{"id":11194,"date":"2019-03-25T09:54:22","date_gmt":"2019-03-25T14:54:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/circassiancenter.com\/tr\/?p=11194"},"modified":"2019-03-25T09:54:22","modified_gmt":"2019-03-25T14:54:22","slug":"rusya-krizinin-orta-asya-turk-cumhuriyetlerine-etkisi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/rusya-krizinin-orta-asya-turk-cumhuriyetlerine-etkisi\/","title":{"rendered":"RUSYA KR\u0130Z\u0130N\u0130N ORTA ASYA T\u00dcRK CUMHUR\u0130YETLER\u0130NE ETK\u0130S\u0130"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/p>\n

Gazi Bilgin
\n<\/b><\/span> Ekonomik Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar ve De\u011ferlendirme Genel M\u00fcd\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Rusya Federasyonu, 2000 y\u0131l\u0131 verilerine g\u00f6re, 145 milyon n\u00fcfusu, 1.737 $ ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na milli geliri ile Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetleri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00f6nemli bir ticaret orta\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. 1991 y\u0131l\u0131nda Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131yla beraber Rusya Federasyonu’nda demokrasi ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine ge\u00e7i\u015f y\u00f6n\u00fcnde h\u0131zl\u0131 bir de\u011fi\u015fim s\u00fcreci ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 1991-1998 d\u00f6nemi boyunca \u00f6nemli ekonomik reformlar ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. Nitekim; piyasa ekonomisine ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u00fcrecinin ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ocak 1992’de fiyatlar serbest b\u0131rak\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, takip eden aylarda h\u0131zl\u0131 ve yo\u011fun bir \u00f6zelle\u015ftirme program\u0131 ba\u015flat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yap\u0131lan \u00f6nemli reformlardan biri de d\u0131\u015f ticaretin serbestle\u015ftirilmesi olmu\u015ftur. Ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nemde y\u00fcksek enflasyon oran\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesinde de ba\u015far\u0131 sa\u011flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. D\u0131\u015f ticaretin serbestle\u015ftirilmesi ve uygulanan di\u011fer ekonomik politikalar sonucu y\u0131ll\u0131k ortalama enflasyon oran\u0131 1995 y\u0131l\u0131nda y\u00fczde 131’e, 1996 y\u0131l\u0131nda y\u00fczde 22’ye ve 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda y\u00fczde 10’lar seviyesine d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n

D\u0131\u015f ticaretin serbestle\u015ftirilmesinde ve enflasyon oran\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesinde sa\u011flanan ba\u015far\u0131lara ra\u011fmen ekonomideki \u00fcretimin k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fclmesi ve y\u00fcksek b\u00fct\u00e7e a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n finansman\u0131nda kar\u015f\u0131la\u015f\u0131lan zorluklar sorun olmaya devam etmi\u015ftir. Rusya’da reel GSY\u0130H 1991 y\u0131l\u0131 sonras\u0131nda ilk defa 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda y\u00fczde 0,8 civar\u0131 art\u0131\u015f g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. Ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin sa\u011flanamam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 halk\u0131n giderek fakirle\u015fmesine yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015f ve reformlara kar\u015f\u0131 direnci art\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

1992-1997 d\u00f6neminde, b\u00fct\u00e7ede harcama kalemlerinde yap\u0131lan ciddi k\u0131s\u0131tlamalara ra\u011fmen finansman a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 devam etmi\u015ftir. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla GSY\u0130H’n\u0131n y\u00fczde 7-9’u kadar bir b\u00fct\u00e7e a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6z konusu olmu\u015ftur. Rusya’da b\u00fct\u00e7e a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fcksek olu\u015fu temelde \u00fc\u00e7 sebebe dayanmaktad\u0131r. Bunlar, kay\u0131t d\u0131\u015f\u0131 ekonominin yayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131 sebebiyle devletin vergi toplamakta kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 sorunlar, sosyal g\u00fcvenlik sisteminin yap\u0131s\u0131, Rusya’da ordunun b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve askeri harcamalar\u0131n y\u00fcksek olu\u015fudur.<\/p>\n

