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Rovshan Mammadov<\/span><\/b> ABD G\u00dcNEY KAFKASYA \u0130L\u0130\u015eK\u0130LER\u0130<\/p>\n A. G\u00dcNEY KAFKASYA\u2019NIN ABD \u0130\u00c7\u0130N \u00d6NEM\u0130 G\u00fcney Kafkasya`n\u0131n genel olarak \u00f6zellikleri: Elde bulundu\u011fu s\u00fcrece Do\u011fu Akdeniz, Basra K\u00f6rfezi, Do\u011fu Anadolu veOrta Asya`y\u0131 kontrol eder.\u00a0<\/span>Rusya`n\u0131n g\u00fcney cephesinin savunmas\u0131nda kuvvet tasarrufu sa\u011flayacak savunulmas\u0131 kolay bir b\u00f6lgedir.<\/p>\n S\u0131cak denizlere ula\u015fmaya imkan sa\u011flayacak stratejik mevkilerinde en k\u0131sa olanlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f noktas\u0131n\u0131 te\u015fkil ve bu istikametleri kontrol eden bir b\u00f6lgedir. G\u00fcneye taarruz i\u00e7in uygun bir \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f b\u00f6lgesidir.<\/p>\n \u0130ran`\u0131 kontrol etmek i\u00e7in \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli b\u00f6lgedir. Eski d\u0131\u015f i\u015fleri bakan\u0131 J.Baker`in dedi\u011fi gibi \u201c XXI. y\u00fczy\u0131lda Hazar petrol\u00fcn\u00fcn end\u00fcstri i\u00e7in \u00f6nemi \u015fimdiki Basra K\u00f6rfezi`nin \u00f6nemi kadar olacak\u201d. (4) ABD bu b\u00f6lgenin Rusya`n\u0131n hem ekonomik hem de askeri ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan kurtulmas\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00e7ok say\u0131da giri\u015fimlerde bulunmu\u015ftur. Bu ba\u011flamda Kongre`nin alt komitesinin Ortado\u011fu ve G\u00fcney Asya\u2019yla ilgili dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 senat\u00f6r S.Braunbek`in Kongre`nin \u201c\u0130pek Yolu\u201d stratejisinin kabul edilmesi \u00fczerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fma ilgin\u00e7tir \u201c ABD G\u00fcney Kafkasya ve Orta Asya`da liderli\u011fini daha da aktif \u015fekilde g\u00f6stermelidir. Bu g\u00fcne kadar bu b\u00f6lgedeki ABD politikas\u0131 ABD`nin Rusya politikas\u0131 olarak alg\u0131lan\u0131yor. Bu devletler ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z ve bu devletlere e\u015fit davranmak laz\u0131m. Onlar\u0131n co\u011frafi konumu stratejik bak\u0131mdan \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir. Lakin Rusya`yla \u0130ran aras\u0131nda yerle\u015fmesi ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 korumalar\u0131nda baz\u0131 sorunlar yaratabilir. Biz ABD olarak onlar\u0131n politik ve ekonomik ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 korumalar\u0131nda yard\u0131mc\u0131 olmal\u0131 ve bu devletlerin Bat\u0131 meyilli politikalar\u0131na destek \u00e7\u0131kmal\u0131y\u0131z\u201d. (5)<\/p>\n B\u00f6lgenin petrol fakt\u00f6r\u00fc Avrupa devletlerini de harekete ge\u00e7irmi\u015f oldu. ABD`yle beraber \u0130ngiltere, Fransa ve di\u011fer Avrupa \u015firketleri de burada b\u00fcy\u00fck oranda pay sahibi olmak i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7abalar sarf ettiler. Ama ABD`nin b\u00f6lgedeki en g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc rakibi \u0130ngiltere oldu. \u0130ngiltere SSCB da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131ktan sonra kendi silah\u0131n\u0131- British Perolium`u (BP) i\u015fe sald\u0131. Bu g\u00fcn b\u00f6lgede i\u015fletilen petrolde en \u00e7ok pay sahibi olan \u015firket BP`dir.<\/p>\n 90`l\u0131 y\u0131llarda ABD ve Bat\u0131 Avrupa \u00fclkeleri Avrasya ileti\u015fim koridorunun yani bat\u0131dan do\u011fuya bir yolun uzanmas\u0131n\u0131 istiyordular. 1995 y\u0131l\u0131nda AB`nin kabul edilmi\u015f \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc program\u0131na esasen \u201cB\u00fcy\u00fck \u0130pek Yolu`nu\u201d hat\u0131rlatan Venesiya \u0130talya`n\u0131n G\u00fcneyi-Poti-Tiflis-Erivan-Bak\u00fc-Krassnovodsk-Bi\u015fkek yolunun bir daha i\u015flenmesi \u00f6neriliyor. (6) Bu koridor G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 korumalar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck rol oynayacak, b\u00f6lgesel i\u015fbirli\u011finin g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesine yol a\u00e7acak, Hazar petrol\u00fcn\u00fcn d\u00fcnyaya sat\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 kolayla\u015ft\u0131racakt\u0131r. Bu kolayl\u0131klar i\u015f adamlar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeye yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmalar\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayacakt\u0131. B\u00f6lgede Rus ve \u0130ran \u015firketlerinin n\u00fcfusunun artmas\u0131ndan korkan ABD i\u00e7in de bu yol hayati \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n ABD b\u00f6lgedeki yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n risk alt\u0131na al\u0131nmamas\u0131 i\u00e7in b\u00f6lge devletlerine reformlar yapmalar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6neriyor. ABD`nin b\u00f6lge i\u00e7in temel politikalar\u0131:<\/p>\n \u2022 Demokrasinin g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi, Pazar ekonomisinin yarat\u0131lmas\u0131. Devletler aras\u0131nda sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesi. Tahran`\u0131n rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi yapana, bat\u0131 y\u00f6nl\u00fc d\u0131\u015f politika \u00e7izgisi benimseyene kadar bask\u0131 alt\u0131nda tutulmas\u0131\u00a0<\/span>Amerikan ve di\u011fer \u00fclke \u015firketlerinin b\u00f6lgedeki ticari faaliyetlerinin desteklenmesi olarak g\u00f6rebiliriz. (8)<\/p>\n B. AZERBAYCAN-ABD \u0130L\u0130\u015eK\u0130LER\u0130 \u0130lerleyen s\u00fcre\u00e7te hem Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali meselesi, hem de petrol fakt\u00f6r\u00fc itibariyle Azerbaycan ABD ili\u015fkilerinde \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmeler ya\u015fand\u0131. Yukar\u0131da da belirtti\u011fimiz gibi, Ocak 1991`den itibaren petrol ihalelerine ilk s\u0131rada kat\u0131lan ABD \u015firketleri, bu konuda birincili\u011fi hi\u00e7 kimseye\u00a0<\/span>kapt\u0131rmam\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. 1991 yaz\u0131nda d\u00f6nemin M\u00fctellibov y\u00f6netimi Hazar`daki en \u00f6nemli petrol yataklar\u0131ndan olan Azeri isimli yata\u011f\u0131n i\u015fletilmesi i\u00e7in AMOCO (ABD) ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda konsorsiyum olu\u015fturulmas\u0131n\u0131 kararla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (10) Azerbaycan, 15\u00a0<\/span>May\u0131s 1992`de Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi`nin fiili olarak iktidar\u0131 ele almas\u0131 ve 7\u00a0<\/span>Haziran 1992`de Eb\u00fclfez El\u00e7ibey`in Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ilmesiyle kendi petrollerini i\u015fletmek i\u00e7in daha b\u00fcy\u00fck projeyi uygulamaya haz\u0131rlan\u0131rken, bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te de Amerikan \u015firketleri \u00f6n s\u0131rada bulunmaktayd\u0131lar. (11)<\/p>\n Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali meselesine gelindi\u011finde ise, ABD`nin bu konudaki tutumunda Ermeni lobisinin etkisi daha yo\u011fun bir bi\u00e7imde hissedilmekteydi. ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Baker`in hem yukar\u0131da zikredilen konu\u015fmas\u0131nda kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 ifadeler, hem de \u015eubat 1992`de ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi Azerbaycan ziyareti sonras\u0131 Kongrede yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmas\u0131nda \u201cDa\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f`daki az\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n haklar\u0131 konusunda yeterli g\u00fcvenceleri alamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece ABD`nin Azerbaycan`a yard\u0131m yapamayaca\u011f\u0131\u201d \u015feklindeki a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131 bunun\u00a0<\/span>g\u00f6stergelerindendi. (12) Halbuki, Hocal\u0131 soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 konusunda ABD y\u00f6netimince 12 Mart 1992`de yap\u0131lan a\u00e7\u0131klamada, sadece taraflar ate\u015fkese davet edilmi\u015f, olay\u0131n faillerine ili\u015fkin tek bir ifadeye dahi yer verilmemi\u015ftir. ABD, i\u015fgal sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc konusunda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan AG\u0130T Minsk Grubunda da yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. May\u0131s 1992`de Helsinki`deki y\u00fcksek komiserler toplant\u0131s\u0131nda ABD yetkilisi ve 19 May\u0131s 1992`de Beyaz Saray taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan a\u00e7\u0131klamalarda Azerbaycan`\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve Azerbaycan`\u0131n \u201cDa\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f ve Nah\u00e7ivan b\u00f6lgelerinin\u201d stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc tek tarafl\u0131 ve\u00a0<\/span>g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanarak de\u011fi\u015ftirilmeyece\u011fi vurgulanmaktayd\u0131. (13) Bu geli\u015fmede, bir \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde de Azerbaycan`daki AHC y\u00f6netiminin d\u0131\u015f politikada ABD`ye \u00f6ncelik vermesinin rol\u00fc oldu\u011fu da s\u00f6ylenebilir. 8-10 Temmuz 1992`de ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen AG\u0130T Helsinki zirvesi \u00f6ncesinde ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 G.Bush`un Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 E.El\u00e7ibey`e yazd\u0131\u011f\u0131 mektupta ve daha sonra yine AG\u0130T \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde iki \u00fclke yetkililerinin yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde, Ermenistan`\u0131n i\u015fgalci sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131 devaml\u0131 ilk maddeyi olu\u015fturmaktayd\u0131. (14)<\/p>\n Bu arada, ABD`nin eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerine y\u00f6nelik giri\u015fimlerini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmekteydi. ABD yeni d\u00f6nemin f\u0131rsatlar\u0131ndan yararlanarak, bu Cumhuriyetleri \u201cKuzey Atlantik \u0130ttifak\u0131na ve demokratik d\u00fcnyaya ba\u011flamak, demokrasiyi, bu konuda yetersiz olan yeni Cumhuriyetlere getirmek\u201d amac\u0131ndayd\u0131. Bu ve benzeri ama\u00e7larla ABD y\u00f6netimi, yeni Cumhuriyetlere yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131 konusunda \u00f6zel yasa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in haz\u0131rl\u0131klara ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yasayla ilgili haz\u0131rl\u0131klar yap\u0131l\u0131rken, s\u00fcrekli bu yasa kapsam\u0131nda Rusya ve di\u011fer 11 eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerine (3\u00a0<\/span>Balt\u0131k Cumhuriyeti ba\u015fka \u00e7er\u00e7evede ele al\u0131nmaktayd\u0131) yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131ndan bahsedilmekteydi. Fakat, yakla\u015fan ba\u015fkanl\u0131k se\u00e7imlerinin de etkisiyle olsa gerek, yasan\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131na yakla\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, art\u0131k geli\u015fmelerde \u201cAzerbaycan`\u0131n Ermenistan`a (ve eski Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lgesine) kar\u015f\u0131 ambargo uygulamas\u0131 ve di\u011fer sald\u0131rgan tav\u0131rlar\u0131 \u201d nedeniyle bu \u00fclkeyle ilgili olarak yasaya \u00f6zel s\u0131n\u0131rlama getirilebilece\u011finden bahsedilmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n ABD Kongresi 24 Ekim 1992`de 2532 say\u0131l\u0131 \u201c\u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fcklere Yard\u0131m Yasas\u0131\u201dn\u0131 onaylam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r : Fakat tek ba\u015f\u0131na de\u011fil beklendi\u011fi gibi 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddesi ile birlikte. 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek madde, Azerbaycan`\u0131n; eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetlerine ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7 i\u00e7in 460 milyon dolar olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclen yard\u0131m\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda tutulmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6rmekteydi. Ek maddeye g\u00f6re, \u201cBu ve benzeri yasalar kapsam\u0131nda Azerbaycan`a ekonomik yard\u0131m, sadece ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131`n\u0131n, Azerbaycan y\u00f6netimin Ermenistan ve Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f`a y\u00f6nelik t\u00fcm ambargolar\u0131 ve her t\u00fcrl\u00fc kuvvet kullan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 sona\u00a0<\/span>erdirdi\u011fi tespit etti\u011fi ve bu konuda Kongreye bilgi verdi\u011fi zaman \u201d yap\u0131labilecektir. (15)<\/p>\n Ayr\u0131ca yasa metninde, daha \u00f6nceki \u201cRusya ve di\u011fer 11 Devletleri\u201d ifadesi yerine, art\u0131k \u201cRusya, Ukrayna, Ermenistan ve di\u011fer devletler\u201d tabiri kullan\u0131lmaktayd\u0131. Yasa ve ek maddesi ayn\u0131 g\u00fcn ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 G.Bush taraf\u0131ndan imzalanarak y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe konmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n E\u011fer yasan\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131rada, Ermenistan`\u0131n Azerbaycan`a y\u00f6nelik sald\u0131r\u0131 halinde oldu\u011fu ve Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fgal alt\u0131nda bulundurdu\u011fu, ya da en hafif deyimiyle, Ermenistan ile Azerbaycan aras\u0131nda bir sava\u015f\u0131n mevcut oldu\u011funu g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurursak s\u00f6ylenecek bir \u015fey kalmamaktad\u0131r. En hafif deyimiyle sava\u015f halinde olan iki devletten birinin, di\u011ferine kar\u015f\u0131 ambargo uygulamakla su\u00e7laman\u0131n, kabul edilebilir bir yan\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r. Bu geli\u015fmenin, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Ermeni lobisinin yo\u011fun \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n sonucu oldu\u011fu ortadad\u0131r. Nitekim karar Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan tepki ile kar\u015f\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00c7e\u015fitli d\u00fczeydeki yetkililerin tepki dolu a\u00e7\u0131klamalar\u0131yla beraber, \u201cAzeri\u201d, \u201cG\u00fcne\u015fli\u201d, \u201c\u00c7\u0131rag\u201d petrol yataklar\u0131na ili\u015fkin konsorsiyumda lider durumunda bulunan AMOCO (ABD) \u015firketi, yerini BP`ye (\u0130ngiltere) b\u0131rakmak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yasan\u0131n ve 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek\u00a0<\/span>maddesinin kabul\u00fcnden sonra ge\u00e7en s\u00fcrede Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkilerinde \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmeler ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Azerbaycan yetkilileri ABD yetkilileri ve \u00f6zel \u015firket temsilcileri ile ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen hemen-hemen t\u00fcm g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde bu konuyu dile getirmi\u015f ve s\u00fcrekli bu ek maddenin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde giri\u015fimlerde bulunmu\u015flard\u0131r. May\u0131s 1993`de Azerbaycan Parlamento Ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u0130.Gember Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndaki Azerbaycan heyetinin ABD ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda, Azerbaycan`\u0131n ABD B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ili\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, yetkililer ve bas\u0131n mensuplar\u0131yla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde, b\u00f6lgedeki olaylar\u0131n ger\u00e7ek y\u00fcz\u00fc ortaya konmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n B.2- ABD D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131nda Lobi Fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn ABD Azerbaycan \u0130li\u015fkilerine\u00a0<\/span>Etkisi 1990\u2019l\u0131 y\u0131llar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131ndan g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze kadar olan s\u00fcrede Emeni lobisininABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik d\u0131\u015f politikalar\u0131n\u0131n \u015fekillendirilmesi \u00fczerindeki rol\u00fc\u00a0<\/span>\u00f6rne\u011finden giderek, i\u00e7 etnik \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikan\u0131n belirlenmesindeki rol\u00fcn\u00fc de\u011ferlendirece\u011fim.<\/p>\n Ermeni \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131n\u0131n ABD politikalar\u0131 \u00fczerinde \u00f6nemli etkilerini g\u00f6stermekle beraber, Ermeni etnik lobisinin \u00f6zellikle 11 Eyl\u00fcl ter\u00f6r sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131ndan sonra, ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik politikalar\u0131n\u0131n belirleyici \u00f6\u011fesi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve etkisinin a\u00e7\u0131k ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlarla s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 oldu\u011fu vurgulanmaktad\u0131r. Fakat ayn\u0131 d\u0131\u015f politikay\u0131 Karaba\u011f sava\u015f\u0131 y\u0131llar\u0131nda g\u00f6remiyoruz.<\/p>\n ABD politika belirleme s\u00fcrecine etkide bulunan etnik gruplar dahil, \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131na izin verme fakt\u00f6rler daha geni\u015f kapsamda devlet \u2013 toplum ili\u015fkilerinin do\u011fas\u0131nda ve \u00fclkenin politik ve parti organizasyonunda yatmaktad\u0131r. (16)<\/p>\n Burada de\u011finilmesi gereken en \u00f6nemli nokta Azerbaycan ad\u0131na bask\u0131 gruplar\u0131n\u0131n bulunmamas\u0131 ve ABD\u2019nin do\u011fal olarak sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu olanaklardan yararlanmamas\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan ABD\u2019de aleyhindeki bask\u0131 gruplar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 ABD\u2019deki Yahudi Lobilerinden yararlanmak istemektedir. Yani Azerbaycan ABD d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131 etkileyebilecek bir etnik bask\u0131 grubuna sahip de\u011fildir. Tarihi ve toplumsal nedenlerden dolay\u0131 Azerilerin burada bulunmamas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n, \u00f6zelikle \u0130ran devriminden sonra rejim kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 Azerilerin ABD\u2019ye g\u00f6\u00e7 etmesi ABD\u2019deki Azerbaycanl\u0131 n\u00fcfusunu art\u0131r\u0131yor.Fakat bu ki\u015filerin bir\u00e7o\u011fu etnik bilin\u00e7ten yoksun sadece \u0130ran\u2019daki rejim de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi i\u00e7in faaliyette bulunan \u201cgruplar\u201d olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r\u00a0<\/span>ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n bu gruplardan ger\u00e7ek anlam\u0131yla verimli olarak yararlanma olana\u011f\u0131 bulunmamaktad\u0131r. (17)<\/p>\n Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Ermeni bask\u0131 gruplar\u0131n\u0131n etkinli\u011fine bakmak i\u00e7in, Ermeni konusu \u00fczerine 1995 y\u0131l\u0131nda te\u015fkil edilen Kongre Komitesinin ocak 2003 itibari ile\u00a0<\/span>126 \u00fcyesi vard\u0131r. (18) Ve \u015fu anda ABD kongresinin en b\u00fcy\u00fck komitesidir. Bunu izleyen\u00a0<\/span>ikinci b\u00fcy\u00fck komite 117 \u00fcyeli Rum komitesidir ve birbirleri ile yak\u0131n i\u015f birli\u011fi i\u00e7indedirler. (19) Etnik \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131 ve organizasyonlar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan yerine getirilen bir di\u011fer \u00f6nemli i\u015flev politik \u00f6nerileri yap\u0131p onlar\u0131 izlemeleridir. (Bu nedenledir ki, Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u0131llard\u0131r s\u00fcren ABD ambargosu uyguland\u0131) Etnik organizasyonlar bu izlemeyi yaparlar ve \u00fcyelerini ve daha geni\u015f topluluklar\u0131 h\u00fck\u00fcmetteki geli\u015fmeler ve d\u00fcnyaca \u00f6nemli olduklar\u0131na inand\u0131klar\u0131 konularda bilgilendirirler.<\/p>\n Ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta politik ve ekonomik alanda ABD ile daha yak\u0131n bir i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde olmak isteyen Azerbaycan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131n ABD, Azerbaycan\u2019la olan ili\u015fkilerini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirme konusunda fazlaca g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan ABD-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri asimetrik bir g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcndeydi.<\/p>\n 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ambargo ile, Ermeni lobisi Azerbaycan h\u00fck\u00fcmetine \u00f6nemli bir ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmeti yard\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n yap\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 engellemekle kalmam\u0131\u015f ayn\u0131 zamanda Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f y\u00f6resindeki anla\u015fmazl\u0131kta Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n sald\u0131rgan rol\u00fc \u00fcstlendi\u011fi olumsuz imaj\u0131n\u0131 da yaratm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Hatta, Ermeni lobisinin bir ba\u015fka stratejik zaferi Da\u011fl\u0131k\u00a0<\/span>Karaba\u011f y\u00f6resini Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ayr\u0131 bir olu\u015fum olarak (ki bu b\u00f6lgenin ABD dahil uluslar aras\u0131 olarak Azerbaycan\u2019a ait oldu\u011fu kabul edilmi\u015ftir) 907. b\u00f6l\u00fcmde g\u00f6sterme \u015fekli ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131rgan g\u00fc\u00e7ler kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmesidir. 907. b\u00f6l\u00fcmle ilgili en ilgin\u00e7 yan\u0131 ise, Ermeni lobisinin Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nden ayr\u0131lan yeni ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devletlere verilecek yard\u0131mdan Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 yararland\u0131rmamas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n, Ermeni H\u00fck\u00fcmetinin b\u00f6lgede ABD\u2019nin rakipleri konumunda olan \u0130ran ve Rusya ile dostluk ili\u015fkileri i\u00e7inde olan otoriter ve m\u00fctecaviz bir h\u00fck\u00fcmet olu\u015fuydu Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran ve Rusya\u2019dan b\u00fcy\u00fck miktarda silah, petrol ve di\u011fer yard\u0131mlar ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 biliniyordu ve bu durum Azerbaycan istihbarat birimlerince de defalarca kan\u0131tlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Azerbaycan yetkilileri pek \u00e7ok ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Amerikal\u0131 g\u00f6zlemcinin de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, ABD H\u00fck\u00fcmetinin ve \u00f6zellikle Kongresinin Kafkaslarla ilgili politika yetkilerini etnik Amerikal\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131n\u0131n ellerine b\u0131rakt\u0131klar\u0131 \u015feklinde defalarca ele\u015ftirmi\u015flerdir.Azerbaycan H\u00fck\u00fcmeti ise Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n abluka iddialar\u0131n\u0131n kendilerin sava\u015f durumunda farz ettikleri bir \u00fclkeyle t\u00fcm ekonomik ili\u015fkilerini dondurarak ve ortak projelerde i\u015f yapmayarak kendilerin savunma a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan yasal haklar\u0131n\u0131 kulland\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrerek reddetmi\u015ftir. Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n o d\u00f6nem i\u00e7in d\u00fcnyaya a\u00e7\u0131labilece\u011fi tek kara s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019d\u0131r.<\/p>\n Azerbaycan yetkililere, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n tek s\u0131n\u0131r kom\u015fusunun kendileri olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yleyerek, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 ger\u00e7ekten ablukaya alamayacaklar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015flerdi. 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ambargo, ABD\u2019li y\u00fcksek mevkili yetkililer taraf\u0131ndan da \u015fiddetle ele\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f ile ABD arabulucusu John J. Maresca\u00a0<\/span>bununla ilgili olarak \u015funlar\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir: ABD \u2013 Azerbaycan \u00f6rne\u011finde \u00f6zellikle ticari ve g\u00fcvenlikle ilgili ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan yeni \u00e7\u0131karlar, Amerikan ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ile Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 zaman i\u00e7inde yakla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ve sonu\u00e7 olarak, ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131 y\u00f6nlendirmekte olan Ermeni lobisinin etkisini ve \u00f6nemini azaltm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu Ermeni lobisinin rol\u00fc ABD Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri daha geli\u015ftik\u00e7e kaybolacak anlam\u0131nda de\u011fildir ve do\u011fal olarak, yaln\u0131zca geli\u015fen ABD \u2013 Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri de de\u011fildir. Ermeni lobilerinin etkisiyle ABD- Ermenistan ili\u015fkileri de g\u00fc\u00e7lenmektedir. Fakat hem Ermeni ekonomisinin i\u00e7inde bulundu\u011fu zor durum, \u201cdo\u011fal abluka\u201d ABD\u2019li yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar ve i\u015f \u00e7evreleri i\u00e7in Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 zor durumda b\u0131rak\u0131yor. Daha \u00f6nce de s\u00f6yledi\u011fimiz gibi Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n tek \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131 olan \u0130ran`d\u0131r ve bu \u00fclke ile ABD\u2019nin ili\u015fkileri bildi\u011fimiz gibi k\u00f6t\u00fcd\u00fcr. Buna G\u00fcrcistan\u2019daki belirsiz ortam ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Ermenistan\u2019la ili\u015fkilerinin olmamas\u0131n\u0131 da eklersek ABD ve Ermenistan aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin ekonomik i\u015fbirli\u011fine \u015fuan i\u00e7in ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz.<\/p>\n ABD \u2013 Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri geli\u015ftik\u00e7e Ermeni lobisinin 1997\u2019li y\u0131llarda oldu\u011fu gibi kolayl\u0131kla Azerbaycan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 d\u0131\u015f politika olu\u015fturulu\u015funu etkileyemeyecektir. Ermeni \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131n\u0131n \u015fimdi ve belki de gelecekte hala ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik politikalar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck etkisi vard\u0131r ve olacakt\u0131r. Ancak ABD\u2019nin ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019la giderek \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015ft\u00fckten sonra, Ermeni lobisinin etkisinin de buna ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak darald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 takip eden d\u00f6nemlerde g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz.<\/p>\n B.3 – Haydar Aliyev D\u00f6nemi ABD \u0130le \u0130li\u015fkiler Bu arada ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nem i\u00e7erisinde Azerbaycan a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00f6nem arz eden tarihi olaylardan biri ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. 20 Eyl\u00fcl 1994`te Bak\u00fc`de Azerbaycan petrollerinin i\u015fletilmesine ili\u015fkin 4 ABD \u015firketinin de kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u201cY\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u201d imzaland\u0131. Bu olay hi\u00e7 ku\u015fkusuz Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkilerinin gelecekteki seyri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan da b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nem arz etmekteydi. (22)<\/p>\n 1995-96 y\u0131llar\u0131nda Azerbaycan ciddi ekonomik s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar ya\u015famakta ve maddi deste\u011fe ihtiya\u00e7 duymaktayd\u0131. Fakat 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek madde Azerbaycan`\u0131 neredeyse y\u0131ll\u0131k b\u00fct\u00e7esi kadar maddi yard\u0131mdan mahrum b\u0131rakmaktayd\u0131. ABD`nin Azerbaycan`a yard\u0131mlar\u0131 bak\u0131m\u0131ndan 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin etkisini g\u00f6rmek a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131rma yapacak olursak, 1995 y\u0131l\u0131 itibariyle ABD`den Ermenistan`\u0131n ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 toplam insani yard\u0131m yakla\u015f\u0131k 455 milyon ABD dolar\u0131 te\u015fkil etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n 1996`da Azerbaycan ABD ili\u015fkileri s\u00fcrecinde Azerbaycan a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan hem olumlu, hem de olumsuz geli\u015fmeler ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. Olumlu geli\u015fme ABD`nin Azerbaycan`a resmi yollardan yard\u0131m yapabilmesi i\u00e7in bir kap\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131yd\u0131.