyasalla\u015ft\u0131ran d\u00f6rt temel etken vard\u0131r. Birincisi, Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkelerin Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131 i\u015fgali konusunda tak\u0131nd\u0131klar\u0131 tutumdur. \u00d6zellikle ayd\u0131nlar aras\u0131nda \u201cBu hakl\u0131 davada Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n kendilerine s\u0131rf T\u00fcrk ve M\u00fcsl\u00fcman olduklar\u0131 i\u00e7in destek vermedi\u011fi\u201d kanaati her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn g\u00fc\u00e7lenmektedir.<\/p>\n \u0130kincisi, misyonerlik \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131d\u0131r. Misyonerlik \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131, bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n hedefi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ters etki yaparak daha fazla insan\u0131n \u0130slam\u2019a y\u00f6nelmesi sonucunu do\u011furmaktad\u0131r. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fcs\u00fc, \u00fclkedeki sosyoekonomik durum ve sorunlard\u0131r. Son etken ise, \u0130ran, Vahabi ve T\u00fcrkiye kaynakl\u0131 \u00e7evrelerin s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalard\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u0130ran, \u015eiilik konusunda oldu\u011fu gibi, ortak tarih ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel miras\u0131n kendisine etkinlik sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131 yan\u0131lg\u0131s\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. \u0130ran bu konuda ilk darbeyi alfabe konusunda alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k s\u00fcreci ile birlikte Azerbaycan\u2019da Kiril alfabesinden Latin alfabesine ge\u00e7i\u015f g\u00fcndeme gelmi\u015ftir. \u0130ran, tercihin Arap alfabesinden yana olmas\u0131 i\u00e7in yo\u011fun bir kampanya s\u00fcrd\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015f, fakat ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019da etkin olmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7abilecek \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc etken ise co\u011frafi konumudur. \u0130ran Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 Rafsancani, \u00fclkesinin bu avantaj\u0131n\u0131 \u015eubat 1992\u2019de yeni ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazanan cumhuriyetlerin Ekonomik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Te\u015fkilat\u0131\u2019na (ECO) \u00fcyeli\u011fi nedeniyle yap\u0131lan bas\u0131n toplant\u0131s\u0131nda \u015fu s\u00f6zlerle ifade etmi\u015ftir: \u201cHaritada g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi \u0130ran, ECO \u00fclkelerini bir birine ba\u011flayan bir konumdad\u0131r. Kuzey-G\u00fcney, Do\u011fu-Bat\u0131, yeni \u00fclkeler-Avrupa, Avrupa-Asya do\u011frultusundaki b\u00fct\u00fcn petrol ve do\u011fal gaz boru hatlar\u0131, demiryollar\u0131, ileti\u015fim hatlar\u0131 ve uluslar aras\u0131 havayolu ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131 \u0130ran \u00fczerinden olmal\u0131d\u0131r\u201d. (9)<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n co\u011frafi konumu \u00fc\u00e7 a\u00e7\u0131dan avantajl\u0131yd\u0131. Birincisi, ikili ticari ili\u015fkiler i\u00e7in sundu\u011fu f\u0131rsatlard\u0131.<\/p>\n Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k sonras\u0131 G\u00fcney Kafkasya cumhuriyetleri, ekonomik zorluklarla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nde, merkez\u00ee planlama ve cumhuriyetler aras\u0131 ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011fa dayanan ekonomik bir sistem mevcuttu. Bu nedenle SSCB\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyle sistem fel\u00e7 olmu\u015ftu. B\u00f6ylece, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k s\u00fcreciyle birlikte b\u00f6lge ekonomisi \u015fiddetli bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f d\u00f6nemine girmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n kazan\u0131lmas\u0131yla eski emir-kumanda sistemi ortadan kalkm\u0131\u015f, liberal piyasa ekonomisine ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u00fcreci ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ekonomik d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm\u00fcn getirdi\u011fi yap\u0131sal sorunlara bir de etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarla bunlar\u0131n do\u011furdu\u011fu istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k ve belirsizlik eklenmi\u015fti. Sava\u015flar sonunda ekonomik altyap\u0131 tahrip olmu\u015f, \u00fcretim adeta durmu\u015ftu. B\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 takiben temel gereksinimlerini b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde d\u0131\u015f ticaretle kar\u015f\u0131lamaktayd\u0131. Ancak b\u00f6yle bir ortamda, co\u011frafi