Rusya’n\u0131n kriz \u00f6ncesi d\u00f6nemde, 140 milyar dolar civar\u0131nda d\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7 ve 70 milyar dolar civar\u0131nda i\u00e7 bor\u00e7 olmak \u00fczere toplam 210 milyar dolar civar\u0131nda borcu bulunmaktad\u0131r. Toplam borcun GSY\u0130H’ya oran\u0131 ise y\u00fczde 42’ler seviyesindedir. Ancak, bor\u00e7 stoku di\u011fer \u00fclkelerle kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda y\u00fcksek olmay\u0131p, sorun k\u0131sa vadeli bor\u00e7lar\u0131n y\u00fcksek olmas\u0131ndan kaynaklanmaktad\u0131r. 70 milyar dolar civar\u0131ndaki hazine bonosunun ortalama vade yap\u0131s\u0131 11 ayd\u0131r. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti bu d\u00f6nemde, her ay yakla\u015f\u0131k 6 milyar dolarl\u0131k yeni bor\u00e7lanma yapmak durumundad\u0131r. B\u00fct\u00e7e gelirlerinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck oldu\u011fu ortamda s\u00f6z konusu k\u0131sa vadeli bor\u00e7 stoku 1997 y\u0131l\u0131 sonundan itibaren Rusya Federasyonu’na y\u00f6nelik kayg\u0131lar\u0131 art\u0131ran bir unsur olmu\u015ftur. Ayr\u0131ca, vergi ve sosyal g\u00fcvenlik reformlar\u0131n\u0131n yap\u0131lamam\u0131\u015f, sa\u011flam b\u00fct\u00e7e kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n olu\u015fturulamam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131, yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131larda Rusya’daki riskin giderek b\u00fcy\u00fcd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc endi\u015fesini do\u011furmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n

Ekonomide ya\u015fanan bu olumsuz geli\u015fmeler \u00fczerine Rus h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, piyasalar\u0131 sakinle\u015ftirmek amac\u0131yla A\u011fustos 1998\u2019de bir dizi \u00f6nlem almak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 17 A\u011fustos 1998 tarihinde daha \u00f6nce Amerikan Dolar\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda 5,27 \u2013 7,13 aral\u0131\u011f\u0131nda olan Ruble band\u0131n\u0131n 1998 y\u0131l\u0131 sonuna kadar 6,0 \u2013 9,5 olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klanm\u0131\u015f ve d\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7lar\u0131n \u00f6denmesi hususunda 90 g\u00fcnl\u00fck moratoryum ilan edilmi\u015ftir. Rublenin alt s\u0131n\u0131r olan 9,5 de\u011ferine d\u00fc\u015fmesi fiili olarak y\u00fczde 34’l\u00fck bir deval\u00fcasyon anlam\u0131na gelmektedir. Kamu bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131na ili\u015fkin bir plan uygulamaya konulmu\u015ftur. Ayr\u0131ca \u00fclkede, yabanc\u0131lar\u0131n 1 y\u0131ldan k\u0131sa vadeli finansal yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmalar\u0131 da yasaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Ekonomi y\u00f6netiminin uygulamaya koydu\u011fu tedbirler sonucu, Rus bankalar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenilirli\u011fi azalm\u0131\u015f, ekonomide d\u00f6viz s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131s\u0131, fiyat art\u0131\u015flar\u0131 ve baz\u0131 t\u00fcketim mallar\u0131n\u0131n temininde s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n


\nI. Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin Rusya Krizi \u00d6ncesinde Ekonomik Durumu<\/p>\n