<\/p>\n 25 Ocak 1996`da Temsilciler Meclisi ve 26 Ocak 1996`da Senato TM \u00fcyesi Charles\u00a0<\/span>Willson`un 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek madde konusundaki d\u00fczeltme \u00f6nerisini onaylam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (23)<\/p>\n Karar ayn\u0131 g\u00fcn ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan imzalanarak y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe konmu\u015ftur. \u201cWillson\u00a0<\/span>D\u00fczeltmesi\u201d, ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131`n\u0131n, gayri resmi kanallardan Azerbaycan`a yap\u0131lan\u00a0<\/span>yard\u0131mlar\u0131n g\u00f6\u00e7men ve m\u00fcltecilerin ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131lamada yetersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131na karar vermesi durumunda, Azerbaycan`a resmi yollarla da yard\u0131m yap\u0131labilmesini \u00f6ng\u00f6rmekteydi. Olumsuz geli\u015fme ise 1997 y\u0131l\u0131 i\u00e7in yard\u0131m yasas\u0131n\u0131n \u201cPorter D\u00fczeltmeleri\u201d dikkate al\u0131narak, 11 Haziran 1996`da TM`de onaylanmas\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. \u201cPorter D\u00fczeltmeleri\u201d, ABD y\u00f6netiminin Azerbaycan ve eski DK\u00d6B co\u011frafyas\u0131ndan olan g\u00f6\u00e7menlere, sanki eski DK\u00d6B ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir devletmi\u015f gibi, ayr\u0131 ayr\u0131 yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6rmek suretiyle, Azerbaycan`\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc ihlal ediyordu. Kararla ilgili olarak 12 Haziran 1996`da ABD y\u00f6netimi, 18 Haziran 1996`da Azerbaycan D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 sert tepki vermi\u015flerdir. Buna kar\u015f\u0131n, Ermenistan D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 15 Haziran 1996`da bir a\u00e7\u0131klama yay\u0131nlayarak, ABD y\u00f6netiminin bu d\u00fczeltme konusundaki tutumunu ele\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. Azerbaycan ve ABD y\u00f6netimlerinin tepkileri ve baz\u0131 senat\u00f6rlerin yo\u011fun \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 sonucunda Senato, 26\u00a0<\/span>Temmuz 1996`da 1997 y\u0131l\u0131 i\u00e7in yard\u0131m yasas\u0131n\u0131, \u201cPorter D\u00fczeltmeleri\u201d ni dikkate almadan onaylam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aliyev ile TM Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkiler Komitesi yetkilileri daha sonraysa bir grup TM \u00fcyesi aras\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler sonucunda karar\u0131n nihai metninde \u201c Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f b\u00f6lgesi de i\u00e7inde bulunmak kayd\u0131yla Azerbaycan`a …\u201d ifadesi yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (24)<\/p>\n \u015eubat 1997`de ABD`nin yeni D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Madeleine Albright, Senatonun Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkiler Komitesinde yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada, \u201cClinton y\u00f6netiminin Azerbaycan`a yap\u0131lan yard\u0131mlarla ilgili s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131rmalara kar\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011funu\u00a0<\/span>22\u00a0<\/span>ve 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddeyi kald\u0131rmak i\u00e7in Kongrede yap\u0131lacak olan her t\u00fcrl\u00fc giri\u015fimi destekledi\u011fini\u201d ifade etmi\u015ftir. (25)<\/p>\n Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkileri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan 1997 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n en \u00f6nemli olay\u0131 ise, Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aliyev`in ABD ziyareti olmu\u015ftur. Ziyarete 27 Temmuz 1997`de ba\u015flayan Aliyev, bir\u00e7ok di\u011fer g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeden sonra 1 A\u011fustos 1997`de Clinton ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme s\u0131ras\u0131nda Clinton 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in elinden geleni yapaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmesine ra\u011fmen, g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme sonras\u0131 imzalanan ortak metinde buna ili\u015fkin ifadelere yer verilmemi\u015ftir. Yine ayn\u0131 g\u00fcn ABD Ba\u015fkan Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Albert Gore ve Azerbaycan Devlet Aliyev taraf\u0131ndan, Azerbaycan ve ABD`nin enerji sekt\u00f6r\u00fcnde i\u015fbirli\u011fine ili\u015fkin anla\u015fma ve Chevron, Exxon, Mobil \u015firketleriyle SOCAR aras\u0131nda Ab\u015feron, Nah\u00e7\u0131van ve O\u011fuz isimli petrol yataklar\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fletilmesi konusunda anla\u015fma imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunlar\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra AMOCO \u015firketiyle \u0130nam yata\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin i\u015fbirli\u011fi anla\u015fmas\u0131 da imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (26)<\/p>\n 29 Ekim 1998`de Azerbaycan ve ABD`nin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra G\u00fcrcistan, \u00d6zbekistan ve Kazakistan yetkililerinin kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131yla imzalanan \u201cAnkara Deklarasyonu\u201d \u00f6nemli bir geli\u015fmeydi. ABD Enerji Bakan\u0131 ve di\u011fer devletlerin Devlet Ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan imzalanan deklarasyon, bu devletlerin Bak\u00fc-Ceyhan`\u0131 desteklemelerini \u00f6ng\u00f6rmekteydi. 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in 1999 y\u0131l\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde petrol \u015firketlerinin \u00e7abalar\u0131 yo\u011funla\u015farak devam etmi\u015ftir. \u00d6zellikle Senato ve TM`de yap\u0131lan d\u0131\u015f politikaya ili\u015fkin oturumlarda konu\u015fma yapan yetkililer, 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin mevcudiyetinin ABD`nin tarafs\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na hem g\u00f6lge d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc, hem de\u00a0<\/span>kendisi i\u00e7in \u00e7\u0131kar b\u00f6lgesi olan Hazar havzas\u0131nda hareket alan\u0131n\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rland\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 dile getirmi\u015flerdir. 22-24 Nisan 1999 tarihlerinde Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aliyev NATO`nun 50. y\u0131l kutlama t\u00f6renlerine kat\u0131lmak i\u00e7in ABD`ye gitmi\u015ftir. Orda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde de as\u0131l konu 907. ek madde olmu\u015ftur. (27)<\/p>\n 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda ya\u015fanan en \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmelerden birisi Beyaz Saray taraf\u0131ndan\u00a0<\/span>17 Aral\u0131k 1999 tarihli \u201cABD`nin Hazar B\u00f6lgesi Enerji Politikas\u0131 Hakk\u0131nda Bilgi Notu\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 belgesinin yay\u0131nlanmas\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. (28) Belgede, Azerbaycan`\u0131n da aralar\u0131nda bulundu\u011fu yeni ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazanm\u0131\u015f Hazar Havzas\u0131 \u00dclkeleri`nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ve g\u00fcvenli\u011finin g\u00fc\u00e7lendirilmesi, b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 piyasalara engellenmeden ula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 konusunda ABD`nin \u00f6nemli ad\u0131mlar atmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi ifade edilmekteydi.<\/p>\n Aliyev May\u0131s 2000`de ABD Senat\u00f6rleri ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde ve Ekim2000`de, Albright`a yazd\u0131\u011f\u0131 mektupta, 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin mevcudiyetinin verdi\u011fi rahats\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 tekrar dile getirmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n George W. Bush`un Ba\u015fkan se\u00e7ilmesiyle birlikte Azerbaycan`\u0131n konuya ili\u015fkin umutlar\u0131 daha da artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Nitekim, Nisan 2001`de Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc konusunda ABD`de ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen Key West g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri s\u0131ras\u0131nda, hemen sonras\u0131nda Azerbaycan ve ABD Ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde, Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aliyev ile Senat\u00f6rler ve di\u011fer ABD yetkilileri aras\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen toplant\u0131larda konuya ili\u015fkin de\u011ferlendirmeler yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, an\u0131lan maddenin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in giri\u015fimlerin s\u00fcrece\u011fi ifade edilmi\u015ftir. 16 Haziran 2001`de Bak\u00fc`de ABD`nin Azerbaycan Sahil G\u00fcvenlik birimlerine hibe etti\u011fi h\u00fccumbot, d\u00fczenlenen t\u00f6renle denize indirilmi\u015ftir. ABD`nin Bak\u00fc B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi Ross Wilson, t\u00f6rende yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada 15 metre uzunlu\u011fundaki h\u00fccumbotun Azerbaycan`a yap\u0131lan yard\u0131m program\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde hibe edildi\u011fini ve Azeri kara sular\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011finin korunmas\u0131nda kullan\u0131laca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir. B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7i bu t\u00fcr yard\u0131mlar\u0131n devam edece\u011fini kaydetmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n 2001 Temmuzunda Azerbaycan ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda Hazar`\u0131n payla\u015fmas\u0131na ili\u015fkin \u00e7\u0131kan kriz, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgede Azerbaycan`\u0131 yaln\u0131z b\u0131rakmamas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi yorumlar\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. Kriz s\u0131ras\u0131nda ABD`nin \u0130ran`\u0131 su\u00e7lay\u0131c\u0131 ve Azerbaycan`\u0131 destekleyici mahiyette a\u00e7\u0131klama yapmas\u0131 da olumlu geli\u015fme olarak dikkat \u00e7ekmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n B.4 – 11 Eyl\u00fcl Sonras\u0131 ABD-Azerbaycan \u0130li\u015fkileri 24 Ekim 2001`de Senato, 14 Kas\u0131m 2001`de Kongre`nin iki kanad\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki uzla\u015fma komisyonu, 19 Aral\u0131k 2001`de ise TM \u201c2002 y\u0131l\u0131 sonuna kadar 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131n durdurulmas\u0131 konusunda\u201d ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131na yetki verilmesine ili\u015fkin karar\u0131 onaylam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (29). Buna g\u00f6re, ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u00fclkenin g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ve \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131, y\u00fcr\u00fct\u00fclen ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele operasyonunun ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan gerekli g\u00f6r\u00fcrse Azerbaycan`a resmi yollardan yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131na karar verebilecektir. Bu arada Azerbaycan ve ABD Devlet Ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 aras\u0131nda 30 Ekim 2001 tarihinde ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen telefon konu\u015fmas\u0131nda, al\u0131nan karara ili\u015fkin memnuniyet ve iki \u00dclkenin askeri alanda i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapabilecekleri dile getirilmi\u015ftir. Azerbaycan karar\u0131 sevin\u00e7, Ermenistan ise tepkiyle kar\u015f\u0131lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Bu arada, ABD yetkililerinin b\u00f6lgeyle ilgilenmeleri de devam etmi\u015ftir. 15<\/p>\n Aral\u0131k 2001`de ABD Savunma Bakan\u0131 Donald Rumsfelt Azerbaycan`\u0131 ziyaret ederek burada Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Haydar Aliyev, Savunma ve D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanlar\u0131 ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler s\u0131ras\u0131nda 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131ndan duyduklar\u0131 memnuniyeti dile getiren Donald Rumsfeld, yeni durumun ABD`nin Azerbaycan`a askeri yard\u0131m yapmas\u0131na olanak sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 umduklar\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir. (30)<\/p>\n 15 Aral\u0131k 2001`de Rumsfelt Ermenistan\u2019a da giderek burada da \u00fcst d\u00fczey yetkililerle g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler s\u0131ras\u0131nda 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin uygulan\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n durdurulmas\u0131 konusuna da de\u011finen Rumsfeld, bu konuda\u00a0<\/span>k\u00f6t\u00fcmser olmamak gerekti\u011fini ifade etmi\u015ftir. Ona g\u00f6re, al\u0131nan karar, Ermenistan ile ABD aras\u0131nda baz\u0131 askeri alanlarda i\u015fbirli\u011fini ve ABD`nin Ermenistan`a askeri yard\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 daha kolay hale getirmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Sonraki d\u00f6nemlerde de g\u00f6r\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr ki, Azerbaycan`daki yo\u011fun beklentilerin ve s\u00f6ylemlerin tersine, ABD`nin Kafkasya Politikas\u0131nda Azerbaycan-Ermenistan dengeleri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ciddi bir de\u011fi\u015fiklikten bahsetmek a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 iyimserliktir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc ABD, Azerbaycan`a y\u00f6nelik her hangi bir olumlu ad\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 hemen Ermenistan`a y\u00f6nelik att\u0131\u011f\u0131 olumlu bir ad\u0131mla dengelemek zorunda kald\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6z\u00fckmektedir. Bu nedenle de ABD`nin 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin uygulamas\u0131n\u0131 durdurmas\u0131n\u0131 Azerbaycan D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ba\u015far\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rmekle beraber, H.Aliyevin bu karar sonras\u0131nda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir a\u00e7\u0131klamada yer verdi\u011fi \u201dBu karar sadece sembolik anlamda \u00f6nemlidir.Bizim i\u00e7in maddi \u00f6nemi yoktur. Zira maddi a\u00e7\u0131dan en \u00e7ok ihtiya\u00e7 duydu\u011fumuz d\u00f6nemde yard\u0131mlar konusunda ambargo vard\u0131.\u201d g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fc de unutmamak gerekmektedir.<\/p>\n 2002 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki \u00f6nemli geli\u015fmelerden birisi, Haydar Aliyev`in ABD Bak\u00fc B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ili\u011fi taraf\u0131ndan \u201c4 Temmuz Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k G\u00fcn\u00fc\u201d dolay\u0131s\u0131yla verilen resepsiyonda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmas\u0131nda, ABD`nin uluslararas\u0131 ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 verdi\u011fi m\u00fccadelede yan\u0131nda olduklar\u0131n\u0131 bir kez daha vurgulamakla beraber, ABD`nin d\u00fcnyan\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli b\u00f6lgelerinde ya\u015fanan sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde aktif rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131na i\u015faret ederek, Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali meselesinin\u00a0<\/span>\u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulunmas\u0131nda da daha cesur davranaca\u011f\u0131 inanc\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da ifade\u00a0<\/span>etmi\u015ftir. (31) Bu konu\u015fma, ABD`nin gelecek d\u00f6nemde G\u00fcney Kafkasya`ya ili\u015fkin siyasal s\u00fcre\u00e7lerde daha aktif rol alaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n habercilerinden birisi olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkileri a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00f6nemli bir noktay\u0131 Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 Haydar Aliyev`in \u015eubat 2003 sonu ba\u015flayan ABD ziyareti olmu\u015ftur. Ziyaretin ABD Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 George Bush`un daveti \u00fczerine ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilece\u011fi ziyaretin ba\u015flamas\u0131ndan k\u0131sa s\u00fcre \u00f6nce a\u00e7\u0131klanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ziyaret s\u0131ras\u0131nda Aliyev 24 \u015eubat 2003`te \u00f6nce AG\u0130T Minsk Grubunun ABD`li E\u015fba\u015fkan\u0131 ile ard\u0131ndan da ABD Ticaret Bakan\u0131 ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 25 \u015eubat 2003`te Azerbaycan-ABD Ticaret Odas\u0131nda Hazar`\u0131n do\u011fal kaynaklar\u0131 konusunda bir konferansa kat\u0131lan ve konu\u015fma yapan H. Aliyev, 26 \u015eubat 2003`te ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Bush ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. G\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme s\u0131ras\u0131nda ikili ili\u015fkilerin durumu ve geli\u015ftirme perspektifleri, Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgali sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc, uluslararas\u0131 g\u00fcvenlik, ter\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fi gibi konular ele al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Aliyev`in ABD ziyaretinin hemen \u00f6ncesindeki bir ka\u00e7 g\u00fcn i\u00e7erisinde \u00e7ok say\u0131daki Rusyal\u0131 yetkili ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yapm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 ilgin\u00e7 bir rastlant\u0131 olu\u015fturmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 George Bush`un Hazar Havzas\u0131 \u00d6zel Temsilcisi Steven Mann`\u0131n 10. Hazar Petrol ve Do\u011falgaz Fuar\u0131na kat\u0131lmak \u00fczere yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Azerbaycan ziyareti H. Aliyev d\u00f6nemi Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkilerinin son halkalar\u0131ndan birisini olu\u015fturmu\u015ftur. Ziyaret \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131\u0131 H. Aliyev taraf\u0131ndan da kabul edilen Mann, g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmede ABD`nin, Hazar havzas\u0131 enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n kullan\u0131m\u0131 konusunda verdi\u011fi g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc deste\u011fini bir kez daha H. Aliyev`e iletmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n ABD, 2003 y\u0131l\u0131ndan itibaren Azerbaycan\u2019da \u00fcs kurmak i\u00e7in g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere devam etmektedir. Azerbaycan eski Ba\u015fkan`\u0131\u0131 Haydar Aliyev, Rusya, \u0130ran ve ABD aras\u0131nda ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir \u015fekilde denge politikas\u0131 izlemi\u015f, bu konuda kesin bir yan\u0131t vermeyerek kendi manevra alan\u0131n\u0131n k\u0131s\u0131lmas\u0131na imkan vermemi\u015ftir. Ancak 2004 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015flar\u0131ndan itibaren ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019da askeri \u00fcs konusu yeniden g\u00fcndeme gelmi\u015ftir. 2004 A\u011fustos ay\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131nda Ba\u015fkan \u0130lham Aliyev taraf\u0131ndan Azerbaycan Milli G\u00fcvenlik Kanunu onaylanarak y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girmi\u015ftir. Bu yasa gere\u011fince Azerbaycan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde yabanc\u0131 \u00fclke askerlerinin konu\u015fland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 yasaklanmaktad\u0131r. Bununla Azerbaycan, Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n endi\u015felerini belli bir\u00a0<\/span>\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde azaltm\u0131\u015f, ABD i\u00e7in ise pazarl\u0131k \u015fartlar\u0131n\u0131 daha da zorlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (32)<\/p>\n \u0130ran Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 Muhammet Hatemi\u2019nin Azerbaycan ziyaretinin ard\u0131ndan ABD Savunma Bakan\u0131 Donald Rumsfeld Azerbaycan\u2019a gelmi\u015ftir. Almanya ve Bat\u0131 Avrupa\u2019da konu\u015flanan ABD askerlerinin geri \u00e7ekilmesinin tart\u0131\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir zamanda, Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) petrol boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011finin sa\u011flanmas\u0131 ba\u011flam\u0131nda Azerbaycan\u2019da askeri \u00fcs kurma talebi yeniden g\u00fcndeme ta\u015f\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Irak operasyonunda Almanya ve Fransa\u2019n\u0131n ABD\u2019yi desteklememesi \u00fczerine Avrupa\u2019da konu\u015flanan askeri \u00fcslerin ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 ile ilgili \u00e7e\u015fitli haberler yay\u0131nlanmaktad\u0131r. ABD Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan konu ile ilgili yap\u0131lan a\u00e7\u0131klamada Bat\u0131 Avrupa ve Almanya\u2019da konu\u015flanan yakla\u015f\u0131k 100 bin Amerikan askerinin b\u00fcy\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn \u00fclkelerine geri d\u00f6nece\u011fi, bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn de NATO\u2019ya yeni \u00fcye olmu\u015f Do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkelerinde (Polonya, Bulgaristan) konu\u015flanaca\u011f\u0131 bildirilmektedir. Ayr\u0131ca Rumsfeld, Do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkelerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra\u00a0<\/span>baz\u0131 eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi \u00fclkelerinde de askeri \u00fcs edinme projelerinin oldu\u011fu konusunda bir a\u00e7\u0131klama yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z eksperler taraf\u0131ndan yap\u0131lan de\u011ferlendirmelerde ise bu \u00fclkelerin Kazakistan, Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan oldu\u011fu ifade edilmektedir. ABD, bu \u00fclkelerde askeri \u00fcs kurmakla enerji kaynaklar\u0131 ve petrol boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flaman\u0131n, ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadelenin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 ku\u015fatmay\u0131 da ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. ABD, \u00f6zellikle \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n n\u00fckleer silah ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 konusunda ciddi endi\u015felerinin oldu\u011fu bilinirken bu uygulamas\u0131 ile \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 daha yak\u0131ndan kontrol etmek f\u0131rsat\u0131n\u0131 da yakalayacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n Rumsfeld, Rusya Savunma Bakan\u0131 Sergey \u0130vanov ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmede Amerikan askerlerini Rusya Federasyonu s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na yak\u0131n b\u00f6lgelerde konu\u015fland\u0131rmak istediklerini bildirmi\u015ftir. Amerikan askerlerinin Rusya\u2019ya s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 olan hangi \u00fclkelere yerle\u015ftirilece\u011fi konusunda bir a\u00e7\u0131klama yap\u0131lmasa da, bu \u00fclkelerin Balt\u0131k \u00fclkeleri, Kazakistan, Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan olaca\u011f\u0131 konusunda ortak bir g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f olu\u015fmu\u015ftur. ABD Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019ndan General Chaerles Wald, Defens News gazetesine verdi\u011fi deme\u00e7te Avrupa\u2019daki Amerikan Ordusu Komutanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n, Afrika ve Hazar Denizi havzas\u0131nda askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek niyetinde oldu\u011funu belirtmi\u015ftir. Hazar havzas\u0131 \u00fclkelerinden \u00f6ncelikle Azerbaycan\u2019da \u00fcs kurmak istediklerini a\u00e7\u0131klayan Wald, bu birliklerin BTC petrol boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011finden sorumlu olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir. ABD, Azerbaycan\u2019dan \u00fcs talep ederken daha \u00e7ok, denizde ve karada bulunan petrol yataklar\u0131n\u0131n ve petrol boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fi konusunu \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Bu ba\u011flamda ABD 2003 y\u0131l\u0131 A\u011fustos ay\u0131nda ve 2004\u00a0<\/span>y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015flar\u0131nda Azerbaycan ile birlikte askeri tatbikatlar d\u00fczenlemi\u015ftir. 2004 y\u0131l\u0131\u00a0<\/span>sonlar\u0131nda ise NATO\u2019nun Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130\u00e7in Ortakl\u0131k (B\u0130O) program\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde\u00a0<\/span>Cooperative Best Effort tatbikat\u0131n\u0131 da Azerbaycan\u2019da ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirecektir. (33)<\/p>\n Asl\u0131nda BTC petrol boru hatt\u0131na y\u00f6nelik yap\u0131lan herhangi bir ter\u00f6rist sald\u0131r\u0131, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgede askeri \u00fcs kurma gereksinimini de beraberinde getirecektir. G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinden hi\u00e7biri (Rusya ve \u0130ran dahil olmak \u00fczere) ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele konusunda askeri, mali ve tecr\u00fcbe bak\u0131m\u0131ndan avantajl\u0131 durumda de\u011fildir. B\u00f6yle bir sald\u0131r\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti\u011fi taktirde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir ihtimal ile b\u00f6lge devletleri kendileri ABD\u2019ye askeri \u00fcs vermeyi teklif edecektir.<\/p>\n Rusya, ABD\u2019nin eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi Cumhuriyetlerinde askeri \u00fcs edinmesinden olduk\u00e7a rahats\u0131z olmu\u015f ve bunu \u00e7e\u015fitli vesilelerle dile getirmi\u015ftir. ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019dan askeri \u00fcs talebi g\u00fcndeme geldi\u011finde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Azerbaycan B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi Nikolay Ryabov yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada ABD Azerbaycan\u2019da askeri \u00fcs edinirse, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde ciddi sorunlarla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fabilece\u011fini ifade ederek Azerbaycan H\u00fck\u00fcmetini adeta tehdit etmi\u015ftir. Bu konular tart\u0131\u015f\u0131lmaya ba\u015flar ba\u015flamaz Rusya Ermenistan ile stratejik i\u015fbirli\u011finden bahsederek, ikili ili\u015fkileri daha da geli\u015ftirmek istediklerini kamuoyuna duyurmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n Bir ba\u015fka dikkate de\u011fer konu da ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan askeri \u00fcs talep etmesine ra\u011fmen, Ermenistan\u2019da konu\u015flanan 102. Rus askeri \u00fcss\u00fc ile ilgili hi\u00e7bir a\u00e7\u0131klamada bulunmamas\u0131d\u0131r. Ermenistan, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019daki Kalesi olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, ABD bu \u00fclkeye Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yard\u0131mdan daha \u00e7ok yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmaktad\u0131r. Ermenistan\u2019a yap\u0131lan yard\u0131m ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na\u00a0<\/span>g\u00f6re hesaplan\u0131rsa, ABD\u2019nin \u0130srail\u2019den sonra en \u00e7ok Ermenistan\u2019a yard\u0131m yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 anla\u015f\u0131lmaktad\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca ABD, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran\u2019a n\u00fckleer silah teknolojisi yard\u0131m\u0131nda bulunmas\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6rmezlikten gelmektedir. Bu ba\u011flamda ABD Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n etkili oldu\u011fu bilinen bir ger\u00e7ektir. Ancak ABD\u2019nin ulusal g\u00fcvenlik anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131, \u00fclkede bulunan bir etnik grubun lobi faaliyetleri sonucunda basit bir \u015fekilde ihlal ediliyorsa, Atlantik\u2019in kar\u015f\u0131 k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131nda g\u00fcvenlik sorununu \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kararak \u00fcs talep etmesin de fazla samimi olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylenebilir. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla ABD\u2019nin amac\u0131n\u0131n enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n ve ula\u015f\u0131m g\u00fczergah\u0131 hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flaman\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra, \u0130ran ve Rusya\u2019y\u0131 kontrol etmek oldu\u011fu kanaati vermektedir.<\/p>\n ABD\u2019nin G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da askeri \u00fcs edinmesi, Rusya\u2019y\u0131 b\u00f6lgedeki askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rmaya itecektir. Bu durumda da AKKA Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019nda \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclen silah kotalar\u0131 ihlal edilecektir. B\u00f6lgede ABD\u2019nin de silahlanmaya kalkmas\u0131 halinde Rusya\u2019dan AKKA Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019nda \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclen kotalara uymas\u0131n\u0131 talep edemeyecektir.