avantaj\u0131na ra\u011fmen \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n G\u00fcney Kafkasya cumhuriyetleri ile ticari ili\u015fkileri kayda de\u011fer bir geli\u015fim g\u00f6sterememi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Bir taraftan \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r\u00fc T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r\u00fc ile rekabet edememi\u015f, di\u011fer taraftan da fiyatlar\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen kalitenin de d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck olmas\u0131 nedeniyle b\u00f6lge halklar\u0131 \u0130ran mallar\u0131na ra\u011fbet etmemi\u015ftir. \u00d6yle ki, \u201c\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n kalitesi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck mallar\u0131, ayn\u0131 kalitedeki \u00c7in mallar\u0131yla bile rekabet edememi\u015ftir\u201d. (10) 2006 y\u0131l\u0131nda Azerbaycan\u2019la \u0130ran aras\u0131ndaki d\u0131\u015f ticaret hacmi 381,8 milyon dolar olarak ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir ki, bu da Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f ticaretinin y\u00fczde 3,3\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. (11) Ayn\u0131 tablo \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019la olan d\u0131\u015f ticaretinde de g\u00f6zlenmektedir. 2004 y\u0131l\u0131nda iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki d\u0131\u015f ticaret hacmi yakla\u015f\u0131k 20 milyon dolar iken son iki y\u0131lda y\u00fczde y\u00fczl\u00fck art\u0131\u015f ya\u015fanmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k 2006\u2019da ancak 43 milyon dolara ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (12) Ayn\u0131 \u015fekilde, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f ticaretinde de \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zel bir a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6zlenmemektedir.<\/p>\n 2004 y\u0131l\u0131nda Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ihracat\u0131nda \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n pay\u0131 y\u00fczde 3,9; ithalat\u0131nda y\u00fczde 5,4 iken, 2005\u2019te de bu rakam y\u00fczde 3, ithalat\u0131nda da y\u00fczde 6 olarak ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. (13) Sonu\u00e7 olarak co\u011frafi avantaj, ikili ticari ili\u015fkiler konusunda beklenen sonucu vermemi\u015ftir. \u0130kincisi, co\u011frafi konumunun \u0130ran\u2019a bu cumhuriyetlerin d\u00fcnyaya a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in sundu\u011fu k\u00f6pr\u00fc olma f\u0131rsat\u0131yd\u0131.<\/p>\n Nitekim G\u00fcrcistan hari\u00e7, di\u011fer iki Kafkasya cumhuriyeti karasal s\u0131n\u0131rlara s\u0131k\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f bir jeopoliti\u011fe sahiptir. Fakat, \u0130ran bu avantaj\u0131n\u0131 da kullanamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkistan\u2019a uzanan T\u00fcrkiye-G\u00fcrcistan-Azerbaycan g\u00fczerg\u00e2h\u0131, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya\u2019n\u0131n d\u00fcnyaya a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayan ba\u015fl\u0131ca g\u00fczerg\u00e2ha d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmektedir.<\/p>\n \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc olarak, \u0130ran, Hazar havzas\u0131 enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 piyasalara ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda co\u011frafi konumundan faydalanmak istemi\u015ftir. Hazar havzas\u0131 enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u0130ran \u00fczerinden Basra K\u00f6rfezi\u2019ne ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 baz\u0131 petrol \u015firketleri de desteklemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n \u00d6zellikle \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n kendisinin de enerji kaynaklar\u0131na sahip olmas\u0131, de\u011fi\u015f-toku\u015f (swap) olana\u011f\u0131 sa\u011flayarak ta\u015f\u0131nma maliyetlerini \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrebilirdi. Fakat, ABD\u2019nin kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 nedeniyle \u0130ran hem Hazar havzas\u0131 enerji konsorsiyumlar\u0131nda yeterince kendisine yer bulamad\u0131 hem de g\u00fczerg\u00e2h olma f\u0131rsat\u0131n\u0131 ka\u00e7\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6kmesi sonucunda ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 yeni kazanan Kafkasya cumhuriyetlerinde etkinli\u011fini sa\u011flayacak f\u0131rsatlar vard\u0131. Fakat yap\u0131sal sorunlar\u0131 olan rejimin niteli\u011fi, \u00fclke i\u00e7indeki T\u00fcrklere uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 k\u00fclt\u00fcrel bask\u0131 ve ABD\u2019yle ili\u015fkileri, etkinli\u011finin s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. \u201cEkonomik\/stratejik \u00e7abalar\u0131 politik etkinlik seviyesine ula\u015famam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u2019\u2019. (14)<\/p>\n Yeni Tehditler<\/strong><\/p>\n \u0130ran, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6kmesinin a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 f\u0131rsatlar penceresi kapan\u0131rken Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesinden ba\u015fl\u0131ca iki tehdit alg\u0131lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Birincisi, G\u00fcney Azerbaycan\u2019dan kaynaklanan etnik nitelikli tehdittir.