<\/strong>1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda ya\u015fanan, Rusya krizi \u00f6ncesinde, Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin makro ekonomik g\u00f6stergeleri 1992-1994 d\u00f6nemine g\u00f6re olumlu y\u00f6nde de\u011fi\u015fmi\u015ftir. Nitekim, T\u00fcrkmenistan d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki \u00fclkelerin g\u00f6stergeleri ekonomik faaliyetlerde canlanma oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir. Yurt i\u00e7i yat\u0131r\u0131mlar \u00e7o\u011funlukla zengin enerji ve mineral kaynaklara ula\u015fmay\u0131 hedefleyen yabanc\u0131 sermaye taraf\u0131ndan finanse edilmi\u015ftir. Reel \u00fccretlerdeki art\u0131\u015f ve vergi gelirlerinin GSY\u0130H\u2019ya oran\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fckselmesi sonras\u0131nda, \u00f6zel ve kamu t\u00fcketimi harcamalar\u0131 h\u0131zl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r .
\n1997 y\u0131l\u0131 ortas\u0131na gelindi\u011finde y\u00fcksek ve istikrars\u0131z enflasyon problemi a\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, \u00fc\u00e7 haneli y\u0131ll\u0131k enflasyon oranlar\u0131 Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan,<\/p>\n

T\u00fcrkmenistan ve \u00d6zbekistan\u2019da geride kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ekonomi y\u00f6netimlerinin g\u00fcndeminde ise tek haneli enflasyon ortam\u0131nda y\u00fcksek bir sosyal maliyet olmaks\u0131z\u0131n ekonominin nas\u0131l canland\u0131r\u0131laca\u011f\u0131 konusu vard\u0131r.
\nAncak, makro ekonomik istikrar ve ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcmeye ra\u011fmen yurt i\u00e7i tasarruflar geli\u015fmemi\u015ftir. T\u00fcrkmenistan d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinde Rusya krizi \u00f6ncesi (1992-1997) d\u00f6nemde, olduk\u00e7a b\u00fcy\u00fck cari a\u00e7\u0131klar g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bu d\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131klar\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u0131sm\u0131 kamu a\u00e7\u0131klar\u0131ndan kaynaklanm\u0131\u015f olmakla beraber \u00f6zel kesim yat\u0131r\u0131m-tasarruf a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n da etkisi olmu\u015ftur. Kamu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu \u00fclkelerin kamu sekt\u00f6r\u00fc toplam bor\u00e7 y\u00fck\u00fcn\u00fcn artmas\u0131na sebep olmu\u015ftur. 1997 y\u0131l\u0131 sonu itibariyle, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n toplam d\u0131\u015f borcu GSY\u0130H\u2019n\u0131n %55\u2019ine tekab\u00fcl ederken, Kazakistan ve \u00d6zbekistan da ise bu oran % 18 ile 30 aral\u0131\u011f\u0131nda bulunmaktayd\u0131. T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019\u0131n bor\u00e7 stokunun GSY\u0130H\u2019ya oran\u0131 ise 1997 y\u0131l\u0131 ortas\u0131nda % 51 seviyesindedir.<\/p>\n

II. Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin Rusya Ekonomisi \u0130le Etkile\u015fimleri<\/p>\n

<\/strong>Sovyetler Birli\u011finin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 ile birlikte ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 kazanan Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetleri, merkezi planl\u0131 ekonomik sistemden piyasa mekanizmas\u0131na ge\u00e7me hususunda ekonomik d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm programlar\u0131n\u0131 ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, klasik \u00fcretim yap\u0131s\u0131 ve buna ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak da klasik arz ve tedarik sisteminin \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde devam etmesi, bu \u00fclkelerin Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n k\u0131smen devam\u0131na yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Eski SSCB ula\u015ft\u0131rma altyap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n Rusya Federasyonuna merkezi bir konum sa\u011flamas\u0131, T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131ndaki devaml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir di\u011fer nedenidir. SSCB d\u00f6neminin ekonomik ihtisasla\u015fma politikalar\u0131 da ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z kalan Cumhuriyetler aras\u0131 ticari ili\u015fkilerin s\u00fcrmesine ve ticaretin b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde BDT \u00fclkelerine y\u00f6nelmesine neden olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n