<\/p>\n Azerbaycan Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u0130lham Aliyev, b\u00f6lgede ya\u015fanan ABD-Rusya ve ABD-\u0130ran rekabeti nedeniyle denge politikas\u0131n\u0131 korumaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fsa da, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne almak \u015fart\u0131yla, dengeyi ABD\u2019nin lehine bozma ihtimalinin oldu\u011fu tahmin edilmektedir. ABD\u2019nin talebinin kar\u015f\u0131lanmas\u0131 bug\u00fcnk\u00fc \u015fartlarda ola\u011fan g\u00f6z\u00fckmektedir. Ancak k\u0131sa ve orta vadede Azerbaycan\u2019dan \u00fcs almas\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00f6ncelikle Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ikna etmesi gerekmektedir. (Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ikna edebilirse, \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n itirazlar\u0131 fazla etkili olmayacakt\u0131r). Azerbaycan h\u00fck\u00fcmeti buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k;<\/p>\n ABD\u2019deki Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n propaganda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 sonucunda Senato ve\u00a0<\/span>Kongrede Azerbaycan kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerin artmas\u0131n\u0131n engellenmesini,\u00a0<\/span>1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda yedi b\u00f6lgenin Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgal edilmesine ra\u011fmen, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 sald\u0131rgan olarak niteleyen ve Azerbaycan\u2019a yard\u0131m\u0131 yasaklayan 907 say\u0131l\u0131 karar\u0131n y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fckten tamamen kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131,\u00a0<\/span>ABD\u2019nin Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 ayr\u0131 birim olarak g\u00f6rmemesini, bu ba\u011flamda Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019a sa\u011flanan yard\u0131mlar\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019a verilen yard\u0131mlar paketi i\u00e7inde verilmesini,\u00a0<\/span>ABD\u2019ye \u00fcs verdi\u011fi taktirde Rusya ve \u0130ran taraf\u0131ndan kaynaklanan sorunlar nedeniyle u\u011frad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik ve ticari zararlar\u0131n ABD taraf\u0131ndan kar\u015f\u0131lanmas\u0131n\u0131,Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n uzla\u015fmaz politikas\u0131n\u0131 yumu\u015fatmas\u0131 i\u00e7in Ermenistan H\u00fck\u00fcmetine bask\u0131 yapmas\u0131n\u0131 ABD H\u00fck\u00fcmetinden talep etmelidir.<\/p>\n ABD, Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ikna etmeden \u00f6nce Azerbaycan ABD\u2019ye askeri \u00fcs verirse, \u00f6zellikle Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f konusunda ciddi sorunlarla kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fabilir. Bir \u00f6nemli nokta ise bu konu g\u00fcndeme geldi\u011finde sanki ABD, Rusya kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 yaln\u0131z b\u0131rakmaktad\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda Azerbaycan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n muhatab\u0131 olmaktan kesinlikle ka\u00e7\u0131nmal\u0131, Rusya ABD taraf\u0131ndan ikna edildikten sonra, ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n korunmas\u0131 \u015fart\u0131yla ABD\u2019ye \u00fcs vermeli, Kafkasya\u2019da ABD-Rusya, ABD-\u0130ran rekabetinde oyuncu konumuna sokulmaktan kesinlikle ka\u00e7\u0131nmal\u0131, Azerbaycan- Rusya, Azerbaycan-\u0130ran ili\u015fkilerinin devam etmesine ve geli\u015ftirilmesine \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/span><\/p>\n C. G\u00dcRC\u0130STAN-ABD \u0130L\u0130\u015eK\u0130LER\u0130 tehdit etmedi\u011fi s\u00fcre\u00e7te RF’nin her hangi bir askeri m\u00fcdahalelerine kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmamay\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. Rusya’n\u0131n \u015eubat 1993’te “Yak\u0131n \u00c7evre Doktrini”ni kabul etmesi ve B. Yeltsin taraf\u0131ndan onayland\u0131ktan sonra y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girmesiyle G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n ABD ve Bat\u0131yla olan ili\u015fkileri s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc o zaman G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n \u00fcst g\u00f6revli yetkilileri ve \u015eeverdnadze’nin taraftarlar\u0131 Rusya’y\u0131 bir tehdit olarak g\u00f6rm\u00fcyor ve aksine \u00fclke i\u00e7indeki etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n ve ekonomik huzursuzluklar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc Rusya’da g\u00f6r\u00fcyordu. Di\u011fer yandan ABD’nin de G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131 hala Rusya’n\u0131n etki alan\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rmesi G\u00fcrcistan’la ili\u015fkilerini \u00e7ok fazla geli\u015fmemesine yol a\u00e7t\u0131. \u0130li\u015fkilerde bu t\u00fcr s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 i\u015fbirli\u011fi 1995 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar devam etti. Ama 1995 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar ABD G\u00fcrcistan’a di\u011fer eski SSCB \u00fclkelerine ay\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi her y\u0131l belirli bir miktarda demokrasi ve insani yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. 1995 senesine geldi\u011fimizde G\u00fcrcistan’da yeni bir geli\u015fmelerin oldu\u011funu g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz. Art\u0131k Rusya’n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’daki problemleri \u00e7\u00f6zmek istemedi\u011fini ve bu problemlerin devam etmesi durumunda\u00a0<\/span>Rusya G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131 daha iyi bir \u015fekilde kendi etkisi alt\u0131nda tuttu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesini g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz. Rusya’n\u0131n bu tutumu hem G\u00fcrc\u00fc halk\u0131 hem de y\u00f6netim taraf\u0131ndan iyice anla\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Art\u0131k y\u00f6netim d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda Rusya’ya daha az yer ay\u0131rmakta ve Bat\u0131yla ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmeye y\u00f6n vermekteydi. \u0130li\u015fkilerin bu t\u00fcr geli\u015fimini etkileyen di\u011fer bir neden 19 A\u011fustos 1995’de E. \u015eeverdnadze’ye yap\u0131lan suikast giri\u015fimi olmu\u015ftur. G\u00fcrc\u00fc y\u00f6neticileri bu ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z suikast giri\u015fiminin arkas\u0131nda Rusya’n\u0131n oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yl\u00fcyor ve art\u0131k Rusya’y\u0131 bir g\u00fcvenlik etkeni olarak de\u011fil tehdit olarak d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorlard\u0131.<\/p>\n Di\u011fer yandan Hazar’\u0131n enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n Bat\u0131 pazarlar\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in Bak\u00fc’de yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmalar G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n \u00f6nemini ABD i\u00e7in art\u0131rd\u0131 bu devirde. Bunu ayr\u0131ca G\u00fcrcistan a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan zaman\u0131n \u015fans\u0131 olarak da de\u011ferlendirebiliriz. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc anla\u015fmalar\u0131n yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir zamanda ABD b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n Rusya’n\u0131n tekelinden \u00e7\u0131karmak i\u00e7in ta\u015f\u0131nacak petrol ve do\u011fal gaz kemerlerinin Ermenistan’dan ge\u00e7mesine taraftar olmu\u015f, ama Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sava\u015f\u0131 nedeniyle Azerbaycan buna raz\u0131 olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u0130ran ve G\u00fcrcistan varyantlar\u0131nda \u0131srar etmi\u015ftir. Bu devirde \u0130ran i\u00e7erisinde ve d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda ABD ve \u0130srail’e y\u00f6nelik k\u00f6t\u00fc geli\u015fmelerin ya\u015fanmas\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan varyant\u0131n\u0131 daha optimal hale getirmi\u015ftir. Bu\u00a0<\/span>geli\u015fmeler G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n ekonomik olarak ABD’ye ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rman\u0131n yan\u0131-s\u0131ra ayn\u0131 zamanda siyasi alanlarda da ABD’yle i\u015fbirli\u011finin art\u0131rmas\u0131na neden ola bilirdi. B\u00f6ylece G\u00fcrcistan, Rusya’n\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na y\u00f6nelik olu\u015fturdu\u011fu tehdidi, yaln\u0131z geni\u015f anlamda Bat\u0131, \u00f6zel olarak ABD ve b\u00f6lgesel g\u00fc\u00e7\u00a0<\/span>olarak T\u00fcrkiye ile dengeleyebilece\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmekteydi. (36)<\/p>\n E\u011fer A\u011fustos 1995 y\u0131l\u0131nda\u00a0<\/span>\u015eeverdnadze’ye kar\u015f\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilen suikast ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olsayd\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan yeniden \u00e7ok kolayl\u0131kla geriye i\u00e7 huzursuzluklara ve etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalara girebilirdi. Bu devirde\u00a0<\/span>ABD’nin G\u00fcrcistan’a ilgisi de artarak devam ediyordu. Bunun da bir nedeni vard\u0131. Hazar b\u00f6lgesinin b\u00fcy\u00fck petrol kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funun G\u00fcrcistan’dan ihra\u00e7 olunmas\u0131- n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc e\u011fer G\u00fcrcistan’da yeniden m\u00fcnaka\u015falar ba\u015flasayd\u0131, Hazar petrol ihracat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131 Rusya’yla petrol ihrac\u0131nda azaltmalar edebilerdi. (37) 1996 y\u0131l\u0131na geldi\u011fimizde ABD’nin G\u00fcrcistan’a daha s\u0131k\u0131 ba\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve hatta ekonomik yard\u0131mlar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda i\u00e7 politikaya da etkili oldu\u011funu g\u00f6r\u00fcyoruz. Nitekim Clinton y\u00f6netimi 1996’dan itibaren geli\u015ftirmeye ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan’la ili\u015fkilerini k\u0131sa bir s\u00fcre sonra Tiflis’in kar\u015f\u0131 – kar\u015f\u0131ya oldu\u011fu sorunlara sahip \u00e7\u0131karak, G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n hamisi oldu\u011funu ve Rusya’n\u0131n bu \u00fclkenin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na tehdit niteli\u011fi ta\u015f\u0131yan giri\u015fimlerini \u00f6nlemek niyetinde oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. (38) ABD’nin bu devirdeki G\u00fcrcistan’a yard\u0131mlar\u0131 daha \u00e7ok USA\u0130D taraf\u0131ndan sa\u011flanan teknik yard\u0131mlarla olmu\u015ftur USA\u0130D yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7 esas i\u015f i\u00e7in ay\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u2022 Ekonominin yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lma USA\u0130D ayn\u0131 zamanda G\u00fcrcistan y\u00f6netimine b\u00fct\u00e7e ve ekonomik reformlar konusunda da dan\u0131\u015fmanl\u0131k yard\u0131mlar\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Genel olarak ge\u00e7en y\u0131llar i\u00e7erisinde ABD y\u00f6netiminin eski Sovyet Birli\u011finin yerinde kurulmu\u015f yeni ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletlerine (YBD) yard\u0131m\u0131 ABD’nin en \u00f6nemli b\u00f6lgeler olan bu araziye dikkatinin art\u0131rmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. ABD y\u00f6netiminin\u00a0<\/span>d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesine g\u00f6re bu b\u00f6lgede, g\u00fcvenlik, geli\u015fme ve kalk\u0131nman\u0131n h\u0131zlanmas\u0131 ayr\u0131ca demokrasinin art\u0131\u015f\u0131 sayesinde b\u00f6lgede ABD`nin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 korunabilir. Bunun i\u00e7in ABD 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik mali yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu yard\u0131mlar \u00f6zellikle G\u00fcrcistan ekonomisinin kalk\u0131nmas\u0131 i\u00e7in yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 1997 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Temmuz ay\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 E. \u015eeverdnadze ABD’ye resmi bir ziyarete gitti. Bu ziyaret s\u0131ras\u0131nda o ABD’yle ekonomik ve siyasi i\u015fbirli\u011fi anla\u015fmalar\u0131 imzalad\u0131. \u015eeverdnadze ayr\u0131ca ABD y\u00f6netimiyle askeri i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerin ard\u0131ndan ABD y\u00f6netimi G\u00fcrcistan ordusuna\u00a0<\/span>yakla\u015f\u0131k 17.6 milyon dolar askeri yard\u0131m yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunun d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ABD \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fcklere destek kanunu \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde G\u00fcrcistan’a yakla\u015f\u0131k 27 milyon dolar yard\u0131m ay\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. K\u0131saca 1997 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131 ABD’nin G\u00fcrcistan’a dikkatinin ve etkisinin artt\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u0131l olarak da de\u011ferlendirebiliriz. 1998 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131nda \u015eeverdnadze’nin ABD y\u00f6nl\u00fc politikas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in ona kar\u015f\u0131 yeni bir suikast giri\u015fiminde bulunuldu. Ama bu suikast giri\u015fimi de \u00f6ncekinden farkl\u0131 olmad\u0131 yani ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131kla sonu\u00e7land\u0131. Ayn\u0131 zamanda h\u00fck\u00fcmet i\u00e7inde de bir huzursuzluk yaranm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan’da 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda olan olaylar\u0131 genel olarak \u015f\u00f6yle s\u0131ralayabiliriz.<\/p>\n \u2022 \u015eubat ay\u0131nda \u015eeverdnadze’ye kar\u015f\u0131 olan suikast giri\u015fimi. T\u00fcm bu yukar\u0131da s\u00f6ylediklerimiz G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda ekonomik ve siyasi geli\u015fiminin durmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. Ama t\u00fcm bu ya\u015fananlara ra\u011fmen G\u00fcrcistan y\u00f6netimi baz\u0131 \u00f6nemli reformlar\u0131 yapabilmi\u015fti. G\u00fcrcistan 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD’nin yard\u0131m\u0131yla Karadeniz s\u0131n\u0131r g\u00f6zlemcili\u011fini Rusya’dan alarak kendi s\u0131n\u0131r g\u00f6z- lemcilerine verebildi. G\u00fcrcistan y\u00f6netimi bu yard\u0131m kapsam\u0131nda ayn\u0131 zamanda T\u00fcrkiye’yle olan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 kendi askeri g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin korumas\u0131 amac\u0131yla Rusya’yla anla\u015fma sa\u011flad\u0131. Bu y\u0131l i\u00e7erisinde ayr\u0131ca G\u00fcrcistan’da olan ABD \u015firketlerinin say\u0131 iki kat artt\u0131. (40) G\u00fcrcistan ayn\u0131 zamanda Hazar enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye’nin Ak denizi limanlar\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 i\u00e7in olu\u015facak projeler kapsam\u0131nda resmi toplant\u0131lara davet ald\u0131. D\u0131\u015f politikaya yard\u0131m kapsam\u0131ndaysa G\u00fcrcistan ABD’den 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda 1.5 milyon dolar yard\u0131m alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD’nin G\u00fcrcistan’a y\u00f6nelik politik ve ekonomik yard\u0131mlar\u0131 NATO \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde de devam etmi\u015ftir. 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD y\u00f6netimi G\u00fcrcistan’a\u00a0<\/span>143.9 milyon dolar yard\u0131m etmi\u015ftir. Bu yard\u0131m\u0131n 85.61 milyonu \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck i\u00e7in yap\u0131lan yard\u0131mlar \u015feklinde de\u011ferlendirilmi\u015ftir. Ayr\u0131lan mali yard\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n 21.5 milyon dolar \u00e7e\u015fitli ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmeti fonlar\u0131ndan sa\u011flan\u0131rken 36.72 milyon dolarl\u0131k yard\u0131m\u0131 ise Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131yla insani yard\u0131m kurumlar\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ayr\u0131ca US\u0130AD G\u00fcrcistan’a 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda 57 milyon dolar yard\u0131m etmi\u015f ve bu yard\u0131m\u0131n da 19.25 milyon dolar\u0131 insani yard\u0131m, 19.6 milyon dolar\u0131 ekonomik reformlar, 8.5 milyon dolar\u0131 demokratik reformlar, 4.4 milyon dolar\u0131ysa di\u011fer reformlar i\u00e7in ayr\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan’a ABD taraf\u0131ndan ayr\u0131lan mali yard\u0131mlar bununla s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n USDA taraf\u0131ndan 17.8 milyon dolar yard\u0131m ayr\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu yard\u0131m\u0131n 15 milyon dolar\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan h\u00fck\u00fcmetine. 2.8 milyon dolar\u0131ysa gayri – h\u00fck\u00fcmet kurulu\u015flar\u0131na verilmi\u015ftir. (41) B\u00f6ylece G\u00fcrcistan Ermenistan’dan sonra eski SSCB`ye \u00fcye \u00fclkeler i\u00e7erisinde ABD’den en fazla yard\u0131m alan \u00fclke konumuna gelmi\u015ftir. Bu mali yard\u0131mlar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ABD ayn\u0131 zamanda G\u00fcrcistan’a siyasi deste\u011fini de kesmemi\u015f ve onu Moskova’n\u0131n etkisinden korumaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD ay\u0131n zamanda G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131 Rusya etkisinden korumak \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde G\u00fcrc\u00fc ordusuna da modernizasyon ve silah almak i\u00e7in de yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 devam ettirmi\u015ftir. G\u00fcrcistan ayr\u0131ca FMF ve IMET pro- gramlar\u0131ndan da yararlanabilmi\u015f ve bu programa uygun olarak ABD’den askeri ara\u00e7lar alabilmi\u015ftir. (42) 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmeti G\u00fcrcistan’a 146.87 milyon dolar yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. G\u00f6sterilen bu yard\u0131m\u0131n 5 milyon dolar\u0131 ABD Tar\u0131m Bakan- l\u0131\u011f\u0131na 480 say\u0131l\u0131 devlet kanununun 1. maddesine uygun olarak indirimli oranla 39.08 milyon dolar\u0131 ABD Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve ba\u015fka insani yard\u0131mlar taraf\u0131ndan edilmi\u015ftir. (43)<\/p>\n ABD’nin G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerine ay\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 yard\u0131mlar kapsam\u0131nda en \u00e7ok askeri yard\u0131m\u0131 da G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n almas\u0131 iki yorumun ortaya \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Birincisi Rusya’n\u0131n siyas\u0131 ve askeri bask\u0131s\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan ordusunun direni\u015fini sa\u011flamak, ikincisiyse gelecekte NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fine al\u0131nmas\u0131 planlanan G\u00fcrcistan ordusunun modernizasyonunu sa\u011flamak ve G\u00fcrc\u00fc ordusu ile NATO ordusunu uzla\u015ft\u0131rmak. ABD 1999 y\u0131l\u0131 ve ondan \u00f6nceki iki y\u0131l i\u00e7erisinde G\u00fcrcistan ordusuna\u00a0<\/span>17.5 milyon dolar askeri yard\u0131m yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ki, bu da G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fck bir rakamd\u0131r. (44) 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmeti G\u00fcrcistan’a 149.56 milyon dolar mali yard\u0131m ay\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu yard\u0131m\u0131n 108.64 milyon dolar\u0131n \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe yard\u0131m fonunun15.33 milyon dolan di\u011fer yard\u0131m fonlar\u0131n\u0131n etti\u011fi yard\u0131mlard\u0131r. ABD Savunma Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan’a di\u011fer insani kurumlarla birlikte yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 yard\u0131m\u0131n miktar\u0131ysa 25.29 milyon dolar civar\u0131nda olmu\u015ftur. (45)<\/p>\n 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan’a artan mali yard\u0131mla birlikte ABD siyasi deste\u011fi de \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunun da as\u0131l nedeni Rusya’da B. Yeltsin’in istifas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan V. Putin’in iktidara gelmesi ve Rusya’n\u0131n “Yeni G\u00fcvenlik Doktrinini” kabul etmesiydi.Yeni G\u00fcvenlik Doktrininde uluslararas\u0131 prensiplere uygun olarak Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011funa \u00fcye devletlerle ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015ftirilmesi, Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011fu \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde Rusya menfaatlerine uygun d\u00fc\u015fen entegrasyon s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin geli\u015ftirilmesi: k\u00fcresel ve b\u00f6lgesel iktisadi ve siyasi olaylara Rusya’n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcn haklara sahip olarak kat\u0131lmas\u0131: yurtd\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki Rusya vatanda\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n hukuki hak ve menfaatlerinin korunmas\u0131, bu ama\u00e7lar siyasi, iktisadi ve di\u011fer karakterli tedbirlerin Bunun i\u00e7in Rusya’n\u0131n elinde iki koz vard\u0131. Birincisi G\u00fcrcistan’da \u00e7o\u011fu say\u0131da Rus \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fcn bulunmas\u0131 ve ikincisi ikinci \u00c7e\u00e7en – Rus sava\u015f\u0131 nedeniyle Rusya’n\u0131n kendi s\u0131n\u0131r g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak istemesini savunmas\u0131yd\u0131. Putin y\u00f6netimi kendi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n arazisi say\u0131lan Panki Vadisindeki \u00c7e\u00e7en ter\u00f6ristlerce ihlal edildi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131kl\u0131yor, Washington’un deste\u011fini arkas\u0131na alan Tiflis y\u00f6netimiyse bunu yalanl\u0131yordu. Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 \u015eeverdnadze yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bas\u0131n konferanslar\u0131n\u0131n birinde Rusya’n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’a olan bask\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yle ele\u015ftirilmi\u015ftir: “Panki vadisi problemi \u00c7e\u00e7enistan\u00a0<\/span>problemi ile ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak yaranm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve baz\u0131 Rus politikac\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi, \u00c7e\u00e7enistan problemi bizim su\u00e7umuz de\u011fil. (47) Rusya’n\u0131n \u015eeverdnadze’ye olan bask\u0131lar\u0131 direk onun \u015fahsiyetine de yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u015e\u00f6yle ki, Rusya’n\u0131n Ba\u015fsavc\u0131s\u0131 \u015eeverdnadze’ye kar\u015f\u0131 dava a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 Rusya y\u00f6netiminden talep etmi\u015ftir. Nedeniyse \u015eeverdnadze’nin SSCB D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan i\u015fledi\u011fi devirde ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131yla yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir anla\u015fma- n\u0131n devlet \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ayk\u0131r\u0131 olmas\u0131 ve bu anla\u015fma sonucunda Rusya’n\u0131n \u015fimdi de b\u00fcy\u00fck ekonomik kay\u0131plar vermesi iddias\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. (48) Ama Rusya’n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’a olan bask\u0131lar\u0131 sonu\u00e7 vermedi.<\/p>\n 11 Eyl\u00fcl 2001 ‘de ABD’nin New- York ve Washington kentlerinde yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ter\u00f6rist sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131n ard\u0131ndan ABD ve NATO taraf\u0131ndan ba\u015f- lat\u0131lan askeri operasyonlar\u0131n d\u00fcnyay\u0131 yeni bir yap\u0131lanmaya g\u00f6t\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. ABD ve onun m\u00fcttefiklerinin ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu bu yap\u0131lanma G\u00fcney Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesinde de G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden ba\u015flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Afganistan’da operasyonu ba\u015far\u0131yla sonu\u00e7land\u0131ran ABD G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n da iste\u011fi \u00fczerine bu \u00fclkeye El – Kaide \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcyle ili\u015fkisi olan ter\u00f6rc\u00fc gruplar\u0131 ortadan kald\u0131rmak i\u00e7in bir grup Amerikan askeri yollad\u0131. Bu askerlerin G\u00fcrcistan’a yollanmas\u0131 Rusya taraf\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fck bir tepkiyle kar\u015f\u0131land\u0131. Ama G\u00fcrcistan’daki alt yap\u0131n\u0131n, halen uluslararas\u0131 ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyis\u00fcrd\u00fcren ABD ile NATO’nun kullan\u0131m\u0131na teslim edilece\u011fine \u015fa\u015f\u0131rmamak gerekir herhalde. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc \u00fclkenin Orta Asya’dan petrol \u00fcr\u00fcnleriyle di\u011fer mineral kaynaklar\u0131n d\u00fcnya piyasalar\u0131na ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 bak\u0131m\u0131ndan \u00f6nemli bir transit ge\u00e7it b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc temsil eden jeopolitik durumu, bu gen\u00e7 ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Cumhuriyetin y\u00f6netimine d\u0131\u015f siyaset alan\u0131nda geni\u015f manevra olana\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00e7ok say\u0131da avantaj vermektedir.<\/p>\n Ayr\u0131ca G\u00fcrcistan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n ABD’nin art\u0131k olduk\u00e7a geni\u015f bir bi\u00e7imde d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda duyurulmu\u015f olan \u0130ran ve Irak’a kar\u015f\u0131 giri\u015fti\u011fi kap\u0131\u015fman\u0131n i\u00e7erisinde kullan\u0131labilece\u011fi\u00a0<\/span>belli bir tak\u0131m avantajlar sahip bir \u00fcs olabilmesi de g\u00f6z ard\u0131 edilmemesi gerekmektedir. (49) G\u00fcrcistan b\u00f6ylece, ABD’nin do\u011fal bir m\u00fcttefikine d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fmektedir. Bununla birlikte Rusya ABD ve NATO’nun G\u00fcrcistan’daki askeri mevcudiyetinin ikinci ve \u015fimdiki teorik d\u00fczeyde olan \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc geni\u015fletme dalgas\u0131na do\u011fal olarak kar\u015f\u0131d\u0131r. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc NATO \u00fcyesi \u00fclkelerle ABD, T\u00fcrkiye’yle askeri alanda i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapan G\u00fcrcistan Rusya’y\u0131 tedirgin etmektedir. (50) Rusya’n\u0131n bask\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n amac\u0131n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131 Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 politikalar\u0131ndan d\u00f6nd\u00fcrmek oldu\u011funu bilen ABD, G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131 himaye etmekte ve Rus bask\u0131lar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 tav\u0131r almaktad\u0131r. (51) Bunun yan s\u0131ra ABD G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n ihtiya\u00e7 duydu\u011fu toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na y\u00f6nelik tehdit olarak alg\u0131lad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Rusya bask\u0131lar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 deste\u011fini her f\u0131rsatta dile getirmi\u015ftir. (52) ABD y\u00f6netimi Rusya bask\u0131lar\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda gerilemiyor aksine daha da ileriye do\u011fru ilerliyor. G\u00fcrcistan’da askeri y\u00f6nden g\u00fc\u00e7lenmeye ba\u015flayan ABD FMF program\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde 2001 y\u0131l\u0131nda bu \u00fclkeye 10 UH\u0130H helikopteri de vermi\u015ftir. B\u00f6ylece a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131kl\u0131 olarak 1996’da ba\u015flayan G\u00fcrcistan – ABD ili\u015fkileri, G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n jeopolitik konumu ve Bat\u0131yla b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fme stratejisi sebebiyle m\u00fcttefiklik d\u00fczeyine ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n C.2 – G\u00fcl Devrimi S\u0131ras\u0131 ve Sonras\u0131 ABD G\u00fcrcistan \u0130li\u015fkileri G\u00fcrcistan’daki resmi kaynaklar\u0131n se\u00e7imlerin kesinle\u015fmemi\u015f sonu\u00e7lar\u0131na ili\u015fkin yapt\u0131klar\u0131 bu ilk a\u00e7\u0131klamalar muhalefet partileri aras\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck bir hayal k\u0131r\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131na yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, bu a\u00e7\u0131klanan se\u00e7im sonu\u00e7lar\u0131na muhalefetin tepkisi \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck olmu\u015ftur. 4 Kas\u0131m tarihinde, Tiflis’in en merkezi caddelerinden Rustaveli’de yap\u0131lan g\u00f6sterilere kat\u0131lan 10,000 kadar ki\u015fi se\u00e7imlere hile\u00a0<\/span>kar\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia ederek, Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131n\u0131n istifa etmesini istemi\u015flerdir. (54)\u00a0<\/span>Ulusal\u00a0<\/span>Hareket se\u00e7im blo\u011funun lideri Mihail Saaka\u015fvili Ba\u015fkan aleyhine yap\u0131lan g\u00f6sterilerde \u201cBen H\u00fck\u00fcmeti zorla devirmeyece\u011fim, ancak \u00fclkedeki h\u00fck\u00fcmetin bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l yollarla de\u011fi\u015ftirilmesinin gereklidir\u201d demi\u015ftir. Yine ayn\u0131 lider, g\u00f6stericilerin Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131n\u0131n muhalefetin se\u00e7imlerde ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 oldu\u011funu ilan etmesine kadar Parlamento \u00f6n\u00fcnde g\u00f6sterilerine devam etmelerini istemi\u015ftir. E\u011fer \u015eevardnadze bunu kabul etmez ise, bu durumda g\u00f6stericilerin g\u00fcvenlik kordonlar\u0131n\u0131 yararak,\u00a0<\/span>Cumhurba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Saray\u0131na girmelerini isteyen Saaka\u015fvili, bu yolla\u00a0<\/span>Cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131n\u0131n istifaya zorlanabilece\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. (55)<\/p>\n T\u00fcm bu se\u00e7im s\u00fcrecinin iyice tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 hale gelmesi \u00fczerine Merkez Se\u00e7im Komisyonu tart\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Protestolar\u0131n kanl\u0131 bir i\u00e7 sava\u015fa yol a\u00e7mas\u0131n\u0131 engellemek ve protestocular\u0131n heyecan\u0131n\u0131 bast\u0131rmak i\u00e7in Merkez Se\u00e7im Komisyonu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Nana Devdariani 8 Kas\u0131m’da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131nda kesin se\u00e7im sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n ancak se\u00e7im itirazlar\u0131na ili\u015fkin ba\u015fvurulara mahkemelerin verecekleri kararlar\u0131n kesinle\u015fmesinden sonra ilan edilece\u011fini belirtmi\u015ftir. Zaten yasal olarak da kesinle\u015fmi\u015f se\u00e7im sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n ilan\u0131 i\u00e7in 20 Kas\u0131m 2003’e kadar beklenmesi gerekmektedir. Bu \u015fekilde iktidar partileri bir s\u00fcre kazanm\u0131\u015f ve bu s\u00fcre i\u00e7inde siyasi ortam\u0131n tekrar istikrar kazanaca\u011f\u0131 beklentisine girmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Ancak, kesinle\u015fmemi\u015f se\u00e7im sonu\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n ilan\u0131yla birlikte ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan geli\u015fmeler iktidar\u0131n bekledi\u011finden \u00e7ok farkl\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu se\u00e7imi daha \u00f6nceki se\u00e7imlerden farkl\u0131 k\u0131lan en \u00f6nemli \u00f6zellik de \u015fu idi ki, bu se\u00e7imlerle birlikte G\u00fcrcistan se\u00e7meni ilk kez sadece h\u00fck\u00fcmet yanl\u0131s\u0131 olan baz\u0131 partiler aras\u0131nda de\u011fil, ger\u00e7ek anlamda muhalefet yapan ve farkl\u0131 g\u00fcndemleri olan muhalefet partileri ile iktidar aras\u0131nda bir se\u00e7im yapma olana\u011f\u0131na kavu\u015fmu\u015f olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Bu durumda sokaklara inen protestocular\u0131 yat\u0131\u015ft\u0131rmak da giderek daha da \u00e7ok zor olmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Siyasi g\u00fc\u00e7lerini daha da fark eden protestocular da zamanla iktidar\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irmenin o kadar da zor olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 fark ederek protestolar\u0131n\u0131n \u015fiddetini art\u0131rm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r.