<\/p>\n \u0130kincisi de, b\u00f6lgenin Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131 haline d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesidir.<\/p>\n G\u00fcney Azerbaycan<\/strong><\/p>\n \u0130ran bir\u00e7ok etnik grubu bar\u0131nd\u0131ran bir \u00fclkedir ve sisteme h\u00e2kim olan Farslar\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, \u00f6nemli oranda<\/p>\n T\u00fcrk, K\u00fcrt, Arap ve Belu\u00e7 n\u00fcfus bar\u0131nd\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. N\u00fcfusun etnik da\u011f\u0131l\u0131m\u0131na ili\u015fkin sa\u011fl\u0131kl\u0131 ve g\u00fcncel veriler bulmak imkans\u0131z oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in, \u015eah d\u00f6neminde yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve etnik aidiyeti de yans\u0131tan n\u00fcfus say\u0131m sonu\u00e7lar\u0131ndan hareketle baz\u0131 tahminlerde bulunulmaktad\u0131r. Bu tahminlere g\u00f6re \u0130ran n\u00fcfusunun en az y\u00fczde 50\u2019sinin Fars olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 iddia Kapak Konusu <\/strong><\/p>\n Buna g\u00f6re, Farslar\u0131n ard\u0131ndan ikinci s\u0131rada T\u00fcrkler er almaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran\u2019daki T\u00fcrk n\u00fcfusun a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc Azerbaycan T\u00fcrkleri ile T\u00fcrkmenistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131ndaki T\u00fcrkmenler olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin n\u00fcfuslar\u0131na ili\u015fkin veriler de farkl\u0131l\u0131k arz etmektedir. Kimi hesaplamalarda Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n genel n\u00fcfusunun y\u00fczde 24\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc olu\u015fturdu\u011funu ileri s\u00fcr\u00fcl\u00fcrken, di\u011ferlerinde bu rakam y\u00fczde 33 olarak telaffuz edilmektedir. (16) G\u00fcney Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin ileri gelenlerinin yayg\u0131n iddias\u0131 ise Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin n\u00fcfusunun 30 milyona yakla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcndedir. Ayn\u0131 durum T\u00fcrkmenler i\u00e7in de ge\u00e7erlidir. T\u00fcrkmen n\u00fcfusunun 1,5-2 milyon aras\u0131nda oldu\u011fu tahmin edilmektedir. Azerbaycan T\u00fcrkleri mutlak \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu olu\u015fturduklar\u0131 Bat\u0131 Azerbaycan, Do\u011fu Azerbaycan, Erdebil, Zencan, Hamedan ve Kazvin vilayetlerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra ba\u015fkent Tahran\u2019da ve di\u011fer b\u00f6lgelerde ya\u015famaktad\u0131rlar. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede Azerbaycan cumhuriyeti \u201cKuzey Azerbaycan\u201d, \u0130ran\u2019da Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131 b\u00f6lgeler ise \u201cG\u00fcney Azerbaycan\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n 20. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131na kadar \u0130ran taht\u0131nda Safavi, Af\u015far ve Ka\u00e7ar gibi T\u00fcrk hanedanlar h\u00fck\u00fcm s\u00fcr\u00fcyordu. 1925 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u0130ngilizlerin ve Ruslar\u0131n deste\u011fi ile tahta \u00e7\u0131kan R\u0131za Pehlevi, Farsl\u0131l\u0131k temelinde devleti yeniden in\u015fa etmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede \u00fclkedeki b\u00fct\u00fcn T\u00fcrkler ve Azerbaycan T\u00fcrkleri yo\u011fun k\u00fclt\u00fcrel bask\u0131 alt\u0131na al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrk\u00e7e ad ve Kapak Konusu soyadlar yasaklanm\u0131\u015f, yer isimleri Fars\u00e7ala\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrklerin Ari \u0130ran \u0131rk\u0131na mensup Azerilerin soyundan geldikleri, Sel\u00e7uklu ve Mo\u011fol d\u00f6nemlerinde T\u00fcrkle\u015ftikleri gibi g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler ortaya at\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrk n\u00fcfusa kar\u015f\u0131 bu muamele \u0130slam Devrimi\u2019yle birlikte \u015fekil de\u011fi\u015ftirerek g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze kadar s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Tahran y\u00f6netiminin