Bu geli\u015fmenin do\u011fal bir sonucu olarak, T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin ekonomileri, di\u011fer Topluluk \u00fclkelerindeki ekonomik, hatta siyasi geli\u015fmelere son derece duyarl\u0131 hale gelmi\u015f ve ticari ili\u015fkilerdeki aksamalar ciddi ekonomik krizlere yol a\u00e7abilecek d\u00fczeyde olmu\u015ftur. Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin ihracat ve ithalat yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fclkelere bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n t\u00fcm \u00fclkeler i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir ticaret partneri oldu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Rusya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetleri\u2019nin ithalatlar\u0131nda birinci s\u0131ray\u0131 almaktayken, ihracatlar\u0131nda da ilk s\u0131ralarda yer almaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kazakistan\u2019\u0131n D\u0131\u015f Ticaretinde Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011fu \u00dclkelerinin Paylar\u0131 (%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/td>\n1996<\/td>\n1998<\/td>\n2000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
 <\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 BDT<\/td>\n69,5<\/td>\n53,8<\/td>\n47,4<\/td>\n39,9<\/td>\n54,6<\/td>\n26,2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Rusya<\/td>\n54,8<\/td>\n42,0<\/td>\n39,4<\/td>\n29,6<\/td>\n48,7<\/td>\n19,5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Ukrayna<\/td>\n2,2<\/td>\n3,6<\/td>\n2,1<\/td>\n4,8<\/td>\n1,6<\/td>\n2,9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u00d6zbekistan<\/td>\n2,1<\/td>\n4,9<\/td>\n2,2<\/td>\n2,2<\/td>\n1,5<\/td>\n1,5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Di\u011fer BDT \u00dclk.<\/td>\n10,4<\/td>\n3,3<\/td>\n3,7<\/td>\n3,3<\/td>\n2,8<\/td>\n2,3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Kaynak:EIU Kazakistan \u00dclke Raporu (2001)<\/p>\n

1996 y\u0131l\u0131nda Kazakistan\u2019\u0131n ithalat\u0131nda Rusya Federasyonunun pay\u0131 y\u00fczde 55 iken, 2000 y\u0131ll\u0131nda y\u00fczde 49\u2019a gerilemi\u015ftir. \u0130hracatta ise daha \u00e7arp\u0131c\u0131 bir geli\u015fme kaydedilerek bu oranlar y\u00fczde 42\u2019den y\u00fczde 20\u2019ye d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n

K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n \u0130hracat Yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ba\u015fl\u0131ca \u00dclkeler (%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/td>\n1996<\/td>\n1997<\/td>\n1998<\/td>\n1999<\/td>\n2000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Almanya<\/td>\n0,6<\/td>\n3,0<\/td>\n37,4<\/td>\n32,7<\/td>\n28,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u00d6zbekistan<\/td>\n22,9<\/td>\n16,8<\/td>\n7,5<\/td>\n10,3<\/td>\n17,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Rusya<\/td>\n26,6<\/td>\n16,4<\/td>\n16,3<\/td>\n15,6<\/td>\n12,9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u00c7in<\/td>\n7,2<\/td>\n5,2<\/td>\n3,1<\/td>\n5,6<\/td>\n8,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u0130svi\u00e7re<\/td>\n0,2<\/td>\n26,9<\/td>\n0,2<\/td>\n4,0<\/td>\n6,8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Kaynak: K\u0131rg\u0131z Milli \u0130statistik Komitesi<\/p>\n