<\/p>\n Tiflis’te se\u00e7imleri takip eden \u00fc\u00e7 hafta boyunca s\u00fcren sokak g\u00f6sterilerinde halk se\u00e7im usuls\u00fczl\u00fcklerini protesto etmi\u015ftir. Saaka\u015fvili halk\u0131 her gece sokaklara inmeye\u00a0<\/span>\u00e7a\u011f\u0131r\u0131rken, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da kutlanan Aziz George g\u00fcn\u00fcnde Saaka\u015fvili destek\u00e7ilerine parlamentoya zorla girerek ele ge\u00e7irmeleri talimat\u0131n\u0131 vermi\u015ftir. Bu s\u0131rada k\u00fcrs\u00fcde konu\u015fma yapan \u015eevardnadze konu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 keserek korumalar\u0131n\u0131n yard\u0131m\u0131yla parlamento binas\u0131ndan ka\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (56)<\/p>\n T\u00fcm bu geli\u015fmelerin sonucunda art\u0131k iktidar\u0131n\u0131n salland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6ren Eduard\u015eevardnadze’nin 23 Kas\u0131m 2003 tarihinde Cumhurba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6revinden istifa etmesi \u00fczerine, G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n \u201cg\u00fcl devrimi\u201d de ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir. Ge\u00e7im s\u00fcrecinin kontroll\u00fc bir \u015fekilde olmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamak amac\u0131yla \u015eevardnadze’nin Cumhurba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yetkileri de anayasa uyar\u0131nca vek\u00e2leten kullanmak \u00fczere Nino Burjanadze’nin eline verilmi\u015ftir. Demokrasinin \u201cG\u00fcl Devrimi\u2019yle\u201d geldi\u011fi G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da ABD ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tutumlar\u0131 \u00f6nemli kaideyi olu\u015fturuyor. Rusya ‘kadife devrim’ s\u00fcreci s\u0131ras\u0131nda Rus D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 \u0130gor \u0130vanov’un \u00e7ok yap\u0131c\u0131 bir rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.\u015eevardnadze y\u00f6netimi ile kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131ndaki g\u00fc\u00e7ler aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin iyice gerildi\u011fi bir d\u00f6nemde, \u0130vanov bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l bir form\u00fcl geli\u015ftirilmesini sa\u011flayarak, olaylar\u0131n iyice kontrol d\u0131\u015f\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131\u00a0<\/span>\u00f6nlemede \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli bir katk\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (57) E\u011fer, bu giri\u015fim olmasayd\u0131, iktidar ve\u00a0<\/span>muhalefetin \u015fiddete ba\u015fvurmas\u0131 \u00e7ok g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir olas\u0131l\u0131kt\u0131. Bu durumda ya iktidar de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fine yol a\u00e7an bu devrim olmazd\u0131, ya da devrim i\u00e7in \u201ckadife\u201d ve \u201cbar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l\u201d gibi s\u0131fatlar\u0131n kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 imk\u00e2ns\u0131z olurdu.<\/p>\n ABD devrim s\u00fcresinde yap\u0131c\u0131 rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Her ne kadar ABD ‘Kadife devrim’ ile i\u015fba\u015f\u0131na ge\u00e7en g\u00fc\u00e7leri aktif olarak desteklese de bu deste\u011fin orta vadedeki devam\u0131 daha \u00e7ok bu g\u00fc\u00e7lerin gerekli reformlar\u0131 uygulamadaki ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131na ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u201cG\u00fcl devrimi\u201d s\u0131ras\u0131nda ABD’nin Tiflis b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi Richard Miles’\u0131n \u015eevardnadze’yi muhalefete kar\u015f\u0131 \u015fiddet kullanmamas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ve sert bi\u00e7imde uyarm\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 \u015eevardnadze’nin iktidar\u0131n\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in ciddi ad\u0131mlar atmaktan al\u0131koymu\u015ftur (58). Ancak, yine de ‘kadife devrim’ ile birlikte iktidara gelen g\u00fc\u00e7lerin \u00fclkenin siyasi ve ekonomik alandaki sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 k\u0131sa vadede hemen \u00e7\u00f6zemeyece\u011fi de dikkate al\u0131n\u0131rsa, yeni y\u00f6netimin de ba\u015fta ABD olmak \u00fczere Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclke ve kurulu\u015flarla ili\u015fkisinin ‘tozpembe’ olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6ylemek hi\u00e7 ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n Devrim sonras\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da \u00fcnl\u00fc para spek\u00fclat\u00f6r\u00fc George Soros ve onun \u201cA\u00e7\u0131k Toplum\u201d Enstit\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn rol\u00fcnden bahsedilmektedir. Bununla ilgili g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fleri a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki b\u00f6l\u00fcmde de\u011ferlendirece\u011fim.<\/p>\n G\u00fcl devrimi sonras\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131nda \u00f6nceli\u011fi Bat\u0131 kurumlar\u0131yla entegrasyonu geni\u015flendirmekte ve ABD ile stratejik ortakl\u0131kta bulmu\u015ftur. D\u0131\u015f Politikada basiretli politika y\u00fcr\u00fctme\u011fin \u00f6nceli\u011fini i\u00e7 sorunlar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6zmekte ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ekonomik ve siyasi bask\u0131lardan uzak kalmakta g\u00f6rmekteydi. Saaka\u015fvili ekonomik sorunlar\u0131 giderme\u011fe \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken, e\u015fzamanl\u0131 olarak \u00fclke b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tehdit eden Acaristan, G\u00fcney Osetya, Abhazya sorunlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme kavu\u015fturma\u011fa \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu plan ABD taraf\u0131ndan da desteklenmi\u015ftir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Rusya devrim sonras\u0131 d\u00f6nemde bu sorunlardan yararlanarak G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a bask\u0131 uyguluyordu.<\/p>\n Saaka\u015fvili ilk ba\u015fta Acaristan sorununu \u00e7\u00f6zmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ki, Saaka\u015fvili\u2019yi bunu yapma\u011fa iten en \u00f6nemli etkenlerden biri ABD\u2019nin yeni y\u00f6netime verdi\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131k destekti. Kas\u0131m devrimin di\u011fer eski SSCB cumhuriyetlerinde \u00f6yk\u00fcnmelere yol a\u00e7abilmesi i\u00e7in yeni y\u00f6netimin ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olmas\u0131n\u0131n gereklili\u011fi ABD\u2019nin Kas\u0131m\u00a0<\/span>devrimindeki rol\u00fcn\u00fcn mant\u0131ksal sonucudur. (59) Nitekim ba\u015f\u0131ndan itibaren ABD Acaristan sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in aktif rol oynam\u0131\u015f ve bir taraftan Aba\u015fidze \u00fczerinde bask\u0131 olu\u015ftururken di\u011fer taraftan da Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun tarafs\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in Moskova ile do\u011frudan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde bulunmu\u015ftur. \u00d6rne\u011fin, 4 Ocak 2004\u2019te yap\u0131lacak G\u00fcrcistan devlet ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 se\u00e7imlerinin Acaristan\u2019da da yap\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in ABD\u2019nin Tiflis b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi sadece Aral\u0131k 2003\u2019de \u00fc\u00e7 defa Batum\u2019u ziyaret etmi\u015f ve sonunda Aba\u015fidze se\u00e7kilerin yap\u0131lmas\u0131na izin verirken ABD\u2019nin bask\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a\u00a0<\/span>itiraf etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Saaka\u015fvili y\u00f6netimi, Acaristan sorunu konusunda eski y\u00f6netimden farkl\u0131 olarak daha sert tutum sergileyece\u011fini ba\u015f\u0131ndan itibaren ortaya koymu\u015ftur. Yeni y\u00f6netim, devrim sonras\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan genelinde yakalam\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu olumlu havayla Acaristan\u2019daki geli\u015fmelerden de yararlanarak, b\u00f6lgeyi kontrol alt\u0131na almay\u0131 hedeflemekteydi. Acaristan sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in yeni y\u00f6netimin \u00f6n\u00fcnde iki yol mevcuttu. Birincisi, Kas\u0131m\u2019da Tiflis\u2019te yap\u0131lan\u0131n bir benzerinin Batum\u2019da yap\u0131lmas\u0131, ikincisi ise askeri m\u00fcdahale idi. Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun tutumu askeri m\u00fcdahale se\u00e7ene\u011fini geri plana itmekteydi. Acaristan \u00d6zerk Cumhuriyeti Y\u00fcksek Konsey Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aslan Aba\u015fidze, bask\u0131lara kar\u015f\u0131 direnemeyerek 6 May\u0131s 2004 tarihinde g\u00f6revinden istifa etmi\u015f ve arabuluculuk giri\u015fimi i\u00e7in Batum\u2019da bulunan Rus Milli G\u00fcvenlik Genel Sekreteri \u0130gor \u0130vanov\u2019la Moskova\u2019ya gitmi\u015ftir. B\u00f6ylece, G\u00fcrcistan merkezi h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ile Acaristan \u00d6zerk Cumhuriyeti aras\u0131nda 10 y\u0131l\u0131 a\u015fk\u0131nd\u0131r s\u00fcregelen gerginlik giderilmi\u015ftir. Saaka\u015fvili b\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar\u0131 ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 bir bi\u00e7imde bir araya getirerek, Aba\u015fidze\u2019nin giderek sertle\u015fen ve yeni y\u00f6netimin \u00fczerine gelmesine yol a\u00e7an hatalar\u0131ndan da yararlanarak Aba\u015fidze sorununu \u00e7\u00f6zmeyi ba\u015farm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n ABD, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7 sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinde etken olmakla kalmam\u0131\u015f, yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik yard\u0131mlarla G\u00fcrcistan Ordusunun modernizasyonu, ekonomik kalk\u0131nmaya destek gibi \u00e7e\u015fitli konularda yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. Bunun d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7in hayati \u00f6nem ta\u015f\u0131yan Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan petrol hatt\u0131n\u0131n tamamlanma s\u00fcrecine girmesi de b\u00f6lgede Amerikan yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n uyguland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bir g\u00f6stergesidir.<\/p>\n ABD\u2019nin devrim sonras\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan ile ili\u015fkilerini de\u011ferlendirirken GeorgeBush\u2019un Tiflis Ziyaretini incelemekte yarar var. ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Bush 9\u201310 May\u0131s\u00a0<\/span>2005\u2019te Tiflis\u2019i ziyaret etmi\u015ftir. Bu ziyaret bir Amerikan Ba\u015fkan\u0131n\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019ya ilk ziyaretidir. B\u00f6lgedeki dengeler, buna ili\u015fkin alg\u0131lamalar ve G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Rus ili\u015fkileri g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurulursa Bush\u2019un ziyareti \u00f6nemli bir geli\u015fme ve kuvvetli bir mesajd\u0131r. Bir Rus analizci, bunu \u201cMoskova\u2019n\u0131n y\u00fcz\u00fcne at\u0131lm\u0131\u015f tokat\u201d (60) olarak de\u011ferlendirmi\u015ftir. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Bush, ister \u201c\u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck Meydan\u0131\u201dnda halka yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada, isterse de Saaka\u015fvili ile ortak bas\u0131n toplant\u0131s\u0131nda, pek \u00e7ok analizcinin ve siyaset\u00e7inin bekledi\u011finden farkl\u0131 olarak, daha \u0131l\u0131ml\u0131 bir \u00fcslup kullanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece, fiili mesajla s\u00f6zl\u00fc mesaj adeta dengelenmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Bush\u2019un Tiflis ziyareti G\u00fcrcistan \u00f6rne\u011finde eski Sovyet co\u011frafyas\u0131nda Rus- Amerikan rekabeti ve demokratikle\u015fme problemi olmak \u00fczere iki a\u00e7\u0131dan incelenebilir. Eski SSCB cumhuriyetleri, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devlet geleneklerinin zay\u0131f olu\u015fu, d\u00fczenli ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ordular\u0131n\u0131n olmay\u0131\u015f\u0131 gibi ortak \u00f6zellikler ta\u015f\u0131maktad\u0131r. Bu da s\u00f6z konusu co\u011frafyada g\u00fc\u00e7 bo\u015flu\u011fu do\u011furmu\u015ftur. ABD bu bo\u015flu\u011fu doldurmakta merakl\u0131d\u0131r. Bug\u00fcn Kafkasya\u2019daki geli\u015fmeleri, tek bir c\u00fcmle ile \u00f6zetlemek gerekirse,Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n giderek daha fazla Amerikan n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131 haline gelmekte oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenebilir. Bush\u2019un Tiflis ziyareti de bunun tescili olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclebilir.<\/p>\n Bush\u2019un Tiflis ziyaretinin ikinci y\u00f6n\u00fc eski Sovyet co\u011frafyas\u0131nda demokratikle\u015fmeye verilen destektir. Bunu da Rusya\u2019ya y\u00f6neltilen demokratikle\u015fme ele\u015ftirileri ve di\u011fer cumhuriyetleri \u00f6yk\u00fcnd\u00fcrme \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde iki a\u00e7\u0131dan ele almak m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr. Rus-Amerikan ili\u015fkilerinde demokratikle\u015fme problemi ekseninde bir gerilimin ya\u015fand\u0131\u011f\u0131 malumdur. G\u00fcrcistan ve Ukrayna gibi eski Sovyet cumhuriyetlerinin demokratikle\u015fme \u00e7abalar\u0131 \u00f6v\u00fcl\u00fcrken, bu ba\u011flamda Moskova\u2019ya\u00a0<\/span>y\u00f6neltilen demokrasi ele\u015ftirileri daha koyu bir g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcme b\u00fcr\u00fcnmektedir. (61)\u00a0<\/span>Yeni\u00a0<\/span>demokrasiler \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131l\u0131rken geri planda adeta demokratik \u00fclkelerle \u00e7evrili \u201cdemokratik olmayan Rusya\u201d \u00f6tekisi kurgusu yap\u0131lmaktad\u0131r. Bush\u2019un \u201c\u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck Meydan\u0131\u201dndaki konu\u015fmas\u0131nda da birka\u00e7 kez vurgulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi di\u011fer b\u00f6lge halklar\u0131n\u0131n da demokrasi \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n desteklenece\u011fi g\u00f6sterilmektedir. Bush\u2019un Tiflis ziyaretinde b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik ve genelde demokratik geli\u015fmeleri destekleyen mesajlar vermi\u015ftir. Onlardan en ba\u015fl\u0131cas\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan halk\u0131na mesajd\u0131: Bush, \u201cSiz burada g\u00fcllerle silahlan\u0131p kararl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131z\u0131n verdi\u011fi g\u00fc\u00e7le topland\u0131n\u0131z ve \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fcz\u00fc istediniz. Ve siz harekete ge\u00e7ti\u011finiz i\u00e7in bug\u00fcn G\u00fcrcistan hem egemen hem de \u00f6zg\u00fcr, ayr\u0131ca b\u00f6lgenin ve d\u00fcnyan\u0131n bir \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck feneri\u201d dedi. Rusya\u2019ya yak\u0131n G\u00fcney Osetya ve Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k taleplerine destek vermeyen Bush, \u201cG\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n egemenli\u011fine ve toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne t\u00fcm devletlerce sayg\u0131 g\u00f6sterilmeli\u201d dedi. (62)<\/p>\n Bush b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerine hitaben verdi\u011fi mesajlar da vard\u0131: “\u015eimdi Kafkasya’da, Orta Asya’da ve Ortado\u011fu’da kalpleri ayn\u0131 \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck heyecan\u0131yla \u00e7arpan gen\u00e7ler var.<\/p>\n \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck istiyorlar ve \u00f6zg\u00fcr olacaklar”. (63) George Bush\u2019un G\u00fcrcistan ziyaretinde verdi\u011fi mesajlar bilhassa b\u00f6lgedeki ve d\u00fcnyadaki demokratik olmayan rejimlere verilmi\u015f bir mesajd\u0131. (64) Bunun d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ABD’de bug\u00fcn ba\u015fta Kaliforniya’da olmak \u00fczere Michigan, New Jersey, New York ve Nevada da ABD ve d\u00fcnyan\u0131n di\u011fer yerlerinde Ermeni \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in hizmet veren vak\u0131flar vard\u0131r. Bu kurulu\u015flar d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda ABD’de mevcut olan Ermeni kiliseleri de buradaki Ermeni lobisinin etkileyici kollar\u0131ndan biridir. T\u00fcm bu kurulu\u015flar 1984 y\u0131l\u0131nda\u00a0<\/span>Amerika Ermeni Asamblesi ad\u0131yla bir lobi kurumu kurmu\u015flar. (65) Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131ylaErmeni lobisi zaman – zaman istedi\u011fi Ermenistan’la ilgili bir\u00e7ok yard\u0131m kararlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131nda etkili olmu\u015ftur. 1995 y\u0131l\u0131nda Senat\u00f6r Porterin \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n sonucu\u00a0<\/span>buna \u00f6rnektir. ABD`den y\u0131ll\u0131k Ermenistan’a geli\u015fim i\u00e7in 30, insani yard\u0131m olarak da\u00a0<\/span>85 milyon dolar yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r devletten. (66)<\/p>\n Ermenistan’\u0131n D\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131na girmezden \u00f6nce onun jeopolitik konumuna ve hangi \u00fclkelerle s\u0131n\u0131r kom\u015fusu olmas\u0131na da bakmam\u0131z gerekir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc her \u00fclkenin d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda bu t\u00fcr durumlar \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir. Ermenistan co\u011frafi olarak “kapal\u0131” bir \u00fclkedir. Hi\u00e7bir denize ve ticari merkezlere do\u011frudan ya da dolayl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131 yok durumdad\u0131r. Ermenistan’\u0131 eski SSCB Cumhuriyetlerine ba\u011flayan bir\u00e7ok demir yollar\u0131, karayollar\u0131 ve deniz yolu Azerbaycan \u00fczerindendir. \u00c7ok az k\u0131sm\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerindendir. Malum Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sava\u015f\u0131 nedeniyle Azerbaycan kendi arazisinden Ermenistan’a giden t\u00fcm bu yollar\u0131 hakl\u0131 olarak kapatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu y\u00fczden Ermenistan i\u00e7in G\u00fcrcistan b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00f6neme sahiptir.<\/p>\n \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Ermenistan’\u0131n di\u011fer bir kom\u015fu ve s\u0131n\u0131r \u00fclkesi olan T\u00fcrkiye de kendi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f ve Azerbaycan’\u0131n topraklar\u0131n\u0131n Ermeni ve Rus birlikleri taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgalini durdurmak ve i\u015fgal olunmu\u015f topraklar\u0131n Azerbaycan’a geri verilmesi nedeniyle kapatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu kapatma i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye \u015fimdiye kadar bir\u00e7ok Avrupa \u00fclkeleri ve hatta ABD taraf\u0131ndan bask\u0131lara maruz kalmaktad\u0131r. B\u00f6yle bir durumda Ermenistan i\u00e7in G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n \u00f6nemi \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fcr. Hem ekonomik alanda hem de siyasi alanda. Ama Ermenistan’\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan’a toprak talebinde bulunmas\u0131 ve orada ya\u015fayan Ermenilere muhtariyet verilmesi talebi G\u00fcrcistan’la bu \u00fclke aras\u0131nda ili\u015fkileri b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00e7\u0131kmaza sokmu\u015ftur. Ayn\u0131 zamanda G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n ABD yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir politika izlemesi onu Rusya’n\u0131n G\u00fcney Kafkasya’daki tek varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 olan Ermenistan’dan uzakla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Rusya Ermenistan’\u0131n d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli rol oynayan bir \u00fclkedir. \u0130ster L. T. Petrosyan isterse de R.\u00a0<\/span>Ko\u00e7aryan’\u0131n Ermenistan’\u0131 Rusya’ya olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131ktan kurtarma \u00e7abalar\u0131nda ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olamam\u0131\u015flar. Ermenistan’\u0131n di\u011fer bir s\u0131n\u0131r kom\u015fusu \u0130ran’d\u0131r. SSCB’nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan bir\u00e7ok yeni devletlerin olu\u015fmas\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Bu devletlerden biri de G\u00fcney Kafkasya’daki Azerbaycan Cumhuriyetidir. \u0130ran, s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda Azerbaycan ad\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131yacak bir Cumhuriyetin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hi\u00e7bir zaman istememi\u015ftir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc kendi s\u0131n\u0131rlan i\u00e7erisinde \u00fc\u00e7 tane Azerbaycan Ostani (Vilayeti) ve ayn\u0131 zamanda 30 milyon civar\u0131nda Azerbaycan T\u00fcrk\u00fc ya\u015famaktad\u0131r. Azerbaycan’la Ermenistan aras\u0131nda Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sava\u015f\u0131 ba\u015flad\u0131ktan sonra \u0130ran Ermenistan’a gizli ve a\u00e7\u0131k \u015fekilde her zaman yard\u0131m etmi\u015f ve bu g\u00fcnde bu yard\u0131mlar davam etmektedir. \u0130ran’\u0131n Ermenistan’a yard\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n nedeni birinci olarak hem Farslar\u0131n hem de Ermenilerin ayn\u0131 milli k\u00f6kten olmas\u0131ysa ikinci nedeni Azerbaycan’\u0131n i\u00e7 problemlerden kurtulmamas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamakt\u0131r. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc i\u00e7erisinde hi\u00e7bir problemi bulunmayan ve ekonomisi g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc olan bir Azerbaycan \u0130ran i\u00e7in tehlikelidir. Bu y\u00fczden Ermenistan \u0130ran’\u0131n b\u00f6lgede en iyi anla\u015fabildi\u011fi bir \u00fclkedir.<\/p>\n ABD, 1991 ‘de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n hemen ard\u0131ndan Ermenistan’\u0131 tan\u0131m\u0131\u015f ve diplomatik ili\u015fkiler kurmu\u015ftur. ABD’de b\u00fcy\u00fck Ermeni toplumunun bulunmas\u0131 nedeniyle Ermenistan ile ili\u015fkileri di\u011fer G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinden farkl\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. Bundan ba\u015fka daha Sovyetler Birli\u011fi’nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131ndan \u00e7ok \u00f6nce ABD ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda baz\u0131 ili\u015fkiler mevcut olmu\u015ftur. Nitekim daha 1970’li y\u0131llar\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131ndan itibaren Ermenilerin ABD’ye g\u00f6\u00e7 etmelerine izin verilmi\u015ftir. XIX. Y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n sonu, XX. Y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131ndan itibaren ve Sovyetler d\u00f6neminde ABD’ye g\u00f6\u00e7 eden Ermeniler burada ciddi bir \u015fekilde \u00f6rg\u00fctlenmi\u015ftir. Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k sonras\u0131 ABD’nin Ermenistan politikas\u0131n\u0131n olu\u015fumunda Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6nemi\u00a0<\/span>oldu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenebilir. Bunu ABD-Ermenistan ili\u015fkilerinin ilk d\u00f6nemlerini inceledi\u011fimiz zaman g\u00f6rebiliriz.<\/p>\n Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ilk y\u0131llar\u0131nda ABD, Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan ile diplomatik ili\u015fkiler kurmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, baz\u0131 konularda kendisini d\u0131\u015far\u0131da tutmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak Ermenistan’\u0131n siyasi, ekonomik ve mali sorunlar\u0131 ile daha yak\u0131ndan ilgilenmi\u015f, Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 faaliyeti sonucunda Ermenistan’a \u00f6zel ilgi g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n ABD mali ve ekonomik olarak Ermenistan ile daha s\u0131k\u0131 bir i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde bulunsa da askeri ve siyasi a\u00e7\u0131dan ili\u015fkilerinde ciddi bir geli\u015fme ya\u015fanmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve ABD’nin Ermenistan’da askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6z konusu de\u011fildir. Ermenistan ‘Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130\u00e7in \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi’ program\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde NATO ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fsa da, g\u00fcvenlik alan\u0131nda Rusya ile i\u015fbirli\u011fine daha \u00e7ok \u00f6nem vermektedir.<\/p>\n ABD’nin mali a\u00e7\u0131dan Ermenistan’\u0131 desteklemesinin en \u00f6nemli nedenlerinden biri de ABD Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n Kongre ve Senato’da yapt\u0131klar\u0131 lobi faaliyetleridir. \u00d6zellikle Ermenistan’\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan ekonomik ablukaya al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia eden Ermeni diasporas\u0131 2002 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015flar\u0131na kadar ABD’nin Ermenistan’a 1 milyar 200 milyon Dolar mali yard\u0131m etmesini sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ki bu a\u00e7\u0131dan Ermenistan \u0130srail’den sonra ABD’den en \u00e7ok yard\u0131m alan ikinci \u00fclke olmu\u015ftur. \u00dc\u00e7 milyon n\u00fcfusa sahip Ermenistan’da ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na 42 dolar Amerikan yard\u0131m\u0131 d\u00fc\u015ferken bu rakam Bosna’da 34 dolara, Rusya’da 1.40 Dolara, Hindistan’da ise 0.14 Ermenistan Ba\u015fbakan\u0131\u00a0<\/span>A. Margaryan’\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131na g\u00f6re, 1992-2001 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda ABD, Ermenistan’a teknik ve insani yard\u0131m \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde 1.400 milyon Dolar yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. (69) Bundan ba\u015fka ABD Kafkasya \u00fclkelerine mali yard\u0131m ederken Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f’\u0131 ayr\u0131 bir birim olarak g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f ve yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur ki bu durum Azerbaycan’\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tan\u0131mas\u0131 hakk\u0131nda g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerine ters d\u00fc\u015fmektedir. (70) 10 Ocak 2002’de Ermenistan’da yap\u0131lan Ermenistan Cumhuriyetinin G\u00fcncel Sorunlar\u0131 adl\u0131 yuvarlak masa toplas\u0131nda Ermenistan D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Vardan Oskanyan’\u0131n ABD’nin Ermenistan’a yerle\u015fmesi hi\u00e7bir zaman Rusya ‘n\u0131nn varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ile mukayese edilemez ve onun yerini dolduramaz \u015feklinde a\u00e7\u0131klama yapmas\u0131, ABD- Ermenistan aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkileri etkilememi\u015ftir. Bu a\u00e7\u0131klamaya ra\u011fmen, Ermenistan Bar\u0131\u015f i\u00e7in \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi program\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde NATO ile ili\u015fkilerine devam etmektedir. Ermenistan Savunma Bakan Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Mikael Melkonyan NATO-Ermenistan\u00a0<\/span>ili\u015fkilerini de\u011ferlendirirken NATO ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7inde olduklar\u0131n\u0131 ancak, Ermenistan’\u0131n NATO’ya \u00fcye olmak istemedi\u011fini vurgulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (72) Ermenistan’\u0131n bu tutumu kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda bile ABD Ermenistan ile askeri i\u015fbirli\u011fine devam etmekte ve \u00f6zel olarak askeri yard\u0131mlarda bulunmaktad\u0131r. Ermenistan’\u0131n ABD’den ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 mali yard\u0131mlara ra\u011fmen, devlet yetkililerinin bu t\u00fcr a\u00e7\u0131klamalarda bulunmas\u0131 \u00f6zellikle g\u00fcvenlik ve askeri ili\u015fkiler a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan Rusya’ya olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bir g\u00f6stergesidir.