bask\u0131lar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 olarak da Azerbaycan T\u00fcrklerinin zaman zaman milli istekleri do\u011frultusunda ayakland\u0131klar\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bu durum G\u00fcney Azerbaycan b\u00f6lgesini Tahran i\u00e7in potansiyel bir tehdit kayna\u011f\u0131na \u00e7evirmi\u015ftir\u201d. (17) B\u00f6yle bir ortamda, \u201cKuzey Azerbaycan\u201dda Azerbaycan cumhuriyetinin do\u011fmas\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019da b\u00fcy\u00fck bir tedirginli\u011fe yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u201cKuzey Azerbaycan\u201ddaki milli harekat\u0131n \u201cG\u00fcney Azerbaycan s\u00f6ylemi\u201d, bu tedirginli\u011fi iyiden iyiye artt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u0130ran, bu tehdidi bertaraf etmek i\u00e7in iki y\u00f6nl\u00fc bir politika uygulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bir taraftan Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 etki alan\u0131na almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken, di\u011fer taraftan da Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin \u0130ran\u2019daki T\u00fcrk n\u00fcfusu d\u00fczerindeki etkisini s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (18) Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede Baku\u2019n\u00fcn bir \u00e7ekim merkezine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmemesi i\u00e7in bir taraftan Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni i\u00e7eride istikrars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 politikalara y\u00f6neltmi\u015f, di\u011fer taraftan, Azerbaycan\u2019la sava\u015fta Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 destekleyerek Baku\u2019n\u00fcn g\u00fc\u00e7s\u00fcz d\u00fc\u015fmesini ama\u00e7lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130ran, Karaba\u011f sava\u015f\u0131nda Ermenistan\u2019a ekonomik ve enerji yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra asker\u00ee destek de vermi\u015ftir. (19) Baku\u2019n\u00fcn s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 politikas\u0131n\u0131n ayaklar\u0131ndan birini de, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Hazar\u2019\u0131n hukuki stat\u00fcs\u00fcne ili\u015fkin tutumu olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. (20)<\/p>\n Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n N\u00fcfuz Alan\u0131na D\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesi \u0130ran a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ikinci tehdit, b\u00f6lgenin Bat\u0131\u2019n\u0131n n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131 haline d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmesidir. Bu nedenle \u0130ran, Bat\u0131 etkisine kar\u015f\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019daki etkinli\u011fini desteklemi\u015ftir. Rusya ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde b\u00f6lgede kendine yer edinmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (21) Bu durumda, Tahran\u2019\u0131n, bir taraftan Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n arka bah\u00e7esi olarak g\u00f6rmesi, di\u011fer taraftan da Azerbaycan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 desteklemesi, ili\u015fkinin Moskova-Erivan ittifak\u0131 olarak eklemle\u015fmesi sonucunu do\u011furmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n m\u00fcttefiki olarak Bat\u0131\u2019ya mesafeli duran Ermenistan, bu tutumuyla \u0130ran i\u00e7in sorun olu\u015fturmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Bat\u0131 merkezli bir politika izlemesini Tahran tedirginlikle izlemekte ve Baku\u2019ye Bat\u0131 ile ili\u015fkilerini s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 tutmas\u0131 konusunda bask\u0131 uygulamaktad\u0131r. <\/p>\n Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019la \u0130li\u015fkilerin Genel Seyri<\/strong><\/p>\n Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan itibaren \u0130ran-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri genel olarak gerginli\u011fini korumu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n \u201cG\u00fcney Azerbaycan\u201d meselesine ve Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin Bat\u0131\u2019yla ili\u015fkilerine ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak bu gerginlik artmakta veya azalmaktad\u0131r. \u0130ki \u00fclke ili\u015fkileri bu a\u00e7\u0131dan d\u00f6nemsel olarak s\u0131n\u0131fland\u0131r\u0131labilir. Ayaz Mutallibov\u2019un devlet ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6neminde ili\u015fkiler g\u00f6reli olarak sakin ge\u00e7mi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Mutallibov\u2019un halktan kopuk, Moskova\u2019ya sad\u0131k bir isim ve alternatifinin El\u00e7ibey liderli\u011findeki Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi olmas\u0131, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131nda etkili olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ran, Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi\u2019nin iktidara gelmesini \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in Mutallibov\u2019u desteklemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n El\u00e7ibey liderli\u011findeki Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi\u2019nin iktidara gelmesi ile iki \u00fclke ili\u015fkileri gergin bir y\u0131l ge\u00e7irmi\u015ftir. El\u00e7ibey\u2019in T\u00fcrk\u00e7\u00fc s\u00f6ylemi, \u201cG\u00fcney Azerbaycan\u201d konusundaki hassasiyeti ve Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 politikas\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 tedirgin etmi\u015ftir. Halk Cephesi iktidar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen darbede Moskova ile birlikte hareket etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Haydar Aliyev\u2019in iktidara gelmesi ile ikili ili\u015fkilerde g\u00f6reli bir yumu\u015fama ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Aliyev, \u0130ran\u2019a Tal\u0131\u015f Deniz Petrol Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019nda y\u00fczde 10\u2019luk bir pay vermenin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, hem Moskova\u2019ya hem de Tahran\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 bir politika izlemi\u015ftir. Fakat bu iyile\u015fme uzun s\u00fcrmemi\u015ftir. Aliyev\u2019in 1994\u2019te Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkelerle \u201cAsr\u0131n Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u201d olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lan petrol anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 imzalamas\u0131n\u0131 takiben Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir politikaya y\u00f6nelmesiyle birlikte, \u0130ran-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri giderek gerginle\u015fmi\u015ftir. \u00d6zellikle 2001\u2019de Hazar\u2019daki Alov-Araz-\u015eark yataklar\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fletilmesi konusunda \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n dostane olmayan tutumu nedeniyle iki \u00fclke ili\u015fkilerindeki gerginlik zirve noktas\u0131na ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Di\u011fer taraftan, bir \u00e7eli\u015fki gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcnse de, 2003\u2019te \u0130lham Aliyev\u2019in iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte \u0130ran-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri yeniden bir yumu\u015fama d\u00f6nemine girmi\u015ftir. Bu konuda iki etken \u00f6nemli rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Birincisi, Baku\u2019deki olas\u0131 bir \u201crenkli devrim\u201din \u0130ran i\u00e7in yarataca\u011f\u0131 tedirginliktir.<\/p>\n \u0130kincisi ise, Aliyev y\u00f6netiminin denge politikas\u0131d\u0131r. \u0130ran, Azerbaycan\u2019la ya\u015fanan gerginli\u011fin Baku\u2019y\u00fc daha fazla Bat\u0131\u2019ya itmemesi i\u00e7in ihtiyatl\u0131 bir tutum tak\u0131nmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019la ili\u015fkileri ini\u015fli \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015fl\u0131 bir seyir konusu izlerken Ermenistan\u2019la ili\u015fkileri s\u00fcrekli bir geli\u015fme kaydetmi\u015ftir. Siyasi, iktisadi ve asker\u00ce ili\u015fkilerde mesafe katedilmi\u015ftir. Bunlar\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra \u0130ran-Ermenistan ili\u015fkilerinde n\u00fckleer \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar konusunda i\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00f6nemli yer tutmaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131na katk\u0131da bulundu\u011fu i\u00e7in ABD taraf\u0131ndan May\u0131s 2002\u2019de iki Ermeni \u015firketine kar\u015f\u0131 yapt\u0131r\u0131m karar\u0131 al\u0131nmas\u0131 dikkat \u00e7ekicidir.<\/p>\n Sonu\u00e7<\/strong><\/p>\n So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u2019\u0131n sona ermesinin ard\u0131ndan, Kafkasya\u2019da \u00fc\u00e7 yeni devletin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 \u0130ran i\u00e7in yeni bir ilgi oda\u011f\u0131 olmu\u015f ve Kafkasya\u2019da etkinlik alan\u0131 olu\u015fturmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Fakat, siyasi sistemi, \u00fclkesindeki T\u00fcrklere kar\u015f\u0131 bask\u0131c\u0131 tutumu ve ABD ile ili\u015fkileri nedeniyle b\u00f6lgeye n\u00fcfuz etme \u00e7abalar\u0131 ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015f, ili\u015fkileri s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Bu etkenlerde kayda de\u011fer bir de\u011fi\u015fiklik ya\u015fanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019da etkinlik sa\u011flamas\u0131 olanaks\u0131z g\u00f6z\u00fckmektedir. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131 iki konuya odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Birincisi, Azerbaycan Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni zay\u0131f d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmektir. Bu ba\u011flamda Azerbaycan\u2019la sava\u015fta Ermenistan\u2019a verdi\u011fi destek d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenemez. \u0130kincisi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n etkinli\u011fine destek olmakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, \u0130ran Kafkasya\u2019daki rekabette tamamlay\u0131c\u0131 bir akt\u00f6rd\u00fcr ve bu politikas\u0131 da ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015ftur. Nitekim Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019daki etkinli\u011finin Bat\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda eridi\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a g\u00f6zlemlenmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda ise, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndan itibaren Ankara\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgede bir rakip olarak alg\u0131lad\u0131\u011f\u0131 rahatl\u0131kla s\u00f6ylenebilir. \u0130ran ayr\u0131ca, gerek G\u00fcney Azerbaycan gerek ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgede artan n\u00fcfuzunu daima T\u00fcrkiye ba\u011flant\u0131l\u0131 tehditler olarak g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n Dipnotlar<\/p>\n 1)<\/strong> Abbas Maleki, \u201cIran and Turan: Apropos of Iran\u2019s Relations With Central Asia and The Caucasian Republics\u201d, Central Asia and The Caucasus, No. 5 (11), 2001, \u0130sve\u00e7, 89-97, s.95. Kamil Ağacan ASAM Kafkasya Uzmanı Güney Kafkasya alt sistemi, Rusya Federasyonu, Türkiye ve İran gibi üç bölgesel güçle çevrelenmiş ir görünüm arz etmektedir. Tarihin önemli bir kesitini, söz konusu üç bölgesel gücün selefi olan imparatorlukların egemenliği altında geçiren Kafkasya, 1991 sonrası da bu üç ülke arasında rekabete sahne olmaya devam etmektedir. ABD ve AB gibi […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"0","ocean_second_sidebar":"0","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"0","ocean_custom_header_template":"0","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"0","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"0","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"0","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"off","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10972","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-arastirma-ana-sayfa","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10972","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10972"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10972\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10974,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10972\/revisions\/10974"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10972"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10972"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10972"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\n<\/span><\/b>ASAM Kafkasya Uzman\u0131<\/span><\/p>\n
\nedilmektedir. (15) <\/p>\n
\n2)<\/strong> B\u00fclent Aras, \u201cAmerika-Orta Asya \u0130li\u015fkileri ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Konumu\u201d, Avrasya Dosyas\u0131, Cilt 5, No. 3, Sohbahar, 1999, ss. 225-243, s.238, Abbas Maleki, \u201cIran and Turan…\u201d, s.91.
\n3)<\/strong> Emre Bay\u0131r ve Araz Aslanl\u0131, \u201cTehdit Merkezli Bir D\u0131\u015f Politika: \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan Politikas\u0131\u201d, Stratejik Analiz, Cilt 2, No. 18, Ekim 2001, ss.47-56, s. 48. Oliver Roy, \u201c\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Orta Asya Politikas\u0131\u201d, 2023 Dergisi, Haziran 2002, ss.11-14, s.12.
\n4)<\/strong> Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, \u201cIran\u2019s Role as Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis\u201d, Bruno Coppieters (der.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Br\u00fcksel, VUBPRESS, 1996, ss.163-177, s. 68.
\n5)<\/strong> Fred Halliday, \u201cCondemned to React, Unable to Influence: Iran and Transcaucasia\u201d, John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Richard Schofield (der.), Transcasucasian Boundaries, New York, St. Martin\u2019s Press, 1996, ss. 71-88, s. 73.
\n6)<\/strong> Nesip Nesipli, \u201cAzerbaycan ve Moskova-Erivan-Tahran \u0130ttifak\u0131n\u0131n Jeopolitik Ku\u015fatmas\u0131\u201d, Stratejik Analiz, Cilt 1, No. 4, A\u011fustos 2000, ss.61-72, s. 70.
\n7)<\/strong> Emre Bay\u0131r ve Araz Aslanl\u0131, \u201cTehdit Merkezli Bir D\u0131\u015f Politika…\u201d, s. 49.