K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n \u0130thalat Yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ba\u015fl\u0131ca \u00dclkeler (%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/td>\n1996<\/td>\n1997<\/td>\n1998<\/td>\n1999<\/td>\n2000<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Rusya<\/td>\n20,8<\/td>\n26,9<\/td>\n24,2<\/td>\n18,2<\/td>\n23,9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u00d6zbekistan<\/td>\n15,7<\/td>\n18,1<\/td>\n14,5<\/td>\n8,3<\/td>\n13,5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Kazakistan<\/td>\n16,7<\/td>\n9,8<\/td>\n8,9<\/td>\n12,1<\/td>\n10,3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 ABD<\/td>\n4,3<\/td>\n5,6<\/td>\n4,9<\/td>\n9,0<\/td>\n9,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u00c7in<\/td>\n0,9<\/td>\n4,6<\/td>\n5,3<\/td>\n6,2<\/td>\n6,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Kaynak: K\u0131rg\u0131z Milli \u0130statistik Komitesi<\/p>\n

K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n ihracat\u0131nda ise, Rusya Federasyonunun y\u00fczde 26,6 olan pay\u0131 y\u00fczde 13 seviyesine gerilerken, ithalat\u0131ndaki pay\u0131 ayn\u0131 y\u0131llar aras\u0131nda 3 puan artarak y\u00fczde 24 seviyesine y\u00fckselmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

\u00d6zbekistan\u2019\u0131n D\u0131\u015f Ticaretinde Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011fu \u00dclkelerinin Paylar\u0131 (%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/td>\n1998<\/td>\n2000<\/td>\n2001 (1. \u00c7yr.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
 <\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n\u0130th.<\/td>\n\u0130hr.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 BDT<\/td>\n27,8<\/td>\n26,0<\/td>\n34,8<\/td>\n35,9<\/td>\n37,8<\/td>\n33,4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Rusya<\/td>\n16,0<\/td>\n14,9<\/td>\n15,8<\/td>\n16,7<\/td>\n16,5<\/td>\n16,9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
 <\/td>\n4,9<\/td>\n3,5<\/td>\n7,3<\/td>\n3,1<\/td>\n5,8<\/td>\n3,7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
 <\/td>\n4,5<\/td>\n0,9<\/td>\n6,1<\/td>\n4,7<\/td>\n8,5<\/td>\n1,0<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Kaynak:EIU \u00d6zbekistan \u00dclke Raporu (2001)<\/p>\n

\u00d6zbekistan\u2019\u0131n ithalat\u0131nda Rusya Federasyonunun pay\u0131 1998-2001 y\u0131llar\u0131nda ayn\u0131 kal\u0131rken, ihracat\u0131ndaki pay\u0131 ise y\u00fczde 2 artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019\u0131n D\u0131\u015f Ticaretinde Ba\u015fl\u0131ca \u00dclkelerin Paylar\u0131 (%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u0130hracat<\/td>\n <\/td>\n\u0130thalat<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
 <\/td>\n2001 (Oc.-Tem.)<\/td>\n <\/td>\n <\/td>\n2001 (Oc.-Tem.)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Ukrayna<\/td>\n46<\/td>\n <\/td>\nRusya<\/td>\n16<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u0130talya<\/td>\n20<\/td>\n <\/td>\nUkrayna<\/td>\n13<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 \u0130ran<\/td>\n12<\/td>\n <\/td>\nABD<\/td>\n10<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 Rusya<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n <\/td>\nAlmanya<\/td>\n9<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0 T\u00fcrkiye<\/td>\n5<\/td>\n <\/td>\nT\u00fcrkiye<\/td>\n6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Kaynak:T\u00fcrkmenistan \u0130statistik Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc Kaynak:T\u00fcrkmenistan \u0130statistik Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc<\/p>\n