<\/p>\n 18-19 May\u0131s 1999’da Erivan’da d\u00fczenlenen ‘Rusya-Ermenistan-\u0130ran: Uygarl\u0131k Diyalogu adl\u0131 konferansta konu\u015fma yapan Ermeni Devrimci Federasyonu (Ta\u015fnaksuryun Partisi) Merkez Y\u00f6netim Kurulu Ba\u015fkan\u0131 ve Devlet Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ko\u00e7aryan’\u0131n Dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 g\u00f6revinde bulunan Vahan Ovannisyan Ermenilerin son 300 y\u0131ll\u0131k tarihinde Rusya’n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve Ermenistan’\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n garant\u00f6r\u00fc oldu\u011funu ifade etmi\u015ftir. (73) Ovannisyan’\u0131n bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fc 8 Ekim 2002’de\u00a0<\/span>Moskova’da d\u00fczenlenen ‘Y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n Kav\u015fa\u011f\u0131nda D\u00fcnya Ermenileri ve Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkilerin G\u00fcncel Sorunlar\u0131’ adl\u0131 konferansta konu\u015fma yapan Rusya D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 \u0130gor \u0130vanov’un g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fleri ile uyu\u015fmaktad\u0131r. \u0130vanov g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerini, \u201c…Rusya Kafkasya devletidir ve bu b\u00f6lgede do\u011fal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 vard\u0131r. Rusya ‘n\u0131n Kafkasya politikas\u0131 tarihi, ekonomik, siyasi, dini ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ili\u015fkilerin s\u00fcreklili\u011fine dayanmaktad\u0131r. Bizim ba\u015fl\u0131ca amac\u0131m\u0131z bu b\u00f6lgede g\u00fcvenlik ve istikrar\u0131 sa\u011flamakt\u0131r. Bizim b\u00f6lgedeki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z istikrar\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131 i\u00e7in yeterlidir. Bu konu bug\u00fcn de bizim i\u00e7in g\u00fcncelli\u011fini korumaktad\u0131r. Ermenistan Kafkasya \u00fclkeleri aras\u0131nda Rusya i\u00e7in \u00f6zel \u00f6neme sahiptir. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiler dostluk ve i\u015fbirli\u011fi prensibine, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131\u00a0<\/span>anla\u015fmaya, milli \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n \u00f6rt\u00fc\u015fmesine ve tarihi geleneklere dayanmaktad\u0131r. (74)\u00a0<\/span>\u015feklinde ifade etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Ermenistan’da Rusya’n\u0131n askeri ve siyasi varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde devam etmesi \u00fczerine ABD, T\u00fcrkiye’nin Ermenistan ile olan s\u0131n\u0131r kap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in zaman zaman T\u00fcrkiye’ye kar\u015f\u0131 bask\u0131 uygulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD, T\u00fcrkiye ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftiren Ermenistan’\u0131n bu \u00fclke \u00fczerinden Bat\u0131ya a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00fczerine Rusya’n\u0131n siyasi ve askeri etkinli\u011finin zay\u0131flayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmektedir. Bu konuda \u00f6nemli olan konulardan biri de ABD’nin tek tarafl\u0131 olarak T\u00fcrkiye’ye bask\u0131 uygulamas\u0131d\u0131r. S\u0131n\u0131r kap\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 isteyen ve Rusya’n\u0131n Ermenistan’daki askeri ve siyasi etkilili\u011finin zay\u0131flamas\u0131na \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan ABD s\u00f6zde soyk\u0131r\u0131m propagandas\u0131n\u0131 durdurmak i\u00e7in Ermenistan’\u0131 uyarmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak sadece s\u0131n\u0131r kap\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131 Ermenistan- Rusya askeri ve siyasi ili\u015fkilerini zay\u0131flatmayacakt\u0131r. Bunun da birka\u00e7 nedeni vard\u0131r: Her \u015feyden \u00f6nce Rusya, Ermenistan y\u00f6netiminin i\u00e7 i\u015flerine kar\u0131\u015fmamakta, \u00fclkedeki bask\u0131c\u0131 rejimi ele\u015ftirmemekte, insan haklar\u0131, bas\u0131n yay\u0131n \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc sorgulamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f Sava\u015f\u0131’nda Ermenistan’\u0131 her zaman askeri ve siyasi a\u00e7\u0131dan desteklemi\u015ftir. Rusya’da ya\u015fayan yakla\u015f\u0131k 2 milyon Ermeni\u2019nin Rusya ile ili\u015fkilerin bozulmas\u0131 sonucunda ana vatanlar\u0131na geri d\u00f6nmeleri Ermenistan’\u0131n i\u00e7 politikas\u0131nda ciddi sorunlar\u0131n ya\u015fanmas\u0131na neden olacakt\u0131r (ABD’de ya\u015fayan yakla\u015f\u0131k 1 milyon Ermeni\u2019nin her hangi bir nedenle ABD h\u00fck\u00fcmetinin geri g\u00f6ndermesi s\u00f6z konusu de\u011fildir).<\/p>\n Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ilk y\u0131llar\u0131ndan bug\u00fcne kadar Ermenistan Rusya ve ABD aras\u0131nda denge politikas\u0131n\u0131 izlemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f, hem Rusya’n\u0131n askeri ve siyasi deste\u011finin hem de ABD’nin mali yard\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n devam etmesini sa\u011flaya bilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Ancak Ermenistan ile askeri ve siyasi ili\u015fkilerinin \u00fcst d\u00fczeyde olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, Rusya Kafkasya’daki etkinli\u011fini daha fazla s\u00fcrd\u00fcrme imkan\u0131na sahip de\u011fildir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc, ABD b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n ve ula\u015ft\u0131rma hatlar\u0131n\u0131n tamam\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc eline ge\u00e7irmi\u015f ve b\u00f6lgeye Rusya’dan daha \u00e7ok sermaye yat\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu nedenle de b\u00f6lgenin g\u00fcvenli\u011finin sa\u011flanmas\u0131nda kendisini sorumlu\u00a0<\/span>g\u00f6rmektedir.<\/span> <\/p>\n ABD`N\u0130N B\u00d6LGEDEK\u0130 PETROL POL\u0130T\u0130KASI<\/p>\n A. Hazar\u0131n Stat\u00fcs\u00fcne Y\u00f6nelik ABD Politikas\u0131<\/p>\n <\/b>1991 Y\u0131l\u0131nda Sovyetler birli\u011finin resmen da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan Rus ve Fars olmayan \u00fc\u00e7 yeni T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyeti ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti. Bununla da Hazar\u2019\u0131n k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131ndaki devletlerin say\u0131s\u0131 ikiden be\u015fe y\u00fckseldi. Ama Hazar Denizinin petrol ve do\u011fal gazla zengin olmas\u0131 onun hukuki stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinde b\u00fcy\u00fck bir engel olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n Uzmanlar g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Hazar havzas\u0131n\u0131n 275 trilyon metrek\u00fcp do\u011fal gaz ve 150 milyar varil petrol i\u00e7erisinde oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemektedirler. Bu y\u00fczden Hazar Deniz\u2019i b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00fclkelerin \u00e7eki\u015fme oda\u011f\u0131 olmu\u015ftur. Onlar Hazar\u2019\u0131n g\u00f6l m\u00fc yoksa deniz mi sorusuna cevap ar\u0131yorlar. Hazar\u2019la ilgili ilk anla\u015fma 10 \u015eubat 1828 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u00c7ar Rusya\u2019s\u0131yla \u0130ran aras\u0131nda imzalanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Anla\u015fma tarihe T\u00fcrkmen\u00e7ay anla\u015fmas\u0131 ad\u0131 alt\u0131nda girmi\u015ftir. Bu anla\u015fma ayn\u0131 zamanda Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 resmen ikiye b\u00f6lerek \u0130ran ve Rusya egemenli\u011fine sokmu\u015ftur. Anla\u015fman\u0131n 4. maddesine g\u00f6re Hazarda askeri birlik bulundurma yaln\u0131z Rusya\u2019ya aittir. Ama \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan kurulan Rus-Bol\u015fevik h\u00fck\u00fcmeti 26 \u015eubat 1921\u2019de \u0130ran\u2019la Hazar Deniziyle ilgili yeni bir anla\u015fma imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Anla\u015fma gere\u011fince t\u00fcm Sovyet ve \u0130ran gemileri Hazar \u00fczerinde serbest dola\u015fma hakk\u0131 kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n Hazar \u00fczerinde imzalanm\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmalar bununla s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 kalmam\u0131\u015f 27 A\u011fustos 1935 y\u0131l\u0131nda imzalanan anla\u015fmayla seyr\u00fcsefer \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fckler tekrarlanm\u0131\u015f ve 10 millik bal\u0131k\u00e7\u0131l\u0131k b\u00f6lgesi kurulmu\u015f bu anla\u015fman\u0131n tekrar\u0131 25 Mart 1940 Y\u0131l\u0131nda yeninden imzalanan bir anla\u015fmayla devam etmi\u015ftir.\u00a0 (75) Sovyetlerin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131yla Rusya Hazar\u2019\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 g\u00f6l olarak nitelendirmi\u015f ve g\u00f6l\u00fcn stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f \u00fclkelerin kendisinin kararla\u015ft\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131 ireli s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. B\u00f6ylece Hazar bir g\u00f6l m\u00fc ve ya deniz mi tart\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. E\u011fer Hazar deniz olarak kabul edilirse o zaman 1982 y\u0131l\u0131nda kabul edilmi\u015f BM deniz Hukuku s\u00f6zle\u015fmesine g\u00f6re her k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f devletin kara sular\u0131 k\u0131ta sahanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve m\u00fcnhas\u0131r ekonomik b\u00f6lgesinin olmas\u0131 gerekmektedir. (76)<\/p>\n Hazar\u2019\u0131n do\u011fal kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u0131sm\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019la Kazakistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bu y\u00fczden her iki \u00fclkenin kendi ekonomilerini yeniden in\u015fa etmeyi ve i\u00e7erideki istikrar\u0131 sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in yat\u0131r\u0131ma ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131 vard\u0131r. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n da kendi s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131na yak\u0131n yerlerde b\u00fcy\u00fck rezervlere sahip oldu\u011fu s\u00f6yleniyor ama bunlar Hazar\u0131n derin k\u0131sm\u0131ndad\u0131r ve bunlar\u0131 \u00e7\u0131karmak \u015fimdilik \u00e7ok pahal\u0131 ve zor. Yukar\u0131da s\u00f6yledi\u011fimiz gibi Hazar deniz stat\u00fcs\u00fc al\u0131rsa bundan en karl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kacak \u00fclke Azerbaycan olacakt\u0131r. Rusya\u2019ysa \u00f6nceleri ireli s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc iddialar\u0131 kendisine destek bulamay\u0131nca sonradan Hazar\u2019\u0131n deniz olarak kabul edilmesini ve t\u00fcm gelirlerin toplanarak k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f \u00fclkeler aras\u0131nda beraberce payla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 savunmu\u015ftur. (77)<\/p>\n \u0130ran\u2019sa Hazar\u2019\u0131n 12 mil prensibini savunmaktad\u0131r. \u0130ran\u2019dan farkl\u0131 olarak Rusya 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda Hazar\u2019la ilgili tutumunu de\u011fi\u015ftirmi\u015f ve deniz taban\u0131n\u0131n e\u015fit uzakl\u0131k ilkesine g\u00f6re b\u00f6l\u00fcnmesini ve su kitlesinin ortak kullan\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nermi\u015ftir. Hazar\u2019\u0131n deniz oldu\u011funu savunan Azerbaycan\u2019sa b\u00f6lgede Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131n kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 alma rol\u00fcn\u00fc \u00fcstlenmi\u015f ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6nerdi\u011fi 45 millik kara su \u00f6nerisini reddetmi\u015ftir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n do\u011fal kaynaklar\u0131 bu 45 millik arazinin i\u00e7erisindedir. Azerbaycan Hazar\u2019a 1982 Y\u0131l\u0131nda kabul edilmi\u015f BM DHS\u2019nin uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131 istemektedir. Kazakistan\u2019da Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc konusunda Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n bu tezini savunmaktad\u0131r. Kazakistan 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda Hazar Denizi stat\u00fcs\u00fcyle ilgili yeni bir \u00f6neri verdi. Bu \u00f6neriye g\u00f6re Hazar\u2019\u0131n y\u00fczeyi deniz olabilir ancak taban\u0131 g\u00f6l yata\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Bu \u00f6neriye ilk tepki Rusya\u2019dan geldi. Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc konusunda g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015flerinin ne oldu\u011fu belli olmayan \u00fclkeyse T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019d\u0131r. \u0130lk \u00f6nceleri Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fcyle ilgili Azerbaycan ve Kazakistan\u2019\u0131n tezini savunan T\u00fcrkmenistan sonralar bu tutumunda vazge\u00e7mi\u015f, Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n ileri s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc tezleri savunmu\u015ftur. Ama T\u00fcrkmenistan bu tutumuna da sad\u0131k olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. T\u00fcrkmenba\u015f\u0131 Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n \u00f6nerdi\u011fi 45 millik b\u00f6l\u00fcnme tezine olumlu yakla\u015fm\u0131\u015f ve sonralar bu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesinden de vazge\u00e7mi\u015ftir. T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019la anla\u015famad\u0131\u011f\u0131 di\u011fer bir konuysa Hazar\u2019da bulunan petrol yataklar\u0131n\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fcyle ilgilidir. Bu yataklar i\u00e7erisinde en \u00e7ok tart\u0131\u015fma yaratan yataksa Kepez yata\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Bu yatak 1959 y\u0131l\u0131nda Azerbaycanl\u0131 jeofizik\u00e7iler taraf\u0131ndan bulunmu\u015ftur. (78)<\/p>\n Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n bu yata\u011f\u0131 i\u015fletmesi 1988 y\u0131l\u0131ndan ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda T\u00fcrkmenistan bakanlar kurulu Hazar\u2019\u0131n T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019a ait yataklar\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fletilmesi hakk\u0131nda uluslararas\u0131 ihale a\u00e7t\u0131. Bu ihaleye Kepez yata\u011f\u0131n\u0131n da kat\u0131lmas\u0131 ve T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019\u0131n bu yata\u011f\u0131n kendisine ait oldu\u011funu iddia etmesi taraflar aras\u0131nda anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011fa neden oldu.<\/p>\n \u0130ran da Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc konusunda Rusya ve T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019\u0131n tezini savunmaktad\u0131r. 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rusya ve Kazakistan\u2019\u0131n Hazar\u2019\u0131n kuzeyini beraberce i\u015fletilmesi yolunda anla\u015fma imzalamas\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck tepkisine neden olmu\u015ftur. Bu anla\u015fmaya kar\u015f\u0131 \u0130ran ve T\u00fcrkmenistan \u00e7ok sert tepki g\u00f6stermi\u015fler. Bundan sonra \u0130ran\u2019la Rusya aras\u0131nda tek anla\u015f\u0131lan konu Hazar\u2019\u0131n dibinden boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7ekilmesine kar\u015f\u0131 ittifak olu\u015fturmak olmu\u015ftur. \u0130ran ayn\u0131 zamanda hi\u00e7bir k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f devletin olumlu bakmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir tezi g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze kadar da savunmaktad\u0131r. Bu teze g\u00f6re Hazar 5 devlet aras\u0131nda y\u00fczde 20 oranla beraberce b\u00f6l\u00fcnmelidir \u0130ran ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n as\u0131l ama\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131n Amerika\u2019n\u0131n petrol \u015firketleri vas\u0131tas\u0131yla b\u00f6lgede g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesinin engellemede ve bu b\u00f6lgeyi kendi n\u00fcfuz alan\u0131nda tutmaktan ba\u015fka bir \u015fey de\u011fildir. Hi\u00e7bir siyasi yolla bu amac\u0131na ula\u015famayan \u0130ran b\u00f6lgede kendi etkinli\u011fini g\u00f6stermek amac\u0131yla askeri hava g\u00fc\u00e7lerinden yararlanmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n 2001 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Temmuz ay\u0131nda \u0130ran sava\u015f u\u00e7aklar\u0131 Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n hava s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131 bozmu\u015f, birka\u00e7 g\u00fcn buna devam etmi\u015flerdir. Bu olay t\u00fcm kom\u015fu devletler hatta \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n m\u00fcttefiki say\u0131lan Rusya taraf\u0131ndan tepkiyle kar\u015f\u0131lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Amerikan \u015firketlerinin g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in Amerika ve T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan \u0130ran\u2019a sert tepkiler gelmi\u015ftir. T\u00fcrkiye daha ileri giderek \u0130ran\u2019a sert tepkisi d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kendi sava\u015f g\u00f6steri u\u00e7aklar\u0131n\u0131 Bak\u00fc\u2019ye getirerek bir g\u00f6steride bulundu. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n bu tutumuna kar\u015f\u0131 \u0130ran\u2019da ya\u015fayan Azerbaycan T\u00fcrkleri Aliyev\u2019e bir mektup yazarak \u00fclkelerinin yapm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu bu harekette Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n yan\u0131nda olduklar\u0131n\u0131 belirtmi\u015fler. Ama \u0130ran verilen tepkileri \u00f6nemsiz saym\u0131\u015f ve hareketlerine devam etmi\u015ftir. Olaylar\u0131n bu t\u00fcr geli\u015fiminin ard\u0131ndan ABD ikinci kez \u0130ran\u2019a bu t\u00fcr hareketlerine son vermesi i\u00e7in bir uyar\u0131da bulunmu\u015ftur. \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n bu tutumundan sonra Rusya \u0130ran\u2019la olan ortak hareket etme d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesinden vazge\u00e7mi\u015f ve Putin Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fcyle ilgili \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n istekleri bizim genel isteklerimiz d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndad\u0131r a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131n\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (79)<\/p>\n ABD b\u00f6lgeden uzakl\u0131\u011f\u0131na ra\u011fmen bu b\u00f6lgede etkili olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD`nin b\u00f6lgedeki enerji sorununa y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 uzun vadeli ekonomik, stratejik hedefler \u00fczerine kurulmu\u015ftur. Hazar\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc konusunda ABD b\u00f6lge devletlerinden her zaman Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n arkas\u0131nda olmu\u015ftur.\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Hazar\u2019\u0131n sekt\u00f6rel olarak Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n istedi\u011fi tarzda b\u00f6l\u00fcnmesi ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131yla uzla\u015fmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n Hazar`\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131nda ABD, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta bu sorunu k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f devletlerin karar verece\u011fi bir konu oldu\u011funu belirttiyse de, zaman i\u00e7erisinde bu tutumunu de\u011fi\u015ftirdi. Bunda, RF`nin 12 Kas\u0131m 1996`da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 teklif etkili olmu\u015ftur. Her bir \u00fclke i\u00e7in 45 millik m\u00fcnhas\u0131r off-shore ekonomik tan\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 ortaya atan RF ayr\u0131ca, 45 millik limitin \u00f6tesindeki rezervler \u00fczerinde ulusal yetkiyi tek tek \u00fclke temelinde tart\u0131\u015fmaya istekli oldu\u011funu; di\u011fer b\u00fct\u00fcn rezervlerin k\u0131y\u0131da\u015f devletlerin \u015firketleri arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla \u201cortak m\u00fclkiyet\u201d alt\u0131nda olabilece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. ABD, bu teklife cevab\u0131n\u0131 BDT \u00d6zel B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7isi James Collins`in Aliyev`e g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi ABD`nin \u201cHazar Denizi`nin sekt\u00f6rlere b\u00f6l\u00fcnmesi fikrini savundu\u011fu\u201d mesaj\u0131yla ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a verdi\u011fi ikinci en b\u00fcy\u00fck destek \u0130ran u\u00e7aklar\u0131n\u0131n Azerbaycan Hava S\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 ihlal ettikten sonra olmu\u015ftur. B\u00f6ylece ABD bu b\u00f6lgede ona yard\u0131mc\u0131 olabilme g\u00fcc\u00fcne sahip T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi de yan\u0131na alarak bu b\u00f6lgede \u0130ran ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n etkisini azaltmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (81) ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki hedefleri ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n hedefleri aras\u0131nda paralelli\u011fin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Azerbaycan i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir avantaj olmu\u015ftur. ABD\u2019nin bu b\u00f6lgede yay\u0131lma politikas\u0131n\u0131 eski Amerikan y\u00f6neticilerinden biri H.Kissenger\u2019in diliyle s\u00f6ylesek daha iyi olur. \u201cBizim hedeflerimiz her \u015feyden \u00f6nce sa\u011flam bir d\u0131\u015f politika ile uzun vadeli \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131m\u0131z\u0131 desteklemektir. Bu politika ne kadar \u00e7ok bizim ve ba\u015fkalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 realist bir tarzda de\u011ferlendirilmesi \u00fczerine dayan\u0131rsa, d\u00fcnyadaki rol\u00fcm\u00fcz de o kadar etkili olur. D\u00fcnya ile ilgilenmemizin nedeni y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerimizin olmas\u0131 de\u011fil, d\u00fcnya ile ilgilenmemizden dolay\u0131 y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerimiz vard\u0131r. \u00c7\u0131kar\u0131m\u0131z y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerimize \u015fekil vermi\u015ftir. Y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerimiz \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131m\u0131za de\u011fil.<\/p>\n B. ABD\u2019nin B\u00f6lgedeki Petrol Boru Hatlar\u0131 Politikas\u0131 Bu ba\u011flamda , ABD \u201cserseri devlet\u201d olarak alg\u0131lad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u0130ran`\u0131 enerji konusunda devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rakmak i\u00e7in 1995`te \u0130ran D\u0131\u015f Petrol Yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 Yasas\u0131 ve 1996`da \u0130ran \u2013Libya Yapt\u0131r\u0131m Yasas\u0131`n\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kartarak, Amerikan petrol \u015firketlerinin \u0130ran`\u0131 i\u00e7eren herhangi bir projeye kat\u0131lmalar\u0131n\u0131 yasaklad\u0131. Ayr\u0131ca, b\u00f6lgenin RF`den ba\u011f\u0131s\u0131zla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 isteyen ABD, bu ama\u00e7la \u201c\u00e7ok say\u0131da boru hatlar\u0131\u201d politikas\u0131n\u0131 izledi. B\u00f6lgede petrol\u00fcn\u00fcn birden fazla hatla ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131yla Rus tekelinin k\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 hedefleyen ABD, erken \u00fcretim petrol\u00fc i\u00e7in Bak\u00fc- Novorossiysk`in yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Bak\u00fc-Supsa`y\u0131 ikinci hat olarak benimsedi. Ayr\u0131ca ABD`nin ana ihra\u00e7 boru hatt\u0131nda RF ve \u0130ran`\u0131 devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rakmak istemesi, ABD i\u00e7in b\u00f6lgede T\u00fcrkiye`nin \u00f6nemini artt\u0131r\u0131yordu. Bu nedenle, ABD G\u00fcney Kafkasya`ya yerle\u015fmek ve b\u00f6lgede etkinli\u011fini artt\u0131rmak i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye`nin i\u015fbirli\u011fine ihtiya\u00e7 duydu. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131n\u0131 k\u0131sa vadeli \u015firket karlar\u0131 \u00fczerine kurmayan ABD, di\u011fer alternatif g\u00fczergahlara g\u00f6re daha uzun olan Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan hatt\u0131n\u0131 desteklemi\u015ftir. (83)<\/p>\n Hazar b\u00f6lgesindeki anla\u015fmalardan b\u00fcy\u00fck pay sahibi olan ABD bu kaynaklar\u0131n d\u00fcnya pazar\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in kendine en uygun olan ta\u015f\u0131ma yoluna ihtiyac\u0131 vard\u0131. Bu yol \u00f6yle bi yol olmal\u0131yd\u0131 ki Azerbaycan`la kom\u015fu olan Rusya`n\u0131n etkisinde \u00e7ok az bulunsun veya hi\u00e7 bulunmas\u0131n. Ama G\u00fcney ve Kuzey Kafkasya`daki etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar bu projenin co\u011frafi yolunun nerden ge\u00e7ece\u011fini net olarak ortaya koymam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kuzeydeki \u00c7e\u00e7en-Rus sava\u015f\u0131 nedeniyle G\u00fcney`den ge\u00e7mesi ve \u0130ran K\u00f6rfezine \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 planlanan boru hatt\u0131 projesi ABD`nin \u0130ran`la olan so\u011fuk ili\u015fkileri nedeniyle ertelenmi\u015ftir. Di\u011fer bir yol olan Ermenistan \u00fczerinden T\u00fcrkiye`ye ula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclen projeyse Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmedi.<\/p>\n B\u00f6yle bir durumda Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye arkalar\u0131na ABD deste\u011fini de alarak ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 gereken bu petrol\u00fcn G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7mekle T\u00fcrkiye limanlar\u0131na ula\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6neren Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan projesini Konsorsiuma kat\u0131lan \u015firketlere \u00f6nerdiler. Bu projeye ilk sert tepki Rusya`dan geldi. Rusya bu projenin olu\u015fmas\u0131na ihtiya\u00e7 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve ta\u015f\u0131nacak petrol\u00fcn Bak\u00fc-Novorossiysk hatt\u0131yla ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nerdi. Ama bu ABD ba\u015fta olmakla T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmedi. BTC hatt\u0131n\u0131n uzun ve pahal\u0131 olmas\u0131 nedeniyle baz\u0131 \u015firketler taraf\u0131ndan da olumlu kar\u015f\u0131lanmad\u0131. Hatt\u0131n toplam maliyetiyse 4,8 milyar dolard\u0131r. Hatt\u0131n uzunlu\u011fu km. dir bunun 1037km. T\u00fcrkiye`nin , 468 km. Azerbaycan`\u0131n 225 km. G\u00fcrcistan`\u0131n arazisinden ge\u00e7iyor. Hatt\u0131n ilk ortaya \u00e7\u0131kma projesi 1992 y\u0131l\u0131nda olmu\u015ftur. Bu hat yaln\u0131zca Azerbaycan petrollerini de\u011fil gelecekte Kazakistan petrol\u00fcn\u00fc de ta\u015f\u0131mak g\u00fcc\u00fcne sahiptir. Hat ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131n\u0131 Bak\u00fcn\u00fcn Sanga\u00e7al terminalinden g\u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fcyor ve G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7erek Ceyhan liman\u0131nda son buluyor. Ama bu hatt\u0131n olu\u015fmas\u0131 o kadar da kolay olmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc BTC hatt\u0131 Hazar kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fcnya pazarlar\u0131na ta\u015f\u0131yacak tek proje olmayacak. Bu hatt\u0131n ard\u0131nda yeni projelerin de olu\u015fmas\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f ve Bak\u00fc \u2013Tiflis \u2013Erzurum do\u011fal gaz boru hatt\u0131 projesi de hayata ge\u00e7irilmi\u015ftir. T\u00fcm bunlarsa Kafkasya ve Orta Asya`da Sovyetler`in \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f Rusya-T\u00fcrkiye rekabetini h\u0131zland\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. Rusya bu b\u00f6lgedeki do\u011fal kaynaklar\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye vas\u0131tas\u0131yla d\u00fcnya pazarlar\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131na izin vermemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor bu i\u015fde Rusya`n\u0131n ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 en b\u00fcy\u00fck destek AB \u00fcyelerindendir. AB \u00fcyesi \u00fclkelerin Rusya`ya verdi\u011fi bu deste\u011fin esas nedeni gelecekte kendi \u00fclkelerinin enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin elinde bulunmas\u0131ndan korkmalar\u0131d\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye ise ABD`nin de bu y\u00f6nde deste\u011fini arkas\u0131na alarak BTC ve di\u011fer hatlar\u0131n kendi topraklar\u0131 \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7mesine \u00e7aba g\u00f6steriyordu.\u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu hatlar\u0131 kendi \u00fclkesinden ge\u00e7irmekle T\u00fcrkiye ilk olarak kendi petrol ve do\u011fal gaz ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 giderecekti. Hatlar\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye`den ge\u00e7mesinin di\u011fer \u00f6nemiyse T\u00fcrkiye`nin Ortado\u011fu, Avrupa ve Kafkaslarda bir enerji hatlar\u0131n\u0131 bulunduran \u00fclke konumuna gelmesidir.