\n8)<\/strong> Nesip Nesipli, \u201cAzerbaycan ve Moskova-Erivan-Tahran…\u201d, s.70.
\n9)<\/strong> Ercan Durdular, \u201c\u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan Politikas\u0131\u201d, Avrasya Dosyas\u0131, Cilt 2, No. 1, \u0130lkbahar, 1995, ss.124-135, s.126.
\n10)<\/strong> T\u00fcrkiye ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri ile ekonomik ili\u015fkilerini bir arada de\u011ferlendiren \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma i\u00e7in bkz. Mehmet Dikkaya, \u201cOrta Asya\u2019da Yeni B\u00fcy\u00fck Oyun: T\u00fcrkiye, Rusya ve \u0130ran\u201d, Avrasya Dosyas\u0131, Cilt 5, No. 3, Sohbahar, 1999, ss. 189-208, s.200.
\n11)<\/strong> Azerbaycan \u0130ktisadi Kalk\u0131nma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Resm\u00ee \u0130nternet Sayfas\u0131, \u201cAzerbaycan Respublikas\u0131n\u0131n 2006-c\u0131 il \u00fczere xarici ticaret d\u00f6vriyyesine dair aray\u0131\u015f\u201d, www.economy.gov.az\/Catalogs\/files\/file1181808439663.doc.
\n12)<\/strong> G\u00fcrcistan D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Resm\u00ee \u0130nternet Sayfas\u0131, \u201c Relations betweenGeorgia and the Republic of Iran\u201d, http:\/\/www.mfa.gov.ge\/index.php?sec_id=376&lang_id=ENG.
\n13)<\/strong> \u201cArmenia Ranks as the Most Economically Free Nation in the C\u0130S\u201d, www.ada.am\/html\/key_economic_indicators.html.
\n14)<\/strong> Yal\u00e7\u0131n Sar\u0131kaya, \u201cGeleneksel D\u0131\u015f Politika \u0130\u00e7in At\u0131l\u0131m \u0130mkan\u0131 m\u0131?\u201d, 2023 Dergisi, Haziran 2002, ss. 24-32, s. 31.
\n15)<\/strong> Bkz. Brenda Shaffer, \u201cIran\u2019s Internal Azerbaijani Challenge: Implications for Policy in the Caucasus,\u201d Moshe Gammer (der.), The Caspian Region, Cilt 1, Londra, Routledge Yay\u0131nevi, 2004, ss.119-140, s.119.
\n16)<\/strong> Brenda Shaffer, \u201cIran\u2019s Internal Azerbaijani Challenge…\u201d, s.137, dipnot 1 ve 2.
\n17)<\/strong> Emre Bay\u0131r ve Araz Aslanl\u0131, \u201cTehdit Merkezli Bir D\u0131\u015f Politika..\u201d, s.55.
\n18)<\/strong> Nesip Nesipli, \u201cAzerbaycan ve Moskova-Erivan-Tahran…\u201d, s. 70.
\n19)<\/strong> Bu konuda ayr\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 bilgi i\u00e7in bkz. Svante E. Cornell, \u201cIran and the Caucasus\u201d, Middle East Policy, Cilt 5, No. 4, Ocak 1998, ss. 59-64. Brenda Shaffer, \u201cIran\u2019s Internal Azerbaijani Challenge…\u201d, s.127. Mesut \u00c7a\u015f\u0131n, \u201c\u0130ran Silahl\u0131 Kuvvetleri\u201d, Avrasya Dosyas\u0131, Cilt 2, No. 1, \u0130lkbahar, 1995, ss. 27-51, s.48. Asker Kartal, \u201cAzerbaycan-Ermenistan Sava\u015f\u0131\u201d, Avrasya Dosyas\u0131, Cilt 2, No. 4, K\u0131\u015f, 1996, ss. 85-108, s.104
\n20)<\/strong> Hazar\u2019\u0131n hukuki stat\u00fcs\u00fc ile ilgili bkz. Elnur Soltan, \u201cHazar Denizi\u2019nin Hukuki Stat\u00fcs\u00fc\u201d, Stratejik Analiz, Cilt2, No 13, May\u0131s 2001, ss. 64-69.
\n21)<\/strong> Atay Akdevelio\u011flu, \u201c\u0130ran \u0130slam Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin Orta Asya ve Azerbaycan Politikalar\u0131\u201d, Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkiler Dergisi, Cilt 1, No. 2, Yaz, 2004, ss.129-159.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"