III. Rusya Krizinin Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerini Etkileme Yollar\u0131<\/p>\n

<\/strong>Rusya krizinin Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerini etkileme yollar\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yle tan\u0131mlanabilir: i) Rusya krizinin T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin ihracat ve ithalatlar\u0131 \u00fczerine do\u011frudan ve dolayl\u0131 etkisi, ii) T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerindeki ihracat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n, Ruble\u2019nin deval\u00fce edilmesi sonucu Rus pazar paylar\u0131ndaki kay\u0131plar\u0131, iii) T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerine yabanc\u0131 sermaye ak\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki azalma, iv) Rusya krizinin T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerindeki yap\u0131sal reformlar\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rmak i\u00e7in f\u0131rsat olu\u015fturmas\u0131.<\/p>\n

i) Ruble\u2019nin de\u011ferinin d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmesi, Rusya\u2019dan ithalat\u0131n artmas\u0131na, Rusya ve di\u011fer BDT \u00fclkelerine ihracat\u0131n azalmas\u0131na sebep olmu\u015ftur. Nitekim, 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin de Rusya ve di\u011fer BDT \u00fclkelerine y\u00f6nelik ihracatlar\u0131nda kayda de\u011fer d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fler g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019da ihracat azal\u0131\u015f\u0131 Ukrayna\u2019ya olan gaz sat\u0131\u015f\u0131 \u00f6demesinin ertelenmesinden kaynaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkmenistan d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda ihracat\u0131nda en b\u00fcy\u00fck d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f \u00d6zbekistan\u2019da, daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck oranl\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fler ise Kazakistan ve K\u0131rg\u0131zistan da olmu\u015ftur. Ancak, 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019\u0131n ihracat\u0131nda daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn nedenleri, Rusya pazar\u0131ndaki daralma ve alt\u0131n madencili\u011fi sekt\u00f6r\u00fcndeki \u00fcretim problemleri ve d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck fiyatlard\u0131r.<\/p>\n

ii) Rusya krizinin di\u011fer etkileme kanal\u0131, T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerindeki hammadde ve sanayi \u00fcr\u00fcnleri ihracat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n pazar paylar\u0131ndaki de\u011fi\u015fmeyi i\u00e7ermektedir. Bu risk, 1998 y\u0131l\u0131 sonu ve 1999 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131nda Rus firmalar\u0131n\u0131n BDT pazar\u0131na sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken belirgin bir \u015fekilde ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

iii) Rusya krizi, T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerine sermaye giri\u015fini yava\u015flatman\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra bu \u00fclkelerin bor\u00e7lanma imkanlar\u0131n\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rlam\u0131\u015f ve bor\u00e7lanma maliyetlerini art\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu arada, Kazakistan ekonomisi tahvil ve bono piyasas\u0131nda yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131n varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve ABD Dolar\u0131na endeksli kamu bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n mevcudiyeti nedeniyle riske girmi\u015f, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan ise, bankac\u0131l\u0131k sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn zay\u0131f olmas\u0131 ve portf\u00f6y yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 ve do\u011frudan yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n ekonomisindeki rol\u00fc nedeniyle riskli g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n

iv) Rusya finansal krizinin T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinde yap\u0131sal reformlar\u0131n h\u0131z\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131raca\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fler, kriz d\u00f6nemlerinde yasal d\u00fczenleme gerektiren yap\u0131sal reformlar\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n daha kolay olaca\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesine dayanmaktad\u0131r. Ancak, kriz d\u00f6neminde reformlar\u0131n h\u0131zlanaca\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki bu tahminler Orta Asya T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015ftir. Avrupa Yat\u0131r\u0131m ve Kalk\u0131nma Bankas\u0131n\u0131n (EBRD) haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 piyasa ekonomisine ge\u00e7i\u015f g\u00f6stergesi Kazakistan, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan ve \u00d6zbekistan i\u00e7in 1997-1999 d\u00f6neminde olumsuz y\u00f6ndedir. Ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nemde, 1996 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki d\u00f6viz kuru sisteminde ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi \u00f6nemli reformlar nedeniyle T\u00fcrkmenistan i\u00e7in bu g\u00f6stergede k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde bir d\u00fczelme g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n