<\/p>\n 19 Ekim 2000`de T\u00fcrkiye`de BTC boru hatt\u0131 nihaiyi anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzaland\u0131.2004`te faaliyete girmesi planlanan boru hatt\u0131 projesi , finansman giderleri ve i\u00e7ini dolduracak ham petrol hari\u00e7, 2,4 milyara mal olmu\u015ftur. Bu hatt\u0131n onaylanmas\u0131n\u0131 istemeyen \u00fclkeler yaln\u0131zca \u0130ran ve Rusya de\u011fil ayn\u0131 zamanda Ermenistan ve ABD`deki Ermeni lobisidir. ABD`deki Ermeni lobisi daha ireli giderek bu hatt\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan`dan ge\u00e7mesini \u00f6nlemeye ve hatt\u0131n Ermenistan`dan ge\u00e7mesini sa\u011flamak amac\u0131yla ABD y\u00f6netimine bask\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rm\u0131\u015f ve \u00e7e\u015fitli medya ve bas\u0131nlarda bu hatla ilgili yalan haberler yaym\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. The NEW York Times gazetesinde 11 Ekim 1998 tarihinde yaz\u0131lm\u0131\u015f bir makalede Amerika`n\u0131n BTC boru hatt\u0131 projesinden vaz ge\u00e7ti\u011fi ve ana petrollerin Bak\u00fc-Supsa boru hatt\u0131ndan ta\u015f\u0131naca\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin bir haber yay\u0131mlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bunun ard\u0131ndan Ba\u015fkan Bill Clinton`un Hazar havzas\u0131 enerji politikalar\u0131 \u00f6zel dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 Richard Morningstar A\u0130OC`un Bak\u00fc Supsa hatt\u0131n\u0131 tercih etmesini s\u00f6z konusu olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve BTC`den ba\u015fka alternatif hatt\u0131n olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Hazar denizinde bulunan \u015eahdeniz yata\u011f\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fletilmesi hakk\u0131nda anla\u015fma imzaland\u0131ktan sonra bu yatakta b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde do\u011fal gaz\u0131n olmas\u0131 ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Azerbaycan`da ilk kez b\u00f6yle bir do\u011fal gaz yata\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bulunmas\u0131 ve bulunan do\u011fal gaz\u0131n d\u00fcnya piyasalar\u0131na \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n olmamas\u0131 yeni bir boru hatt\u0131 projesinin ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131na neden oldu. \u0130lkin belirlemelere g\u00f6re \u015eahdeniz yata\u011f\u0131nda 700 milyar metrek\u00fcp gaz bulunmaktad\u0131r. Kom\u015fusunda bu kadar do\u011fal gaz\u0131n bulundu\u011funu g\u00f6ren T\u00fcrkiye di\u011fer \u00fclkelerden ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 baz\u0131 do\u011fal gaz anla\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 ask\u0131ya alarak onlardan daha ucuza mal olacak Azerbaycan gaz\u0131n\u0131 almak i\u00e7in Azerbaycan`la bir anla\u015fmaya vard\u0131. Bu anla\u015fmaya g\u00f6re \u015eahdeniz yata\u011f\u0131ndaki gaz Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Erzurum hatt\u0131yla T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ta\u015f\u0131nacakt\u0131r. Ayn\u0131 zamanda T\u00fcrkiye`nin ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda kalan gaz\u0131n da Yunanistan`a bu hat vas\u0131tas\u0131yla ula\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 da kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131. Bu projeye en b\u00fcy\u00fck destek ABD ve G\u00fcrcistan`dan geldi. 2001 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Mart ay\u0131nda Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 H.Aliyev`in T\u00fcrkiye`yi ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda Ankara`da Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131nda do\u011falgaz ihracat\u0131na ili\u015fkin bir anla\u015fma imzaland\u0131. Anla\u015fma gere\u011fince 2004 y\u0131l\u0131ndan itibaren T\u00fcrkiye`ye \u015eahdeniz yata\u011f\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lacak 2 milyar metrek\u00fcp halinde, 2005`te 3 milyar metrek\u00fcp 2006 BTC boru hatt\u0131n\u0131n maliyeti 4 milyar dolard\u0131r.. Boru hatt\u0131na ilk petrol 25.05.2005 tarihinde y\u00fcklenmi\u015ftir. Ve Ceyhan liman\u0131na 28.05.2006`da ula\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu g\u00fcne kadar BTC boru hatt\u0131ndan 13 milyon tondan \u00e7ok petrol ta\u015f\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n BTC boru hatt\u0131ndaki y\u00fczdeler: BP-\u0130ngiltere, SOCAR-Azerbaycan, UNOCAL-ABD, STATO\u0130L-Norve\u00e7, TPAO-T\u00fcrkiye, EN\u0130-\u0130talya, TFE (Total) Fransa, \u0130TOCHU-Japonya, Azeri-\u00c7\u0131rag-G\u00fcne\u015fli platformundaki y\u00fczdeler: BP-\u0130ngiltere, SOCAR-Azerbaycan, CHEVRON-ABD, STATO\u0130L-Norve\u00e7, TPAO-T\u00fcrkiye, EXXON MOB\u0130L-ABD, DEVON ENERGU-ABD, Bu g\u00fcne kadar A\u00c7G`dan 74 mln ton petrol ve 16 milyar metrek\u00fcpten \u00e7ok gaz \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 2010 y\u0131l\u0131 i\u00e7in A\u00c7G`dan 58 milyon ton petrol ve 15 milyar metrek\u00fcp gaz \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131lmas\u0131 planla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131l\u0131yor.<\/p>\n Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Erzurum gaz boru hatt\u0131 Azerbaycan gaz\u0131n\u0131 yine G\u00fcrcistan ve T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden Avrupaya \u00e7\u0131karacak. Bu boru hatt\u0131 \u015eahdeniz`den al\u0131nacak qaz\u0131n ihrac\u0131 i\u00e7in yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Hatt\u0131n uzunlu\u011fu 970 kilometredir. Y\u0131ll\u0131k verimlili\u011fi 30 milyar metrek\u00fcp gazd\u0131r. Boru hatt\u0131 2004 y\u0131l\u0131nda yap\u0131lmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f ve 2006 sonunda in\u015fas\u0131 bitmi\u015ftir. Bu boru hatt\u0131yla 15 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde T\u00fcrkiye`ye 91 milyar metrek\u00fcp gaz verilmesi planla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131l\u0131yor. Bu boru hatt\u0131yla G\u00fcney Avrupa \u00fclkelerine de gaz ihrac\u0131 planla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131l\u0131yor. Kazakistan da bu boru hatt\u0131yla kendi gaz\u0131n\u0131 ihra\u00e7 etmek d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesindedir. 13.03.2007 tarihinde ilk gaz bu boru hatt\u0131na vurulmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n \u015eahdeniz d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en \u00e7ok gaz rezervlerinden biridir. Arazisi 859,8 km2`dir. Bu layihan\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in 4,5 milyar dolar har\u00e7lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu g\u00fcne kadar \u015eahdenizden 280 milyon metrek\u00fcp gaz ihra\u00e7 edilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n \u015eahdeniz yata\u011f\u0131ndaki y\u00fczdeler: BP-\u0130ngiltere, STATO\u0130L-Norve\u00e7, SOCAR-Azerbaycan, <\/span>B\u00d6L\u00dcM D\u0130PNOTLARI:<\/b> ABD\u2019N\u0130N B\u00d6LGEDEK\u0130 \u0130 SORUNLARA Y\u00d6NEL\u0130K TUTUMU<\/p>\n A. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f Sorunu<\/p>\n <\/b>SSCB da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131ktan sonra yeni yaranm\u0131\u015f devletlerin baz\u0131lar\u0131nda arazi b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fcy\u00fc sorunu ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. SSCB`nin politikalar\u0131ndan biri de devletlerin i\u00e7inde zorla yar\u0131n istedi\u011fi gibi kullanabilece\u011fi \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lgelerin yarat\u0131lmas\u0131yd\u0131. Bu politika SSCB da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131ktan sonra Rusya i\u00e7in eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi devletlerinin baz\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n i\u00e7 i\u015flerine kar\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na zemin olu\u015fturdu. Maalesef Azerbaycan devleti de bu politikan\u0131n getirdi\u011fi zorluklarla y\u00fcz y\u00fcze kalm\u0131\u015f oldu.Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131nda yer almakla beraber SSCB zaman\u0131nda zorla g\u00f6\u00e7 ettirilmi\u015f Ermenilerin \u00e7o\u011funlukta oldu\u011fu bir b\u00f6lge olan Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f odakl\u0131 sorun 1980`lerin sonlar\u0131na yak\u0131n g\u00fcndeme gelmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. (85 20 \u015eubat 1988`de Da\u011flk Karaba\u011f \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lgesi Sovyet’inin, Azerbaycan SSC`den ayr\u0131l\u0131p Ermenistan SSC`ye birle\u015fmek iste\u011fini Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, ve SSCB Sovyetlerine bildirmesi ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n bunu redd etmesinin ard\u0131ndan g\u00f6steriler ve \u015fiddet olaylar\u0131 bir birini izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Sorunun daha da b\u00fcy\u00fcmesine 15 Haziran 1988`de Ermenistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti`nin Karaba\u011f’\u0131n Ermenistan`a ba\u011flanmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde karar almas\u0131 sebep olmu\u015ftur. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7 Azerbaycan`da Azerbaycan Halk Cephesi`nin (AHC) nin yaranmas\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturan bir s\u00fcre\u00e7 olmu\u015ftur. 1 Aral\u0131k 1989`da Ermenistan Parlamentosunun Da\u011fl\u0131k Karba\u011f`\u0131n Ermenistan`a birle\u015fti\u011fini ilan etmesiyle taraflar aras\u0131ndaki gerginlik t\u0131rmand\u0131. (86<\/p>\n 1990 y\u0131l\u0131nda belki de SSCB`nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 daha da yakla\u015ft\u0131ran bir olay oldu. Azerbaycan`da art\u0131k Azeri Ermeni \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Halk art\u0131k SSCB`ni d\u0131\u015flayan mitingler yap\u0131yordu. 19 Ocak`tan 20`ne ge\u00e7en gece g\u00fcya halk \u00fczerinde yetkiyi yitirmek ku\u015fkusuyla Sovyet ordusunun Bak\u00fc`ye girmesine Moskova taraf\u0131ndan yetki verildi. 130 silahs\u0131z ki\u015finin \u015fehit odlu\u011fu bu kanl\u0131 gece Azerbaycan`da SSCB`ye kar\u015f\u0131 olan bu nefreti daha da att\u0131rm\u0131\u015f oldu.<\/p>\n 3 Eyl\u00fcl 1991`de Ermeniler Da\u011fl\u0131k Karba\u011f`\u0131 \u201ccumhuriyet\u201d olarak ilen ettiler. 26 Kas\u0131m 1991`de Azerbaycan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti Da\u011fl\u0131k Karba\u011f`\u0131n \u00f6zerklik stat\u00fcs\u00fcne son verdi. \u201cDa\u011fl\u0131k Karba\u011f cumhuriyetindeki\u201d Ermeniler buna kar\u015f\u0131n 8 Aral\u0131k`ta yapt\u0131klar\u0131 \u201creferandumla\u201d \u201cba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k\u201dkarar\u0131n\u0131 ald\u0131lar.<\/p>\n 1992`de AHC`nin BDT`yi onaylamamas\u0131 ve yabanc\u0131 askerlerin Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 karar Rusya`y\u0131 k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rtm\u0131\u015f oldu. Azerbaycan`dan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olan Rus askerleri Ermenistan`da yerle\u015ftirildi. Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n sava\u015f\u0131 kaybetmesinin en b\u00fcy\u00fck sebebi de kendi topraklar\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olan Rus askerleri ve silahlar\u0131yd\u0131. Sonu\u00e7ta 1994`te Bi\u015fkek`te imzalanan ate\u015fkese kadar Azerbaycan`\u0131n Da\u011fl\u0131k Karba\u011f da dahil olmakla %20 topraklar\u0131 Ermenistan(Rusya) silahl\u0131 kuvvetleri taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgal edilmi\u015f oldu. Sava\u015f sonunda tarihi Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131ndan( \u015fimdiki Ermenistan ve Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f) 1 milyona yak\u0131n Azeri T\u00fcrkleri etnik temizleme sonucunda g\u00f6\u00e7men halinde ya\u015famaya mecbur kalm\u0131\u015flar. Bu insan haklar\u0131 ihlali halen devam etmektedir. Birle\u015fmi\u015f Milletler G\u00fcvenlik Konseyi\u2019nin Ermeni i\u015fgalleri nedeniyle alm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu 822, 853, 874 ve 884 say\u0131l\u0131 kararlarla, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fcn dokunulmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n sorunda taraf oldu\u011fu ve i\u015fgal edilen topraklar\u0131n hemen ve \u015farts\u0131z olarak terk edilmesi gerekti\u011fi vurgulanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. (87<\/p>\n 30 Ocak 1992\u2019de Avrupa G\u00fcvenlik ve \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Te\u015fkilat`\u0131na (AG\u0130T) \u00fcye olan iki devlet Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n \u00fcyeliklerinin hemen sonras\u0131nda aralar\u0131ndaki sorunlar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6zmek i\u00e7in AG\u0130T temsilcileri b\u00f6lgeye g\u00f6nderilmi\u015f, durum tespiti yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve 27-28 \u015eubat 1992\u2019de Prag\u2019da yap\u0131lan toplant\u0131da Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019a ait oldu kabul edilmi\u015ftir. AG\u0130T\u2019e \u00fcye \u00fclke D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanlar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n 23-24 Mart 1992\u2019de Helsinki\u2019de yapm\u0131\u015f olduklar\u0131 toplant\u0131da Karaba\u011f konusu m\u00fczakere edilmi\u015f Minsk\u2019te bar\u0131\u015f konferans\u0131n\u0131n toplanmas\u0131na karar verilmi\u015f ancak bar\u0131\u015f ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015ftir. 9-11 1994 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Azerbaycan ile Ermenistan aras\u0131nda her ne kadar bir ate\u015fkes anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalanm\u0131\u015fsa da Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131 i\u015fgali hadisesi nihai bir sonuca ula\u015famam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n 1996 AG\u0130T Lizbon Zirvesi\u2019nde, Azerbaycan y\u00f6netimi, toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fcn korunmas\u0131na y\u00f6nelik bir karar \u00e7\u0131kartmay\u0131 ba\u015farm\u0131\u015fsa da Ermenistan bu karar\u0131 kabul etmemi\u015ftir.1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda, AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019nun alm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu Ermenilerin i\u015fgal etmi\u015f olduklar\u0131 topraklar\u0131n sadece bir k\u0131sm\u0131ndan \u00e7ekilmesini i\u00e7eren karar\u0131, d\u00f6nemin Ermenistan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Levon Ter Petrosyan s\u0131cak kar\u015f\u0131lam\u0131\u015fsa da 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda Robert Ko\u00e7aryan\u2019\u0131n devlet ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131na se\u00e7ilmesiyle birlikte bar\u0131\u015f s\u00fcreci de durmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n 1999\u2019da AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu kontrol\u00fcnde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6nerdi\u011fi Azerbaycan ve Karaba\u011f aras\u0131nda ortak devlet kurulmas\u0131 \u00f6nerisi 1996 Lizbon Kararlar\u0131n\u0131n hi\u00e7e say\u0131lmas\u0131 anlam\u0131n\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131mas\u0131 y\u00fcz\u00fcnden hakl\u0131 olarak Azerbaycan y\u00f6netimi taraf\u0131ndan reddedilmi\u015ftir. Yine, 1999\u2019da Bill Clinton\u2019un ABD Ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131ras\u0131nda, Clinton y\u00f6netimi, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda arabuluculuk g\u00f6revi y\u00fcr\u00fctmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f, ancak sonu\u00e7 \u00e7\u0131kmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (89<\/p>\n 2001 y\u0131l\u0131 Nisan ay\u0131nda, Florida Key West\u2019te bu defa d\u00f6nemin ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Bush\u2019un arabuluculu\u011funda Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Haydar Aliyev ve Ermenistan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Robert Ko\u00e7aryan bir araya gelmi\u015f fakat AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019nun \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n devam etmesinin desteklenmesi konusundan ba\u015fka bir uzla\u015fmaya gidilememi\u015ftir. 2002 y\u0131l\u0131nda Viyana\u2019da toplanan AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019nun Ermenistan ile Azerbaycan aras\u0131ndaki problemlerin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc i\u00e7in liderler ve Minsk grubu \u00fcyeleri d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda iki \u00fclkenin i\u00e7i\u015fleri ba\u015fkan yard\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131 ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda olu\u015fturulacak heyetler aras\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerle devam edilmesi ve Minsk Grubu E\u015fba\u015fkanlar\u0131 ile 2-3 ayda bir liderlerin temsilcileri ile bir araya gelerek Karaba\u011f meselesi \u00fczerine g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yap\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00f6nerileri kabul edilmi\u015fse de sonraki s\u00fcre\u00e7te uygulama ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmemi\u015ftir. (90<\/p>\n 2 Ekim 2002\u2019de AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu \u00fcyelerini Bak\u00fc\u2019de kabul eden Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Haydar Aliyev, Karaba\u011f sorunu i\u00e7in arabuluculuk g\u00f6revi \u00fcstlenen uluslararas\u0131 kurulu\u015flar\u0131n yard\u0131m\u0131yla sorunun bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l y\u00f6nden \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclece\u011fine dair inanc\u0131n Azerbaycan kamuoyunda azald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, arac\u0131 rol \u00fcstlenen uluslararas\u0131 kurulu\u015flar\u0131n sorun \u00fczerinde pasif kald\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ve s\u00f6zde Karaba\u011f cumhurba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 se\u00e7imini kazanan Arkadi Gukasyan\u2019a g\u00f6nderilen tebrik mesajlar\u0131n\u0131n Azerbaycan kamuoyunu \u00e7ileden \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir. (91<\/p>\n 2003\u2019te Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019daki Ba\u015fkan`l\u0131k se\u00e7imleri gerek\u00e7esiyle AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f, 2003 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Aral\u0131k ay\u0131n\u0131n ilk haftas\u0131nda AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu E\u015fba\u015fkanlar\u0131 Amerikal\u0131 Rudolf Perina, Frans\u0131z Henry Racoulen, Rus Yuri Merzlakov\u2019u kabul eden Azerbaycan Savunma Bakan\u0131 Sefer Abiyev, BM\u2019nin Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n i\u015fgali ile ilgili alm\u0131\u015f oldu\u011fu kararlar\u0131n uygulanmamas\u0131 ve Ermenistan\u2019dan uluslararas\u0131 hukuk kurallar\u0131na uymas\u0131n\u0131n istenmemesi halinde bir sonu\u00e7 beklemenin anlams\u0131z oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemi\u015ftir. (92<\/p>\n 2004 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Polonya\u2019n\u0131n Var\u015fova kentinde d\u00fczenlenen Avrupa Ekonomik zirvesine kat\u0131lan G\u00fcney Kafkas \u00fclkelerinin liderleri 28 Nisan 2004\u2019te ikili ve \u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc d\u00fczeyde g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmi\u015f \u00f6zellikle Azerbaycan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 \u0130lham Aliyev ve Ermenistan Ba\u015fkan`\u0131 Robert Ko\u00e7aryan aras\u0131ndaki ikili g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeye AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu ABD, Fransa ve Rusya E\u015fba\u015fkanlar\u0131 da kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015flar ancak s\u00f6z konusu bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerden de herhangi olumlu bir netice elde edilememi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Nihayet, 2005 y\u0131l\u0131 Ocak ay\u0131nda Avrupa Konseyi Parlamenterler Meclisi Genel Kurulu taraf\u0131ndan \u201cErmenistan\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131 i\u015fgal etti\u011fine dair\u201d yeni bir karar daha \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Her ne kadar s\u00f6z konusu karar, Azerbaycan y\u00f6netimini hakl\u0131 davas\u0131nda, bir uluslararas\u0131 kurulu\u015f taraf\u0131ndan bir kez daha teyit etmi\u015f olsa da, bir anlamda Azerbaycan kamuoyunu teselli etmeyi ama\u00e7layan bir karar g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcs\u00fc i\u00e7erisindedir. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc karar\u0131n yapt\u0131r\u0131m g\u00fcc\u00fc olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm i\u00e7in herhangi bir eylem plan\u0131 da sunmamaktad\u0131r. Benzer kararlar daha \u00f6nce gerek AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019ndan gerekse BM\u2019den \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f ancak, sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne y\u00f6nelik somut bir ad\u0131m at\u0131lmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda Azerbaycan taraf\u0131 BM`ye Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n i\u015fgal alt\u0131ndaki topraklar\u0131nda olan durum hakk\u0131nda bir belge sunmu\u015ftur bu belge oy \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fuyla kabul edilmi\u015ftir. Ne yaz\u0131k ki kendini tarafs\u0131z g\u00f6steren Minsk Gurubu \u00fcye devletleri \u00e7ekimser kalmak yerine bu oylamada aleyhine oy kullanm\u0131\u015flar. Bu da halk aras\u0131nda Minsk Gurubuna kar\u015f\u0131 inam\u0131 daha da azaltm\u0131\u015f oldu. Baz\u0131 kurumlar bu Gurubun tamamen bu sorundan uzakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 istemekteler.<\/p>\n B.G\u00fcney Osetya Sorunu Osetlerin atalar\u0131n\u0131n Hazar Denizi\u2019nin kuzeyinde, Deon nehri boylar\u0131nda ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131 bilinmektedir. Daha sonra buradan baz\u0131 kabileler Azak Denizi k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131na, Terek ve Kuban nehirleri aras\u0131na ve Kafkasya\u2019ya yerle\u015fmi\u015flerdir. Daha sonra baz\u0131lar\u0131 Kuzey Kafkasya da\u011f eteklerine g\u00f6\u00e7 ederek 6. y\u00fczy\u0131lda Kabartaylar\u2019\u0131n atalar\u0131 olan Kerketler ile beraber Alania olarak bilinen bir birlik kurmu\u015flard\u0131r. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczdeki Osetler, Alan dil ve k\u00fclt\u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fcn hakim oldu\u011fu Alan- Sarmatya ve Kuzey Kafkas halklar\u0131n\u0131n kar\u0131\u015f\u0131m\u0131ndan meydana gelmi\u015fler ve Kuzey Osetya\u2019ya yerle\u015fmi\u015flerdir. (96<\/p>\n G\u00fcneydeki Oset yerle\u015fimi daha yak\u0131n zamanlarda ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmi\u015ftir.96 Osetler, 1774 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rusya\u2019ya kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. (97 19. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ortalar\u0131nda Kafkasya Rusya taraf\u0131ndan istila edildikten sonra \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya\u2019s\u0131 G\u00fcney Osetya halk\u0131n\u0131n idaresini G\u00fcrc\u00fc feodallerin eline b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcney Osetya topraklar\u0131n\u0131 G\u00fcrc\u00fc feodallerin m\u00fclk\u00fc olarak ilan etmi\u015ftir. (98 20. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131nda kilise ve sosyal demokrat Men\u015feviklerin ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekti\u011fi ulusal uyan\u0131\u015f ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler\u2019in 1917\u2019de Ruslar\u2019dan duyduklar\u0131 kayg\u0131lar\u0131n ayn\u0131s\u0131n\u0131, Osetler ulusal devlet kurma gayreti i\u00e7erisindeki G\u00fcrc\u00fc Men\u015feviklerden duymu\u015flard\u0131r. Daha \u00f6nce \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n egemenli\u011fi alt\u0131nda ya\u015fayan G\u00fcrcistan Bol\u015fevik devrimi sonras\u0131 26 May\u0131s 1918\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ilan edince \u00fclkedeki b\u00fct\u00fcn az\u0131nl\u0131klara e\u015fit siyasi ve sosyal haklar tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 belirtmi\u015f ancak 1919\u2019da yerel meclislerini kapatarak G\u00fcney Osetler\u2019i kendi kaderlerini tayin hakk\u0131ndan yoksun b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Osetyal\u0131 \u00e7ift\u00e7iler, Mart 1918, Ekim 1919 ve Nisan, Haziran 1920 ayaklanmalar\u0131nda Bo\u015feviklerin yan\u0131nda yer alm\u0131\u015flar ve G\u00fcrc\u00fclere kar\u015f\u0131 sava\u015fm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Bu ayaklanmalar\u0131n G\u00fcrc\u00fclerce kanl\u0131 \u015fekilde bast\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 bug\u00fcnlere uzanan G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Oset anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n temellerini atm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 25 \u015eubat 1921\u2019de K\u0131z\u0131lordu\u2019nun G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a girmesi ile G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019daki G\u00fcrc\u00fc hakimiyeti sona ermi\u015ftir. (99 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da Sovyet rejiminin kurulmas\u0131ndan sonra da Oset halk\u0131n\u0131n \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya\u2019s\u0131 d\u00f6nemindeki ikiye b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015fl\u00fck durumu devam etmi\u015f, G\u00fcney Osetya, 20 Nisan 1922\u2019de \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lge stat\u00fcs\u00fc ile G\u00fcrcistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti\u2019ne, Kuzey Osetya ise 1925 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na ba\u011flanm\u0131\u015f ve 1936\u2019da \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lge stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc kazanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (100<\/p>\n G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze uzanan Oset-G\u00fcrc\u00fc kriz d\u00f6nemi ise 1989\u2019da ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Tskhinvali Pedagoji Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc \u00d6\u011fretim \u00dcyesi ve Ademon N\u0131has adl\u0131 G\u00fcney Osetya Halk Cephesi \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fcn lideri Alan \u00c7o\u00e7iyev\u2019in, Abhazya b\u00f6lge gazetesinde yay\u0131mlanan mektubunda Osetler\u2019in G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lmak ve Birlik Cumhuriyeti stat\u00fcs\u00fc kazanmak i\u00e7in ba\u015flatt\u0131klar\u0131 m\u00fccadeleyi Abhazya halk\u0131n\u0131n desteklemesini istemesi G\u00fcrc\u00fclerden b\u00fcy\u00fck tepki g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f, bunun \u00fczerine 1989 yaz\u0131nda Oset-G\u00fcrc\u00fc \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (101 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Osetlere tepkisi en ufak sosyal ve ekonomik talebi kabullenmeme \u015feklinde olmu\u015ftur. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, bu d\u00f6nemde G\u00fcrc\u00fcceyi \u00fclkede tek resmi dil haline getirmek ve \u00fcniter bir yap\u0131 olu\u015fturma politikas\u0131 g\u00fctm\u00fc\u015flerdir. G\u00fcney Osetya ifadesi dahi t\u00fcm yay\u0131nlardan silinmek istenmi\u015f, G\u00fcney Osetya G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n bir b\u00f6lgesi stat\u00fcs\u00fcne indirgenmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. S\u00f6z konusu d\u00f6nemde G\u00fcney Osetya Same\u00e7ablo ya da Shida Kartli olarak adland\u0131r\u0131lmaya ba\u015flanm\u0131\u015f, idari olarak merkeze ba\u011fl\u0131 Tskhinvali b\u00f6lgesi olarak nitelendirilmi\u015ftir. 1989 y\u0131l\u0131 Eyl\u00fcl sonlar\u0131nda G\u00fcrc\u00fc askeri birlikleri G\u00fcney Osetya b\u00f6lgesine girmi\u015fler, \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar h\u0131z kazanarak devam etmi\u015ftir. 10 Kas\u0131m 1989\u2019da ise G\u00fcney Osetya B\u00f6lge Sovyeti ve Oset Halk Cephesi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc, G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyetinden, G\u00fcney Osetya \u00d6zerk B\u00f6lgesinin \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet stat\u00fcs\u00fcne y\u00fckseltilmesini istemi\u015fler ancak G\u00fcrc\u00fc yetkililer G\u00fcney Osetya B\u00f6lge Parti Birinci Sekreterini g\u00f6revden alarak bu iste\u011fi reddetmi\u015flerdir. Oset-G\u00fcrc\u00fc \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 1990 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Ocak ay\u0131 boyunca devam etmi\u015ftir. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131lar, Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fme isteklerinden vazge\u00e7memi\u015fler, Haziran ay\u0131nda Anemon N\u0131has \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fc G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u015fkenti Tskhinvali\u2019de b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00f6steri d\u00fczenlemi\u015ftir. (102 G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti, A\u011fustos 1990\u2019da, G\u00fcrcistan Parlamento se\u00e7imlerine G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da b\u00f6lgesel faaliyet g\u00f6steren siyasi partilerin kat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 engelleyen bir se\u00e7im kanununu kabul etmi\u015f, karar, a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a Osetleri ve Abhazalar\u0131 hedef alm\u0131\u015f ve sonraki olaylara kaynakl\u0131k etmi\u015ftir. Osetler tepkilerini 20 Eyl\u00fcl 1990\u2019da G\u00fcney Osetya Demokratik Sovyet Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni ilan ederek g\u00f6stermi\u015fleridir. (103<\/p>\n Ayr\u0131ca Rusya\u2019ya basvurarak Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir \u00fcyesi olarak tan\u0131nmak istediklerini bildirmi\u015fleridir. Ekim 1990\u2019daki G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti se\u00e7imlerine boykot ederek kat\u0131lmayan G\u00fcney Osetya Aral\u0131k 1990\u2019da kendi se\u00e7imlerini yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (104 G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti ise bu se\u00e7imleri tan\u0131mad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 bildirmi\u015f, yeni olu\u015fturulan G\u00fcney Osetya Cumhuriyeti\u2019nin G\u00fcrc\u00fc aleyhtar\u0131 ve anayasaya ayk\u0131r\u0131 oldu\u011funa karar vermi\u015ftir. Osetlerin boykot ettikleri G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti se\u00e7imlerini ise a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 milliyet\u00e7i Yuvarlak Masa\/H\u00fcr G\u00fcrcistan koalisyonunun ba\u015fkan\u0131 Zviad Gamsahurdiya kazanm\u0131\u015f, Gamsahurdiya ilk konu\u015fmas\u0131nda G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ve Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zerkliklerini koruyaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lmalar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011funu bildirmi\u015ftir. G\u00fcrcistan Parlamentosu, Aral\u0131k 1990\u2019da G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zerklik stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 oylamaya sunmu\u015f, buna gerek\u00e7e olarak da G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fme iste\u011finin G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n tarihi birli\u011fini tehdit etti\u011fi iddias\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n Tskhinvali\u2019de \u00fc\u00e7 G\u00fcrc\u00fc polisin \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclmesi sonras\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan Parlamentosu b\u00f6lgede ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc hal ilan edilmesini teklif etmi\u015ftir. Bu d\u00f6nemde G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Moskova\u2019dan yard\u0131m istemesi ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n MVD birliklerini d\u00fczeni sa\u011flamak \u00fczere b\u00f6lgeye g\u00f6ndermesi Tiflis\u2019i rahats\u0131z etmi\u015f, G\u00fcrcistan parlamentosu bu hareketi k\u0131nam\u0131\u015f ve Sovyet askeri birliklerinin Osetleri desteklediklerini ileri s\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. 