IV. Rusya Krizine Kar\u015f\u0131 Al\u0131nan \u00d6nlemler<\/p>\n

<\/strong>Eyl\u00fcl 1998 ile Mart 1999 aras\u0131n\u0131 kapsayan d\u00f6nemde T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin ekonomi y\u00f6netimleri mal ve hizmetlere olan toplam talep seviyesini de\u011fi\u015ftirebilmek i\u00e7in genellikle geni\u015fletici maliye ve para politikalar\u0131 kullanm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Geni\u015fletici maliye politikalar\u0131 sonucunda, Kazakistan ve K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019da 1998 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n 3. ve 4. \u00e7eyreklerinde kamu a\u00e7\u0131klar\u0131 belirgin bir \u015fekilde artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kamu kesimi genel a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n GSY\u0130H\u2019ya oran\u0131 s\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde Kazakistan i\u00e7in % 8, K\u0131rg\u0131zistan i\u00e7in % 10\u2019a ula\u015f\u0131rken, \u00d6zbekistan\u2019da kamu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 di\u011fer T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerine g\u00f6re daha \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 seviyede ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinde, para politikas\u0131 da 1998 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n 4. \u00e7eyre\u011finden itibaren geni\u015fletici y\u00f6nde uygulanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin kriz \u00f6ncesinde ge\u00e7erli olan d\u00f6viz kuru sistemi g\u00f6zetimli dalgalanma idi. Rublenin deval\u00fcasyonu sonras\u0131nda, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta ulusal para birimlerinin de\u011fer yitirmesine izin verilmemi\u015f ve bu ama\u00e7la d\u00f6viz piyasas\u0131na m\u00fcdahale edilmi\u015ftir. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, Kazakistan, 1998\u2019in son 5 ay\u0131nda br\u00fct rezervlerinin b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 kaybetmi\u015ftir. K\u0131rg\u0131zistan Merkez Bankas\u0131n\u0131n d\u00f6viz piyasas\u0131na m\u00fcdahalesi Kazakistan\u2019a g\u00f6re daha s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 olmu\u015f, T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019da ise m\u00fcdahale g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilecek kadar k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n

Bunun sonucunda da Temmuz 1998-Nisan 1999 d\u00f6neminde T\u00fcrkmenistan para birimi karaborsada % 70\u2019den daha fazla de\u011fer kaybetmi\u015ftir. \u00d6zbekistan da ise 1998 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n ikinci yar\u0131s\u0131nda Merkez Bankas\u0131 bireylerin ve firmalar\u0131n d\u00f6viz kullan\u0131mlar\u0131na s\u0131n\u0131r getirince, resmi kur ile piyasa kuru aras\u0131ndaki fark daha da b\u00fcy\u00fcm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. 1999 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131ndan itibaren T\u00fcrkmenistan haricindeki \u00fclkelerde ulusal para birimlerinin de\u011fer yitirmesine izin verilmi\u015ftir. 1999 Nisan ay\u0131na gelindi\u011finde 1998 Temmuz ay\u0131na g\u00f6re Kazakistan para birimi Tenge %32, K\u0131rg\u0131z para birimi Som %49, T\u00fcrkmenistan para birimi Manat % 0 (%70), \u00d6zbekistan para birimi Sum % 14 (%56) de\u011fer kaybetmi\u015ftir. Bu de\u011fer d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015flerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, i\u00e7 talebi k\u0131s\u0131tlay\u0131c\u0131 politikalar\u0131n uygulanmas\u0131yla, bu \u00fclkelerde enflasyon 1999\u2019un 2. yar\u0131s\u0131ndan itibaren a\u015famal\u0131 olarak d\u00fc\u015fmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Resmi d\u00f6viz kurunu de\u011fi\u015ftirmeyen T\u00fcrkmenistan haricindeki T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin para birimleri, bu de\u011fer d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fleri sonras\u0131nda Rus Rublesine g\u00f6re kriz \u00f6ncesi de\u011ferlerine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. B\u00f6ylece, Ruble\u2019nin deval\u00fcasyonundan sonra Rusya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 bu \u00fclkelerin rekabet g\u00fc\u00e7lerinde g\u00f6r\u00fclen azalma giderilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n

V. Sonu\u00e7 ve Genel De\u011ferlendirme<\/p>\n

<\/strong>Rusya Federasyonu ile T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetleri aras\u0131ndaki ekonomik ve ticari ili\u015fkilerin y\u0131ldan y\u0131la azalan bir trend izlemesine ra\u011fmen, hala a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 korudu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Bu \u00fclkelerin ekonomi ve ticaretlerinin global ekonomilere a\u00e7\u0131lmalar\u0131na paralel olarak Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na ekonomik ve ticari ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 azalacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Rusya krizi, T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na ve di\u011fer BDT \u00fclkelerine mal ihracat\u0131nda ani bir d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fe neden olmu\u015f, ancak krizin T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerindeki yap\u0131sal reformlar\u0131n h\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde beklenen etkisi ise ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015ftir. Krize ekonomi y\u00f6netimlerinin ilk tepkisi, geni\u015fletici para ve maliye politikas\u0131 kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 ve para birimlerinin de\u011fer yitirmesine izin verilmemesi \u015feklinde olmu\u015ftur. Ancak, bu s\u00fcrecin sonunda Merkez Bankalar\u0131n\u0131n rezervlerindeki azal\u0131\u015flar T\u00fcrkmenistan d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki \u00fclkeleri para birimlerini deval\u00fce etmeye zorlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkmenistan da ise resmi kurun de\u011feri d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmemi\u015f, ancak bu durum piyasa kuru ile resmi kur aras\u0131nda fark\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fcmesine yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Rusya finansal krizi; t\u00fcm geli\u015fmekte olan \u00fclkelerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyetlerinin de bor\u00e7lanma imkanlar\u0131n\u0131 daraltm\u0131\u015f, bor\u00e7lanma maliyetlerini artt\u0131rm\u0131\u015f, dolay\u0131s\u0131yla s\u00f6z konusu \u00fclkelerin ekonomilerini olumsuz y\u00f6nde etkilemi\u015f bulunmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

KAYNAK\u00c7A
\n<\/strong>Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States, \u201cRussian Financial Crisis: Summary of Events Through September 7, 1998\u201d,
\nhttp:\/\/www.bisnis.doc.gov
\nDPT (1998), \u201cRusya Krizi ve T\u00fcrkiye \u00dczerine Muhtemel Etkileri\u201d, http:\/\/www.dpt.gov.tr\/dptweb\/ekutup98\/rusya\/kriz.html
\nEIU (2000) Country Report: Russia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London.
\nEIU (2001) Country Report: Kazakhstan, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London
\nEIU (2001) Country Report: Uzbekhstan, The Economist Intelligence Unit, London
\nOwen, David (1999), \u201cThe Impact of the Russian Ruble Devaluation on Exchange Markets of BRO Countries\u201d, IMF.
\nPastor, Gonzalo; Damjanovic, Tatiana (2001), \u201cThe Russian Financial Crisis and its Consequences for Central Asia\u201d, IMF Working Paper.
\nPoirson, Helene (2001), \u201cHow the Countries Choose Their Exchange Rate Regime\u201d, IMF Working Paper.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Gazi Bilgin Ekonomik Araştırmalar ve Değerlendirme Genel Müdürlüğü Rusya Federasyonu, 2000 yılı verilerine göre, 145 milyon nüfusu, 1.737 $ kişi başına milli geliri ile Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetleri açısından önemli bir ticaret ortağıdır. 1991 yılında Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasıyla beraber Rusya Federasyonu’nda demokrasi ve serbest piyasa ekonomisine geçiş yönünde hızlı bir değişim süreci başlamıştır. 1991-1998 dönemi 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