1990 Aral\u0131k ay\u0131 sonunda uzla\u015fma sa\u011flamak amac\u0131yla Rusya, G\u00fcrcistan, G\u00fcney Osetya yetkilileri bir araya gelmi\u015f, akabinde bir uzla\u015ft\u0131rma komisyonu olu\u015fturulmu\u015ftur. Bu bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm sa\u011flamam\u0131\u015f, G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Oset \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 devam etmi\u015ftir. 7 Ocak 1991\u2019de Gorba\u00e7ov, G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ilan\u0131n\u0131, G\u00fcrcistan Parlamentosu\u2019nun G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zerkli\u011fini kald\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131 k\u0131nam\u0131\u015f, \u00fc\u00e7 g\u00fcn i\u00e7inde G\u00fcrc\u00fc askeri birliklerinin G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019dan \u00e7ekilmelerini istemi\u015ftir. Gamsahurdiya ise bu istekleri G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7 i\u015flerine kar\u0131\u015fma olarak nitelendirmi\u015f ve Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019u ordusunu G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a sokmak i\u00e7in bahane aramakla su\u00e7lam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu arada Tskhinvali\u2019de \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar artm\u0131\u015f ve G\u00fcrc\u00fc milisler Tskhinvali\u2019ye girmi\u015fleridir. (105 \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar s\u0131ras\u0131nda bir k\u0131s\u0131m Oset Kuzey Osetya\u2019ya, G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a ka\u00e7m\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. 19 Ocak 1992\u2019de yap\u0131lan referandum da G\u00fcney Osetya halk\u0131n\u0131n %97\u2019si Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fmek ve Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na kat\u0131lmak istediklerini ortaya koymu\u015flar, bu durum ili\u015fkileri daha da gerginle\u015ftirmi\u015ftir. Ard\u0131ndan Rus birlikleri b\u00f6lgeye girmi\u015f, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n giri\u015fimi ile ate\u015fkes sa\u011flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Geli\u015fen olaylar \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde, BDT \u00fcyesi 11 devletin cumhurba\u015fkanlar\u0131n\u0131n kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 6 Temmuz 1992 tarihli Moskova Zirvesi\u2019nde cumhuriyetler aras\u0131ndaki etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n \u00f6nlenmesi i\u00e7in bir bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc kurulmas\u0131 kararla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, olu\u015fturulan bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019da konu\u015fland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ile d\u00fczen nisbeten sa\u011flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (106 Ya\u015fanan \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarda 53 binden fazla G\u00fcney Osetya vatanda\u015f\u0131 b\u00f6lgeyi terk etmek zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar d\u00f6neminde Kuzey Osetya\u2019ya ge\u00e7en 17 bin Osetyal\u0131\u2019n\u0131n haricinde \u00e7ok say\u0131da G\u00fcrc\u00fc m\u00fclteci de G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7inde da\u011f\u0131n\u0131k halde ya\u015famaktad\u0131r. (107 Aral\u0131k 1992\u2019de AG\u0130K durumu g\u00f6zlemek i\u00e7in b\u00f6lgeye heyet g\u00f6ndermi\u015ftir. Mart 1994\u2019te G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019daki parlamento se\u00e7imleri radikal milliyet\u00e7i y\u00f6netimin yenilgisi ve Kom\u00fcnist Parti\u2019sinin iktidara gelmesi ile sonu\u00e7lanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Yeni radikal y\u00f6netimin Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fme ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan tam ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k istekleri bask\u0131 ile engellenmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n G\u00fcney Osetya Y\u00fcksek Konseyi ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u00c7ibirov, G\u00fcrcistan ile uzla\u015fmaya kar\u015f\u0131yd\u0131 ancak G\u00fcney Osetya mali a\u00e7\u0131dan Moskova\u2019n\u0131n yard\u0131mlar\u0131na ba\u011fl\u0131 oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in \u00f6zerklik konusunda G\u00fcrcistan\u2019la yap\u0131lacak anla\u015fmalar Moskova\u2019n\u0131n deste\u011fine ba\u011fl\u0131yd\u0131. Ancak 1995\u2019te G\u00fcrcistan anayasas\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirilmi\u015f ve \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lge stat\u00fcs\u00fc kald\u0131r\u0131lan G\u00fcney Osetya do\u011frudan Tiflis\u2019e ba\u011flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (108 G\u00fcney Osetya ile Tiflis aras\u0131ndaki gerginlik ilerleyen d\u00f6nemde devam etmi\u015ftir. Bu gerginlikte Rusya hep bu \u015fekilde Osetlerin yan\u0131nda yer alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Aral\u0131k 2000\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan tabiiyetinde olanlara vize uygulamas\u0131 getiren Moskova\u2019n\u0131n, G\u00fcney Osetya ve Abhazya\u2019y\u0131 bu uygulaman\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda tutmas\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Tiflis kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Osetlere verdi\u011fi deste\u011fin \u00e7ok a\u00e7\u0131k bir \u00f6rne\u011fidir. G\u00fcney Osetya \u00d6zerk B\u00f6lge Parlamentosu daha yak\u0131n bir tarihte 9 Haziran 2004\u2019de Rusya Federasyonu ile birle\u015fme karar\u0131 alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n G\u00fcney Osetya Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Eduard Kokoev, 12 Haziran 2004 tarihinde, Moskova\u2019da bas\u0131na; \u201cOsetya halk\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015f bir halk oldu\u011funu, uluslararas\u0131 camian\u0131n G\u00fcney Osetya problemini b\u00f6l\u00fcnm\u00fc\u015f halk kapsam\u0131nda ele almas\u0131, ayr\u0131ca toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne ili\u015fkin kanun ve taleplerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra bir milletin kendi se\u00e7imini yapma hakk\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcnde bulundurmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fi, yak\u0131n bir tarihte Osetler\u2019in Kuzey ve G\u00fcney b\u00f6l\u00fcmlenmesinden kurtularak Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na dahil olaca\u011f\u0131na inand\u0131\u011f\u0131, G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na dahil edilmesi i\u00e7in gerekli m\u00fcracaat\u0131n DUMA\u2019ya ve Rusya Federasyonu H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019ne yap\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131\u201d a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131nda bulunmu\u015ftur. (109 Ancak bu karar da, \u00f6nceki ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k karar\u0131 gibi kabul g\u00f6rmemi\u015f ve havada kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bununla beraber, kabul g\u00f6rmemesine ra\u011fmen, bu kararlar\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n elini kuvvetlendirdi\u011fi ve Moskova\u2019ya G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da hareket serbestli\u011fi kazand\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 da bir ger\u00e7ektir.<\/p>\n 2004 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki bu birle\u015fme karar\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k g\u00f6rmemi\u015f, ortada b\u0131rak\u0131lm\u0131\u015f iken, G\u00fcney Osetya, 2006 y\u0131l\u0131nda yeniden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa y\u00f6nelmi\u015f ve bu y\u00f6ndeki iste\u011fini tekrarlam\u015ft\u0131r. \u0130\u00e7inde bulunulan g\u00fcnlerde Moskova\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019ya ne cevap verece\u011fi merak edilmekte ve Moskova\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey K\u0131br\u0131s T\u00fcrk Cumhuriyeti ile T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkinin bir benzerini Rusya ile G\u00fcney Osetya aras\u0131nda tesis edilip edilemeyece\u011fi \u00fczerinde \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 ifade edilmektedir. (110 G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fmek ve Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na dahil olmak iste\u011fi hala devam etmektedir. Ayr\u0131ca Osetler Bar\u0131\u015f G\u00fcc\u00fc\u2019n\u00fcn b\u00f6lgedeki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n da devam\u0131n\u0131 istemektedirler. G\u00fcrcistan ise olaya G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc olarak yakla\u015fmakta ve istemektedir. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019daki Abhazya, G\u00fcney Osetya gibi etnik problemler Rusya G\u00fcrcistan, T\u00fcrkiye, AB ve ABD a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan farkl\u0131 etkilere ve sonu\u00e7lara sahiptir. Bu a\u00e7\u0131dan bu akt\u00f6rlerin s\u00f6z konusu problemler kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131ndaki sergiledikleri tutumlara ve yak\u0131n gelecekte bu konularda ya\u015fanabilecek geli\u015fmelere s\u00f6z konusu akt\u00f6rlerin b\u00f6lgedeki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 do\u011frultusunda bak\u0131lmal\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya- G\u00fcrcistan ili\u015fkilerini etkileyen G\u00fcney Osetya probleminin iki \u00f6nemli taraf\u0131 vard\u0131r.<\/p>\n Bunlardan birincisi, G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ya da otonomi iste\u011finin Rusya i\u00e7in Kuzey Osetya\u2019da s\u0131n\u0131r problemleri yaratabilece\u011fi ihtimalidir. Rusya bu sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnden endi\u015fe etmekte ve G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131lara Rus vatanda\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 verilerek G\u00fcney\u2019den Kuzey Osetya\u2019ya g\u00f6\u00e7leri yava\u015flatmay\u0131 denemektedir. Rusya, Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019da ya\u015fayanlara vize uygulamamaktad\u0131r. G\u00fcney Osetya sorunun bir di\u011fer taraf\u0131 ise G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n \u00c7e\u00e7enistan ve Pankisi Vadisi\u2019ne yak\u0131n olu\u015fudur. G\u00fcrc\u00fc birliklerinin G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019ya ve ba\u015fkent Tskhinvali\u2019ya yak\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00f6lgede kayg\u0131 ve gerginlik yaratmaktad\u0131r. (111 2004 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131nda iktidara gelen Saaka\u015fvili yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamalarda Osetya meselesi\u2019nin kendi d\u00f6neminin sonu olan 2008\u2019e kadar mutlaka \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclece\u011fini ve Osetya\u2019n\u0131n hi\u00e7bir zaman Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ileri s\u00fcrmektedir. Bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede Acaristan\u2019da oldu\u011fu gibi, Tiflis yanl\u0131s\u0131 gruplar\u0131n Osetya\u2019da s\u00f6z sahibi k\u0131l\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flayacak olaylar\u0131n meydana gelmesi bekleniyordu. (112<\/p>\n Rusya Azeri petrol\u00fcn\u00fcn ve Hazar kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n Bat\u0131\u2019ya G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden aktar\u0131lmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131d\u0131r. Moskova\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019daki etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ve i\u00e7 \u00e7eki\u015fmeyi desteklemesi Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Kafkasya\u2019daki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 devam ettirme iste\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir. Siyasi karga\u015fa G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 Avrasya petrol\u00fc i\u00e7in daha az \u00e7ekici bir g\u00fczergah yapmaktad\u0131r. (113 Yani G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7 etnik problemler ile u\u011fra\u015fmas\u0131 onu g\u00fcvensiz ve istikrars\u0131z bir konuma sokmaktad\u0131r. Enerjinin ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda ula\u015f\u0131m kolayl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n yan\u0131 s\u0131ra g\u00fcvenli\u011fin de etkili bir unsur oldu\u011fu g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131n\u0131rsa Rusya\u2019n\u0131n amac\u0131 daha iyi anla\u015f\u0131labilir. \u00d6te yandan s\u00f6z konusu sorun Rusya\u2019ya G\u00fcrcistan ile oynama imkan\u0131 vermekte ve Kafkasya\u2019da etkili olma f\u0131rsat\u0131 sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. Rusya, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da askeri ve siyasi varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tekrar g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek i\u00e7in, Gamsahurdiya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 muhalefeti desteklemi\u015f ve bask\u0131lar sonucu Gamsahurdiya iktidardan uzakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131larak yerine Sevardnadze getirilmi\u015ftir. Ancak yeni y\u00f6netim de milli e\u011filimlerini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Bunun \u00fczerine G\u00fcney Osetya, Abhazya ve Acarya meseleleri k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rt\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ve desteklenmi\u015f ya\u015fanan geli\u015fmeler sonucu G\u00fcrcistan BDT\u2019ye dahil olmak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015f ve Rusya ile ortak bir askeri isbirli\u011fi anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece Rusya eski SSCB\u2019nin T\u00fcrkiye s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131ndaki askeri varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tekrar elde etmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019da etnik sorunlar ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma tehlikesi ise hala s\u00fcrmektedir. G\u00fcney Osetya Ba\u015fbakan yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 Valeri Hubulov, 31 May\u0131s 1998\u2019de Kuzey Osetya s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Rusya bu etnik m\u00fccadelelere destek vererek G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n zay\u0131f ve g\u00fcvensiz bir imaj \u00e7izmesini bu sayede petrol ve dogal gaz boru hatlar\u0131 ve ta\u015f\u0131ma yollar\u0131n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7mesini engellemek ve ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131lara kar\u015f\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Moskova\u2019dan yard\u0131m almas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamak istemektedir. Bu ger\u00e7ekle\u015firse Rusya, Kafkasya ve G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde eski etkisini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecek, Kafkasya\u2019dan Karadeniz limanlar\u0131na ula\u015facak petrol ve dogal gaz ta\u015f\u0131mac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fczerinde kontrol sa\u011flayabilecektir. (114 \u00d6te yandan G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n jeopoliti\u011fi AB ve ABD i\u00e7in giderek artan bir \u00f6nem arz etmektedir. Daha \u00f6nce de ifade edildigi gibi G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Karadeniz k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131nda yer almas\u0131 Karadeniz\u2019deki uluslararas\u0131 m\u00fccadele nedeni ile G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 \u00f6n plana \u00e7\u0131karmaktad\u0131r. Bu a\u00e7\u0131dan AB ve ABD, G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde etki sa\u011flayabilmek i\u00e7in G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7 etnik sorunlar\u0131ndan yararlanmay\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnebilir. Bu sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc sa\u011flayan taraf olarak G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde bir n\u00fcfuz kazanma iste\u011fi ad\u0131 ge\u00e7en iki akt\u00f6r\u00fcn de iste\u011fidir. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n AB ve ABD ile yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler kurmay\u0131 hedefledi\u011fi ve Rusya\u2019dan giderek uzakla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 da d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde bu n\u00fcfuzu sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in iki akt\u00f6r aras\u0131nda bir m\u00fccadele ya\u015fanaca\u011f\u0131 da a\u015fikard\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 AB ve ABD i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli k\u0131lan bir di\u011fer fakt\u00f6r enerji nakil hatlar\u0131n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 ve Kafkasya\u2019dan gelen petrol-do\u011fal gaz\u0131n Karadeniz limanlar\u0131na aktar\u0131lmas\u0131 durumudur. Bu a\u00e7\u0131dan G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde n\u00fcfuz sahibi olmak bu aktar\u0131mda da kontrol imkan\u0131 sa\u011flayabilir.<\/p>\n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n istikrars\u0131z ve etnik sorunlar kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131ndaki \u00e7aresiz imaj\u0131 ise Rusya\u2019n\u0131n hedefledi\u011fi gibi bu do\u011fal kaynaklar\u0131n ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a olumsuz bir konum y\u00fckler. Oysa AB i\u00e7in enerjinin kolay ve ucuz ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 kadar g\u00fcvenli ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131 da \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir. AB i\u00e7in, enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fi de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n etnik meselelerinin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc gerektiren bir unsurdur. AB, bu a\u00e7\u0131dan sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde rol alarak hem G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde n\u00fcfuz kazanabilir hem de enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flayabilir. Ancak bu ABD fakt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn de ayn\u0131 y\u00f6ndeki giri\u015fimleri nedeni ile \u00e7ok kolay olmayacakt\u0131r.<\/p>\n Mihail Saaka\u015fvili, RF\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki az\u0131nl\u0131klar\u0131 kullanarak G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 etkinli\u011fi azaltmak i\u00e7in G\u00fcney Osetya sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne y\u00f6nelik olarak giri\u015fimlerde bulunmu\u015f, bir yandan ekonomik yard\u0131m ve te\u015fviklerle Osetlerle iyi ili\u015fkiler kurmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f, di\u011fer taraftan ise s\u0131n\u0131ra asker y\u0131\u011farak Osetleri korkutmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak hem G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019dan hem de RF\u2019den gelen b\u00fcy\u00fck tepkiler \u00fczerine Saaka\u015fvili bu politikay\u0131 terk etmek zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Saaka\u015fvili\u2019nin ba\u015fa gelmesinden sonra ya\u015fanan olaylar sonras\u0131nda, G\u00fcney Osetya, anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme kavu\u015fturulmas\u0131 i\u00e7in 14-15 Haziran 2004 tarihleri aras\u0131nda Tiflis’te ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmesi planlanan d\u00f6rtl\u00fc (RF, G\u00fcrcistan, Kuzey ve G\u00fcney Osetya) g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere kat\u0131lmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klayarak, bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131l \u00e7abalar\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fc t\u0131kam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (115<\/p>\n Bar\u0131\u015f yolunda taraflar\u0131n \u00e7abalar\u0131 s\u00fcrmektedir. Ancak sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde olumlu bir geli\u015fme sa\u011flan\u0131p sa\u011flanamayaca\u011f\u0131, taraflar aras\u0131nda bir bar\u0131\u015f anla\u015fmas\u0131 yap\u0131l\u0131p yap\u0131lamayaca\u011f\u0131 ve Osetya\u2019n\u0131n bundan sonraki stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn ne olaca\u011f\u0131 belirsizli\u011fini korumaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n Kosova`n\u0131n tan\u0131nmas\u0131ndan sonra Rusya`n\u0131n Eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi devletlerindeki b\u00f6l\u00fcc\u00fclere kar\u015f\u0131 tutumu de\u011fi\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Art\u0131k Rusya Abhazya`ya da daha da yak\u0131ndan yard\u0131mlar yap\u0131yor ve b\u00f6lgenin G\u00fcrcistan`dan kopmas\u0131 i\u00e7in zemin olu\u015fturuyor.<\/p>\n SONU\u00c7 Azerbaycan ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 t\u00fcm sorunlara ra\u011fmen, \u00fclkesinde bir Rus \u00fcss\u00fc kurulmas\u0131na izin vermemi\u015ftir . Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n petrole dayal\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta sorunlar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olamam\u0131\u015f, ancak daha sonra petrol \u015firketlerinin Amerikan y\u00f6netiminde y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc lobicilik faaliyetlerinin kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f, ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan politikas\u0131nda olumlu ad\u0131mlar at\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD\u2019nin G\u00fcney Kafkasya politikas\u0131nda at\u0131l\u0131mda bulundu\u011fu 2001 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD\u2019nin ter\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc sava\u015fa destek veren Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek karar uygulamadan kald\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da RF ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmeye en hevesli \u00fclke olan Ermenistan, \u00fclkesinde var olan Rus askeri \u00fcslerini kendisi i\u00e7in bir g\u00fcvence olarak g\u00f6rmektedir. Halen Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin ambargo uygulamakta oldu\u011fu Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n, irredantist politikalar\u0131 nedeniyle, \u0130ran hari\u00e7 kom\u015fular\u0131yla ili\u015fkileri pek iyi de\u011fildir. Kendisini d\u00fc\u015fman bir co\u011frafyada alg\u0131layan Ermenistan i\u00e7in Rus \u00fcsleri, g\u00fcvenlik anlam\u0131na gelmekte, RF\u2019nin G\u00fcrcistan\u2019daki askeri \u00fcslerinin tahliyesi nedeniyle, ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan askeri te\u00e7hizat ve askeri personeli memnuniyetle \u00fclkesine kabul etmektedir. ABD her ge\u00e7en g\u00fcn Kafkasya\u2019da n\u00fcfuzunu art\u0131rmaktad\u0131r. Bu durum Kafkasya\u2019daki Rus etkinli\u011fini azaltmakta, RF\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeden \u00e7ekilmek zorunda kalaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span>B\u00d6L\u00dcM D\u0130PNOTLARI:<\/b> KAYNAK\u00c7A Makaleler Internet Kaynaklar\u0131 Rovshan Mammadov Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararasi İlişkiler Anabilim Dali ABD GÜNEY KAFKASYA İLİŞKİLERİ A. GÜNEY KAFKASYA’NIN ABD İÇİN ÖNEMİ Sovyet İmparatorluğunun çöküşünün ardından Güney Kafkasya’da eskiSSCB üyesi olmuş üç Cumhuriyet- Azerbaycan, Gürcistan ve Ermenistan bağımsızlıklarını kazandılar. Eski SSCB mekanında oluşan bu bağımsız devletlerin varlığı ABD’nin dış politikasında yeni bir yol açmış oldu. 1991 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\n<\/b><\/span>Ankara \u00dcniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc Uluslararasi \u0130li\u015fkiler Anabilim Dali<\/span><\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nSovyet \u0130mparatorlu\u011funun \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcn ard\u0131ndan G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da eskiSSCB \u00fcyesi olmu\u015f \u00fc\u00e7 Cumhuriyet- Azerbaycan, G\u00fcrcistan ve Ermenistan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 kazand\u0131lar. Eski SSCB mekan\u0131nda olu\u015fan bu ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devletlerin varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ABD\u2019nin d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda yeni bir yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015f oldu. 1991 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar bu b\u00f6lgeyi kendisi i\u00e7in bir tehdit olarak alg\u0131layan ABD art\u0131k buray\u0131 kendi n\u00fcfus alan\u0131na \u00e7evirmeye ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n jeostratejik \u00f6nemi, B\u00fcy\u00fck \u0130pek Yolunun merkez noktas\u0131nda bulunmas\u0131, Uzak Do\u011fu, Orta Asya\u2019y\u0131 Avrupa\u2019yla birle\u015ftirecek yollar\u0131n ge\u00e7ti\u011fi arazide olmas\u0131 ve do\u011fal enerji kaynaklar\u0131na sahip olmas\u0131, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye giri\u015fimlerinin esas nedenleriydi. \u00d6zellikle de Hazar Denizi petrollerinin d\u00fcnya pazar\u0131na s\u00fcr\u00fclmesi yolunda ABD, Almanya ve Rusya aras\u0131nda ciddi bir rekabet ya\u015fanmaktad\u0131r. Washington b\u00f6lge etkinli\u011fini art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in bu b\u00f6lgede devam eden antik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalara Rusya\u2019dan farkl\u0131 olarak \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm aray\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7indedir.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nStratejik yeralt\u0131 zenginliklerini ve petrol yataklar\u0131 nedeniyle uygun ekonomik ham madde kayna\u011f\u0131 ve pazar imkanlar\u0131na sahiptir.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nWashington G\u00fcney Kafkasya ve Hazar havzas\u0131 devletlerde demokrasinin ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7lenmesi i\u00e7in politik demokrasi ve pazar ekonomisi kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n yarat\u0131lmas\u0131na \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor. Ama yine de Amerikan\u0131n b\u00f6lgedeki politik \u00f6nceli\u011fi eline ge\u00e7irmek istedi\u011fi petrol kuyular\u0131d\u0131r. ABD`nin d\u0131\u015f i\u015fleri bakan\u0131n\u0131n yeni ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devletlerle ilgili \u00f6zel dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131 S.Sestanovi\u00e7in s\u00f6yledi\u011fi gibi \u201c ABD taraf\u0131ndan Kafkasya devletlerinin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n desteklenmesinin, ekonomilerinde ilerleyi\u015f\u00a0<\/span>yapabilmesi i\u00e7in \u00e7aba sarf etmesinin sebebi petrol ve stratejik konumudur\u201d. (1) Enerji\u00a0<\/span>Bakan\u0131 F.Pebyan\u0131n s\u00f6zlerine g\u00f6re \u201c bizi as\u0131l rahats\u0131z eden Basra K\u00f6rfezinden ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n daha da artmas\u0131d\u0131r. Hazar havzas\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015ftirilmesi petrol ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azalt\u0131r ve enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flar\u201d. (2) Amerikan \u015firketleri bu b\u00f6lgede kendi maddi \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131ndan \u00e7ok ABD`nin hayati \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorlar. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc bu b\u00f6lge Asya`yla Avrupa`y\u0131 \u0130ran ve Rusyas\u0131z kavu\u015fturan tek b\u00f6lgedir. Bu b\u00f6lgeye de kontrol\u00fc ABD kendi eline almak istiyor. (3)<\/p>\n
\n\u2022 Enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n geli\u015ftirilmesi ve Bat\u0131`yla Do\u011fu aras\u0131ndaki yolun yeniden i\u015fe ba\u015flamas\u0131.
\n\u2022 G\u00fcvenlik konusunda i\u015fbirli\u011fi. (7)
\n\u2022 B\u00f6lgedeki a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 milliyet\u00e7i ve ya a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 dinci ak\u0131mlar\u0131n cayd\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131, Kuzey Kafkasya ba\u015fta olmakla b\u00f6lgede destabilizasyonun \u00f6nlenmesi
\n\u2022 G\u00fcney Kafkasya cumhuriyetlerinin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n ve toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fcklerinin korunmas\u0131.
\n\u2022 T\u00fcrkiye`nin Kafkasya uyu\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131nda samimi bir arabulucu olarak hizmet etme konusundaki isteklilik ve kabiliyetinin desteklenmesi.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nB.1- AHC D\u00f6nemi \u0130li\u015fkileri
\n<\/b>
\nUzun bir zaman sonra, Azerbaycan 1991`de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131na tekrar kavu\u015funca, ili\u015fkiler konusunda da geli\u015fmeler ya\u015fanmaya ba\u015flanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu defa da ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015ftirilmesinde ilk aya\u011f\u0131 petrol olu\u015fturmaktayd\u0131. Daha Ocak 1991`den itibaren Azerbaycan petrol\u00fc ile ilgilenen Amerikan \u015firketleri a\u00e7\u0131lan ilk ihaleleri de kazanm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. (9) Ama bu, ABD`nin Azerbaycan politikas\u0131n\u0131n olu\u015fumunda Ermeni lobisinin rol\u00fcn\u00fc azaltmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 25 Aral\u0131k 1991`de t\u00fcm di\u011fer eski Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri ile beraber Azerbaycan`\u0131n da ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tan\u0131yan ABD, Azerbaycan ile diplomatik ili\u015fki kurma karar\u0131n\u0131 ancak 23 \u015eubat 1992`de alm\u0131\u015f ve 17\u00a0<\/span>Mart 1992`de de Bak\u00fc`de B\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ilik a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Halbuki Ermenistan ile diplomatik ili\u015fkilerini hemen 25 Aral\u0131k 1991`den itibaren ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f, bu \u00fclkede b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ili\u011fini ise \u015eubat 1992`de a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Daha 12 Aral\u0131k 1991`de bir \u00fcniversitede yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Jeyms Baker, sava\u015fmak i\u00e7in silahlanmay\u0131, ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 G.Bush ise 25 Aral\u0131k 1991`de televizyonda yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 konu\u015fmada demokrasi ilkelerine uymamay\u0131 neden g\u00f6stererek Azerbaycan ile ili\u015fkilerinde ve Azerbaycan`a yard\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131nda aksama olabilece\u011finin ipu\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 vermi\u015flerdir.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nEtnik olgu, g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcz Amerikan i\u00e7 politikas\u0131nda etkili oldu\u011fu kadar, d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda da ayn\u0131 \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde etkin bir unsurdur. Yahudi, Yunan, Ermeni, vb. gibi baz\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc etnik \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131 Amerikan i\u00e7 politikas\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7 sahibi olmu\u015flard\u0131r ve \u00f6z\u00fcnde ait olduklar\u0131 \u00fclkelerle ilgili d\u0131\u015f politika konular\u0131nda da bu g\u00fcc\u00fc giderek artan bir \u015fekilde kullanma e\u011filimindedirler. Etnik \u00e7\u0131kar gruplar\u0131n\u0131n etkisi, politika belirleme s\u00fcrecini etkileyen ve i\u00e7 politik sistemin do\u011fas\u0131, devlet \u2013 toplum ili\u015fkileri, kamuoyunun ve toplumsal gruplar\u0131n rol\u00fc ve hatta politika belirleme s\u00fcrecini etkileyen fikirler ve alg\u0131lamalar gibi konular dahil, \u00e7ok geni\u015f kapsaml\u0131 i\u00e7 determinantlarla yak\u0131ndan ilgilidir.<\/p>\n
\n
\n<\/span>\u201c907. B\u00f6l\u00fcm Nagorno-Karaba\u011f anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n sald\u0131rgan rol\u00fcnde oldu\u011funu kabul etmektedir. Bu k\u0131s\u0131tlay\u0131c\u0131 maddenin ifadesi Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Ermenistan ve Nagorno-Karaba\u011f\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131rgan g\u00fc\u00e7 kullan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Ancak a\u00e7\u0131k olan husus, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n hi\u00e7 kimseye kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131rgan g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanmad\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Tam aksine topraklar\u0131 istila edilen Azerbaycan bunun sonucunda y\u00fczlerce i\u00e7 g\u00f6\u00e7menle sorun ya\u015famaktad\u0131r. Azerbaycan en az alt\u0131 y\u0131ld\u0131r kendini savunmaktad\u0131r. 907. B\u00f6l\u00fcm, bu nedenle, tamamen gerek\u00e7eden yoksun, haks\u0131z ve ger\u00e7ek d\u0131\u015f\u0131 varsay\u0131mlara
\ndayal\u0131d\u0131r\u201d. (20)<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\n1993 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n 2. yar\u0131s\u0131ndan itibaren Azerbaycan`\u0131 y\u00f6neten H.Aliyev iktidar\u0131, konuya ili\u015fkin giri\u015fimlerini \u00e7e\u015fitli y\u00f6ntemlerle s\u00fcrd\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Eyl\u00fcl 1993`te ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131 B.Clinton`a , Ba\u015fkan Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 A.Gore`a ve Kongre Ba\u015fkan\u0131 T.Fole`ye birer mektup yazan H.Aliyev 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddeyi Azerbaycan-ABD ili\u015fkilerinin geli\u015fmesinde bir engel olarak nitelemi\u015ftir. Ard\u0131ndan Bak\u00fc`y\u00fc ziyaret eden ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131n\u0131n Yeni Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletlerle ilgili yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 S.Talbott, Aliyev ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme s\u0131ras\u0131nda ABD Ba\u015fkan\u0131`n\u0131n mektubunu ona iletmi\u015ftir. Bu mektupta Clinton, 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin do\u011furdu\u011fu s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131 azaltmak i\u00e7in, Azerbaycan`a sivil toplum \u00f6rg\u00fctleri arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla yard\u0131m yapacaklar\u0131n\u0131 vurgulam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 3 Eyl\u00fcl
\n1994`te ABD`nin BM temsilcisi Madeleine Albright Bak\u00fc ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda, ABD\u00a0<\/span>y\u00f6netimini Azerbaycan`a resmi olmayan kanallarla yard\u0131m\u0131 art\u0131raca\u011f\u0131n\u0131, 907 say\u0131l\u0131\u00a0<\/span>ek maddenin \u00f6nce yumu\u015fat\u0131lmas\u0131, sonra ise tamamen kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde gerekli ad\u0131mlar\u0131 ataca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir. (21)<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\n11 Eyl\u00fcl sonras\u0131 geli\u015fmeler ABD y\u00f6netimine, uzun zamandan beri ifade etti\u011fi\u00a0<\/span>907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek madde konusunda bir tak\u0131m ad\u0131mlar atma olana\u011f\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. D\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda herkesin dikkati \u201cTer\u00f6r kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 m\u00fccadele\u201dye y\u00f6nelmi\u015fken ve Azerbaycan tam olarak bu harekat\u0131 destekledi\u011fini ifade etmekteyken ABD y\u00f6netimi de Afganistan`daki operasyonlar ve genel olarak ter\u00f6r kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 operasyonlar\u0131 kapsam\u0131nda Azerbaycan ile de i\u015fbirli\u011fi yapaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etmi\u015ftir. Bu ba\u011flamda Azerbaycan`a resmi kanallarla yard\u0131m yap\u0131labilmesi i\u00e7in 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131ndurdurulmas\u0131 y\u00f6n\u00fcnde giri\u015fim ba\u015flat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.Bush y\u00f6netimi Kongre`ye mektupla\u00a0<\/span>m\u00fcracaat ederek, 907 say\u0131l\u0131 ek maddenin uygulanmas\u0131n\u0131n durdurulmas\u0131 konusunda\u00a0<\/span>Ba\u015fkan`a yetki verilmesini istemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nC.1 \u2013G\u00fcl Devriminden \u00d6nceki ABD G\u00fcrcistan \u0130li\u015fkileri
\n<\/b>
\nSovyetler Birli\u011finin tam olarak da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan eski SSCB \u00fcyesi olmu\u015f di\u011fer devletlerde oldu\u011fu gibi G\u00fcrcistan’da da bir i\u00e7 bo\u015fluk yaranm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Kendisini eski SSCB’nin varisi ilan etmi\u015f Rusya’n\u0131n i\u00e7erisinde meydana gelen i\u00e7 sava\u015flar (\u00c7e\u00e7enistan, \u0130ngu\u015fetiya, Tataristan) nedeniyle arka bah\u00e7esi sayd\u0131\u011f\u0131 Kafkas’lardan kopmu\u015ftu. G\u00fcney Kafkasya’da Rusya’dan kopman\u0131n ilk ad\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan atm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Fakat o zaman SSCB’nin “de yuri” ayakta olmas\u0131 ABD’yi bu b\u00f6lgeye girmekte \u00e7ekinceli hale getiriyordu. Di\u011fer bir yandan G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131nda kendi i\u00e7inde geli\u015fen i\u00e7 sava\u015f ve huzursuzluklar onun d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131 da b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde etkilemi\u015ftir. 1992 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Ocak aylar\u0131ndan sonra Z. Gamsahurdia’nin iktidar\u0131 b\u0131rak\u0131p \u00fclkeyi terk etmesi ve onun yerine E. \u015eeverdnadze’nin gelmesi G\u00fcrcistan a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan olumlu bir olay olmu\u015ftur. \u015eeverdnadze’nin SSCB’nin sonuncu D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 olmas\u0131 kendisinin bir\u00e7ok Bat\u0131 ve ABD’li y\u00f6neticilerle \u015fahsi ili\u015fkiler kurmas\u0131na neden olmu\u015ftur. G\u00fcrcistan’da i\u015f ba\u015f\u0131na geldikten sonra \u015eeverdnadze bu ili\u015fkilerden G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7in yararlanmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Nitekim 25 May\u0131s 1992’de d\u00f6nemin ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 James Baker Lizbon’dan \u00fclkesine d\u00f6nerken G\u00fcrcistan’a gitmi\u015f ve bununla da\u00a0<\/span>ABD’nin \u015eeverdnadze y\u00f6netimine destek verdi\u011fini belirtmi\u015ftir. (34) \u015eeverdnadzey\u00f6netimininse ABD’ye y\u00f6nelik politika izlemesinin esas \u00fc\u00e7 nedeni var. Birincisi \u00fclke\u00a0<\/span>i\u00e7erisinde olu\u015fan etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6zmek i\u00e7in Rusya’dan istedi\u011fini alamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn di\u011fer yolunu ABD’de, g\u00f6rmesi. \u0130kincisi RF’ nin G\u00fcrcistan’a kar\u015f\u0131 tutumu ve onu kendi “arka bah\u00e7esinin” bir taraf\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rmesi. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fcs\u00fc Hazar enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015fta ABD olmak \u00fczere Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u015firketlerce i\u015fletmesinden d\u0131\u015far\u0131da kalmamak ve ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f projelere kat\u0131lmakla kendi devletinin g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak olmu\u015ftur. Di\u011fer yandan ABD’de esas rakibi olan SSCB’nin yak\u0131n\u0131nda \u00f6nemli rol \u00fcstlenmi\u015f \u015eeverdnadze’nin kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda manevi olarak bor\u00e7lu\u00a0<\/span>durumundayd\u0131. (35) ABD ayn\u0131 zamanda RF’nin etkin oldu\u011fu b\u00f6lgelerde onun \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131<\/p>\n
\n\u2022 Demokratik d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm
\n\u2022 Sosyal istikrar\u0131n sa\u011flanmas\u0131<\/p>\n
\nbulunmu\u015ftur. (39)<\/p>\n
\n\u2022 May\u0131s ay\u0131nda Abhazya’n\u0131n Gali reyonun da yeniden ba\u015flanan sava\u015f ve bu sava\u015f sonucunda 40.000 G\u00fcrc\u00fcn\u00fcn g\u00f6\u00e7men olarak evlerini terk ederek G\u00fcrcistan’\u0131n di\u011fer b\u00f6lgelerine gelmesi.
\n\u2022 Yaz aylar\u0131nda ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015f kabine krizi.
\n\u2022 Ekimde y\u00f6netime kar\u015f\u0131 ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olan askeri ayaklanma
\n\u2022 Kas\u0131mda olan ekonomik kriz.<\/p>\n
\nal\u0131nmas\u0131, temel d\u0131\u015f politika ama\u00e7lar\u0131 olarak ele al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (46) Rusya’n\u0131n bu doktrin\u00a0<\/span>\u00e7er\u00e7evesinde G\u00fcney Kafkasya’da yerle\u015fmek istemesi ABD’nin endi\u015felerini hakl\u0131 olarak art\u0131rmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Ermenistan’da etkin g\u00fc\u00e7 olan Rusya G\u00fcney Kafkasya’daki yerle\u015fmesini G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecekti.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nAna Muhalefeti olu\u015fturan Nino Burjanadze, Zurab Jvaniya ve Mihail Saaka\u015fvili zaman\u0131nda \u015eevardnadze iktidar\u0131nda \u00fcst d\u00fczey g\u00f6revlerde bulunmu\u015flard\u0131. Bat\u0131, Mihail Saaka\u015fvili\u2019nin liderli\u011findeki partinin parlamentoda \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fck kazanmas\u0131ndan yana\u00a0<\/span>tav\u0131r tak\u0131n\u0131yordu. 2000\u20132001 y\u0131llar\u0131nda Adalet Bakan\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rev yapan ve hortumculara kar\u015f\u0131 m\u00fccadele veren Saaka\u015fvili hem Bat\u0131, hem de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da pop\u00fclariteye sahipti. (53) 2001 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n ocak ay\u0131nda h\u00fck\u00fcmetten istifa ederken \u2018 \u015eevardnadze y\u00f6netiminin yolsuzlukla m\u00fccadelede yetersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, sorunun i\u00e7ten kaynakland\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n \u2018a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131n\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Saaka\u015fvili 2001 Ekim ay\u0131nda Ulusal Hareket Partisini kurmu\u015f, Zurab Jvaniya ve Nino Burjanadze\u2019nin Birle\u015fik Demokratlarla i\u015fbirli\u011fi yaparak ilk s\u0131nav\u0131n\u0131 2002 y\u0131l\u0131nda Tiflis\u2019te yerel se\u00e7imlerde vermi\u015f, y\u00fcksek sonu\u00e7 alarak Tiflis \u015fehir asamblesine ba\u015fkan se\u00e7ilmi\u015ftir. Daha sonra iktidarla m\u00fccadelesini bu platformda s\u00fcrd\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr.<\/p>\n
\n2004 Ocak ay\u0131ndaki se\u00e7imlerde Ulusal Hareket Partisinin lideri Mihail Saaka\u015fvili cumhurba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
\n
\nD. ERMEN\u0130STAN – ABD \u0130L\u0130\u015eK\u0130LER\u0130
\n<\/b>
\nErmenilerin ABD ile olan ili\u015fkileri asl\u0131nda XX y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015flar\u0131ndan ba\u015flamaktad\u0131r. Asl\u0131nda Ermeniler ABD’deki ve di\u011fer \u00fclkelerdeki lobicilik faaliyetlerinin ba\u015flamas\u0131n\u0131 1915 y\u0131l\u0131nda Osmanl\u0131larca Ermenilere yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015f olan S\u00f6zde Ermeni Soyk\u0131r\u0131m\u0131na ba\u011flarlar. Yani tehcir olay\u0131ndan sonra Ermeniler t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyaya da\u011f\u0131lm\u0131\u015flar ve kendi haklar\u0131n\u0131 korumak i\u00e7in lobicili\u011fe ba\u015flam\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. Lobicili\u011fin ana hatt\u0131n\u0131 da T\u00fcrkiye’nin d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131na her an m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu kadar darbe indirmek olu\u015fmu\u015ftur. ABD’deki Ermeni lobisinin tarihi uzun olsa da en etkin olduklar\u0131 devir
\n60`l\u0131 y\u0131llardan sonrad\u0131r. Bu lobicilik faaliyetleri ABD’de ya\u015fayan zengin Ermeni as\u0131ll\u0131 ki\u015filer taraf\u0131ndan olu\u015fturulan \u00e7e\u015fitli kurulu\u015flar vas\u0131tas\u0131yla daha da etkili hala gelmi\u015ftir, ABD’de faaliyet g\u00f6steren Ermeni \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 ve Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Merkezleri \u00e7e\u015fitli Amerikan \u00dcniversitelerinde faaliyet g\u00f6stermektedirler.<\/p>\n
\nDolara kadar iniyor.ABD Y\u00f6netiminin d\u0131\u015f yard\u0131mlar\u0131 azaltma e\u011filimine kar\u015f\u0131n bu durumdan etkilenmeyen \u00e7ok az \u00fclke aras\u0131nda bulunan Ermenistan’a 2001 y\u0131l\u0131 b\u00fct\u00e7esinden de 90 milyon dolar ayr\u0131ld\u0131. \u00d6zellikle de Mitch McConnel’in 1994 y\u0131l\u0131nda\u00a0<\/span>ABD Senatosu \u00d6denekler D\u0131\u015f Operasyonlar Alt komitesi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 se\u00e7ilmesinden\u00a0<\/span>sonra ABD y\u00f6netimi 1994 y\u0131l\u0131ndan \u015fimdiye kadar Ermenistan’a 500 milyon dolar\u0131n \u00fczerinde yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. 1996 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD y\u00f6netimi Ermenistan’a 300 milyon dolar kredi sa\u011flam\u0131\u015f ama bu kredinin nereye harcand\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fczerinde durmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (67) 1998 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD’nin etti\u011fi yard\u0131mlar sayesinde Ermenistan’da ki\u015fi\u00a0<\/span>ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen para 97 dolar oldu\u011fu halde Azerbaycan’da bu rakam 3 dolar olmu\u015ftur. (68)<\/p>\n
\n2003 y\u0131l\u0131nda ABD Freedom Support Act program\u0131 gere\u011fince Ermenistan’a 93 milyon\u00a0<\/span>750 bin Dolar, Karaba\u011f’a ise 25 milyon Dolar yard\u0131mda bulunmu\u015ftur. (71)<\/p>\n
\n<\/span><\/span><\/span>
\n<\/span><\/span>
\n<\/span>B\u00d6L\u00dcM D\u0130PNOTLARI:
\n1)\u00a0<\/b>S. \u00c7ernyavskiy , \u201cWashington`un Kafkasya politikas\u0131\u201d, Uluslararas\u0131 Hayat,cilt 1,
\n1999 s. 30
\n2)<\/b>\u00a0Hac\u0131yev, ob.cit. s.372
\n3)<\/b>\u00a0D. Lewis , \u201cThe Politics of Energy in the Caspian Region\u201d Easter Europe and the CommonWealth of \u0130ndependent states, 1999, s. 160
\n4)\u00a0<\/b>Ibid, s. 89
\n5)<\/b>\u00a0V. \u015eoroxov, \u201cBak\u00fc Petrol\u00fc ve Politikas\u0131\u201d, Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce, 1995, s.36
\n6)<\/b>\u00a0Ibid. s., 40
\n7)\u00a0<\/b>Hazar Havzas\u0131 ve Rusya`n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131, BDT Enstit\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn Raporu, 1998
\n8)\u00a0<\/b>DR.A.Cohen, \u201cABD, Merkezi Asya ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya ili\u015fkilerinin Perspektif ve Problemleri\u201d, www.ca-c.org\/journal \/cac 08-2000
\n9)<\/b>\u00a0Nazim Cafersoy,\u201dEl\u00e7ibey D\u00f6nemi Azerbaycan D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131(Haziran 1992-Haziran
\n1993)\u201d,ASAM Yay\u0131nlar\u0131,Ankara 2001,s.146
\n10)\u00a0<\/b>Elman Nesirov,\u201dAzerbaycan-ABD M\u00fcnasebetleri\u201d,Bak\u00fc,Kanun 1998,s.93
\n11)\u00a0<\/b>E. Nesirov,\u201d Azerbaycan Petrol\u00fc ve Uluslararas\u0131 Amla\u015fmalar\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Respublika Hat\u0131ra Kitap\u0131yay\u0131mlar\u0131. s, 95
\n12)<\/b>\u00a0Cafersoy, op.cit, s.138
\n13)<\/b>\u00a0Ali Hasanov, \u201cAzerbaycan`\u0131n D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131: Avrupa Devletleri ve ABD(1991-1996)\u201d ,
\nAzerbaycan Devlet Ne\u015friyyat\u0131,Bak\u00fc 1998, s.147
\n14)\u00a0<\/b>A. Abbasbeyli, A. Hasanov, \u201cAzerbaycan Uluslararas\u0131 B\u00f6lgesel \u00d6rg\u00fctler Sisteminde\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Azerne\u015fr Yay\u0131mevi, 1999, s.256
\n15)\u00a0<\/b>John J.Mareska,\u201dU.S. Ban on Aid to Azerbaijan(section 907): How it started in 1992 and Why \u0130tShould be Lifted \u201d, Azerbaijan \u0130nternational,(6.4) Winter 1998
\n16)<\/b>\u00a0R. Berls, \u201cABD`nin Ulusal \u00c7\u0131karlar\u0131 ve Ermeni Lobbisi\u201d, Moskova, Dir\u00e7eli\u015f,1999, s.94
\n18)\u00a0<\/b>Curt Tarnoff, \u201cThe Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign assistance\u201d, Congressional ResearchService (CRS) Issue Brief for Congress order Code IB95077, 7 Ocak, 2002
\n19)<\/b>\u00a0Congressional Hellenic Caucus\u201d American Hellenic Council Web sitesi http:\/\/www.americanhellenic.org\/network\/modules.php?name=Coucus
\n20)<\/b>\u00a0http:\/\/www.azer.com\/aiweb\/categories\/magazine\/64 folder\/64 articles\/64 maresca.html(10\/12\/2003)
\n21)\u00a0<\/b>V.Abdullayev, \u201cAzerbaycan yeni diplomatiya aleminde\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Azerbaycan yay\u0131mevi,2000, s.480
\n22)\u00a0<\/b>A.Abbasbeyli, \u201cH.Aliyev ve D\u00fcnya Politikas\u0131\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Azerne\u015fr, 1997, s.472
\n23)<\/b>\u00a0E.Hasanov, \u201cAzerbaycam-ABD: Anla\u015fmazl\u0131ktan Stratejik Ortakl\u0131\u011fa Do\u011fru\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Azerbaycan \u00dcniversitesi Ne\u015friyyat\u0131, 1997, s.103
\n24)<\/b>\u00a0Azerbaycan Gazetesi,19 Eyl\u00fcl 1996
\n25)\u00a0<\/b>Ali Hasanov, \u201cAzerbaycan`\u0131n D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131: Avrupa Devletleri ve ABD(1991-
\n1996)\u201d,Azerbaycan Devlet Ne\u015friyyat\u0131,Bak\u00fc 1998, s 164
\n26)<\/b>\u00a0P.Darabadi, A.Abbasbeyli, \u201cAzerbaycan ve Hazar Yeni Uluslararas\u0131 \u0130li\u015fkiler Sisteminde\u201d,Bak\u00fc, Azerne\u015fr Yay\u0131mevi, 2000, s. 211
\n27)<\/b>\u00a0A.Ezimli, \u201cAzerbaycan-NATO ili\u015fkileri\u201d, Bak\u00fc, Adilo\u011flu Yay\u0131mevi, 2001, s, 226
\n28)<\/b>\u00a0\u015e\u00fckr\u00fc Elekda\u011f, \u201cABD`nin \u00c7eli\u015fkili Kafkas Politikas\u0131\u201d, Milliyet,12 Ocak,2000
\n29)\u00a0<\/b>Namik Aliyev,\u201c ABD`nin Konumu De\u011fi\u015fiyor\u201d,Zaman,Bak\u00fc,5Ocak 2002
\n30)<\/b>\u00a0\u201cYine \u0130kili Standartlar\u201d Yeni Musavat,16 Aral\u0131k 2001
\n31)\u00a0<\/b>\u201cAliyev : ABD daha cesur olmal\u0131\u201d,H\u00fcrriyet, 5 Temmuz 2002
\n32)<\/b>\u00a0\u201cAzerbaycan Topraklar\u0131n\u0131 Kullanmas\u0131 \u0130\u00e7in ABD`ye \u0130zin Vermedi\u201d, Ayna Gazetesi, 20 A\u011fustos,2004
\n33)<\/b>\u00a0\u201cNATO Rusyay\u0131 \u00c7er\u00e7eveye Al\u0131yor\u201d, Musavat, 16 Arala\u0131k, 2004
\n34)<\/b>\u00a0F. \u00c7ilo\u011flu , \u201cRusya Federasyonu ve Transkafkasya`da Etnik \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u201d , \u0130stanbul,Sinatle yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 1998, s. 293
\n35)<\/b>\u00a0G.Nodia,.: “Obraz Zapada v Gruzinskom Soznanii”, Mejdunarodniy Op\u0131t Razresheniya Etnicheskih
\nKonfliktov”. http:\/\/www.poli.vub.ac.be\/publi\/etni3\/no-dia.htm
\n36)<\/b>\u00a0K. A\u011facan., \u201cBa\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z\u011fl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n 10 Y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan ABD`nin Kafkasya`daki Kalesi mi?\u201d, Stratejik Analiz , cilt 1 , Say\u013111 Mart 2001 ,s. 34
\n37)<\/b>\u00a0“U. S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New \u0130ndependent States of the Former Soviet Union”, FY 1995 Annaual Report. ww\\v.state.gov\/p\/cur\/rls\/fs\/l 1029pf.htm
\n38)\u00a0<\/b>A\u011facan, op.cit., s.36
\n39)\u00a0<\/b>D. Dorchiashvili,.: “The Russian Military Presence in Gcorgia: The Parties Attitudes and Prospects”, Caucasian Regional Studeis, 1997, C. 2, S. 1.
\n40)<\/b>\u00a0Fy. 1998 Annual Report
\n41)<\/b>\u00a0Fy. 1999 Annual Report
\n42)\u00a0<\/b>Fy. 2000 Annual Report
\n43)\u00a0<\/b>Fy. 1999 Annual Report
\n44)<\/b>\u00a0D. Dorchiashvili “Georgia Courts NATO, Strves For Defense Overhaul”, www.eurasianet.org
\n45)<\/b>\u00a0Fy. 2000 Annual report
\n46)\u00a0<\/b>K.A\u011facan ,op.cit. , s. 315
\n47)\u00a0<\/b>“Rusya’n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan Planlan”. Yeni M\u00fcsavat gazetesi 7 A\u011fustos, 2002.
\n48)<\/b>\u00a0“G\u00fcrcistan Rusya Kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Geri \u00c7ekiliyor”, \u015eerg gazetesi, 10 Eyl\u00fcl 2002
\n49)\u00a0<\/b>M. Hodoryonok,.: “Amerikan \u00dcslerinden olu\u015fan Bir halka” Stratejik Analiz, Cilt: 2, Say\u0131 25, May\u0131s 2002, S. 94.
\n50)\u00a0<\/b>www.kavkaz.org\/news\/2OOO\/O6\/23\/news7.htm
\n51)<\/b>\u00a0K.A\u011facan, ob.cit, s. 36.
\n52)\u00a0<\/b>Musavat Gazetesi, 15Eyl\u00fcl 2001
\n53) I<\/b>nternational Crisis Group, Europe Report N 151, Georgia: What now? 3 December 2003, s.6
\n54)\u00a0<\/b>Oktay Tanr\u0131sever,\u201d G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da yap\u0131lan 2003 Parlamento se\u00e7imleri ve yol a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 Kadife Devrimi: Ufukta istikrar g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor mu?\u201d, Stradigma Dergisi, 2004
\n55)\u00a0<\/b>Misha Dzhindzhikhashvili, \u201cPro-Government Bloc Leads Georgia So Far\u201d, Associated Press, 3 Kas\u0131m 2003.
\n56)\u00a0<\/b>Seth Mydens, \u201cOpposition Unites Behind Georgia Revolt Leader\u201d, New York Times, 27 Kas\u0131m 2003.
\n57)<\/b>\u00a0Sergei Blagov, \u201cRussia Wary of Georgia’s Regime Change\u201d, Eurasia Insight, 26 Kas\u0131m 2003.
\n58)\u00a0<\/b>Oktay Tanr\u0131sever,\u201d G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da yap\u0131lan 2003 Parlamento se\u00e7imleri ve yol a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 Kadife Devrimi: Ufukta istikrar g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor mu?\u201d, Stradigma Dergisi, 2004
\n59)\u00a0<\/b>Kamil A\u011facan \u201c Acaristan\u2019daki geli\u015fmeler ve Saaka\u015fvilinin zaferi\u201dStratejik Analiz, K\u0131\u015f, 2004
\n60)\u00a0<\/b>\u201cABD G\u00fcrcistan\u0131n taraf\u0131nda\u201d, , \u0130A Regnum Haber Ajans\u0131, 13 May\u0131s 2005
\n61)\u00a0<\/b>Kamil A\u011facan \u2018\u201dBush\u2019un Tiflis ziyareti\u201d, ASAM G\u00fcnl\u00fck K\u00fcresel Derlendirme B\u00fclteni,12 May\u0131s,2005
\n62)\u00a0<\/b>\u201cRock y\u0131ld\u0131z\u0131 gibi kar\u015f\u0131land\u0131\u201d, H\u00fcrriyet, 12 May\u0131s 2005
\n63)<\/b>\u00a0\u201cDevrimci\u201d Bush: G\u00fcrc\u00fc \u201cDevrimi\u201d’ni \u00d6vd\u00fc, Stratejik G\u00fcndem, USAK Dergisi, 14 May\u0131s 2005
\n64)\u00a0<\/b>Bush\u2019un G\u00fcrcistan ziyareti s\u0131ras\u0131nda Azerbaycan bas\u0131n\u0131nda tart\u0131\u015fmalar ya\u015fanm\u0131\u015f, Bush neden Azerbaycan\u2019a u\u011framad\u0131 sorusu ba\u015fl\u0131ca konu olmu\u015ftur. Muhalefet bunu Aliyev h\u00fck\u00fcmetine ters tokat anlam\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 iddia etmi\u015ftir.
\n65)\u00a0<\/b>“Rus Silah Mafyas\u0131 Korkuttu”, Zaman, 5 \u015eubat 1998.
\n66)\u00a0<\/b>A. Gasparyan, “Dinamika Karabaksko\u011fa Konfl\u0130kta I Rol Rossiyskoy Federasii v Ego Uregulirovanii (Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f Sorununun Dinami\u011fi ve Rusya Federasyonunun Sorunun \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcndcki Rol\u00fc. www.ca-c.org\/journal\/cac061999.
\n67)<\/b>\u00a0http:\/\/karabakhdoc.gen.az\/forum\/vievvtopic.php?p=361&sid=ld5fcaf24c-4318ea44e4130831116cl0
\n68)<\/b>\u00a0http:\/\/karabakhdoc.gen.az\/forum\/viewtopic.php?p^361&sid=ld5fcaf24c-4318ea44e4130831116cl0
\n69)\u00a0<\/b>http:\/\/karabakh-doc.gen.az\/forum\/viewtopic.php?p=361&sid=ld5fcaf24-
\n70)\u00a0<\/b>Daha geni\u015f bilgi i\u00e7in bkz: http:\/\/www.azg.am\/TR\/20O21009\/-200210O9-O4.shtm
\n71)\u00a0<\/b>Daha geni\u015f bilgi i\u00e7in bkz: http:\/\/www.panarmetiian.net\/news\/rus\/headlines\/?- task=archive&day=27 &month=0t &year=2003&id=7203
\n72)<\/b>\u00a0L. Grigoryan, “Armeniya ne Sobiraetsa Vstupat v NATO”, Daha geni\u015f bilgi \u0130\u00e7in bkz: http:\/\/www.panarmenian.nct\/news\/rus\/hcadlines\/?task=archive&day=13& month=ll&ycar=2002&id=6731
\n73)<\/b>\u00a0S. Petrosyan, “Rossiya – Armeniya – \u0130ran:Dialog Tsivilizatsii”, Daha Geni\u015f Bilgi \u0130\u00e7in Bkz. http:\/\/www.ca-c.org\/journal\/cac05_1999\/st_05_spetros-jan.shtml
\n74)<\/b>\u00a0Vstuplenie Ministra inostrann\u0131h Del Rossii \u0130. S. \u0130vanova Zaklyu\u00e7itelnom Plenarnorn Zasedanii Mejdunarodn\u0131y Konferantsii ‘Arrnyane na Rubeje Vekov i Aktualn\u0131e problemi Mejdunarodn\u0131h Otno\u015feniP, Daha geni\u015f bilgi bkz: http:\/\/www-.In.mid.ru\/ns-sng.nsf\/ 6bc38aceada6e44b432569e7004-19ef5\/432569d800-022146643256c4d00326374? OpenDocument<\/span><\/p>\n
\n
\nverdi. (80) B\u00f6ylece, 1994`te b\u00f6lgeyi ilgi alan\u0131 ilan eden ABD, b\u00f6lgede RF`nin ve \u0130ran`\u0131n etkinli\u011fini artt\u0131racak ortak sahiplik yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131 Resmi Washington Azerbaycan\u2019a en b\u00fcy\u00fck deste\u011fini Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ileri s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc 45 millik anla\u015fma plan\u0131n\u0131 geri \u00e7evirdikten sonra vermi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nABD i\u00e7in Hazar havzas\u0131, petrol temin etme se\u00e7eneklerini \u00e7o\u011faltmak ve Barsa K\u00f6rfezi`ne ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131ktan kurtulmak : k\u0131saca, Clinton`un s\u00f6zleriyle \u201c\u00fclkelerin enerji \u00fcr\u00fcnleri donan\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7e\u015fitli yollardan sa\u011flamak\u201d a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan \u00f6nemlidir. (82) Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla ABD, b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131kart\u0131lmas\u0131nda ve ta\u015f\u0131nmas\u0131nda belirleyici olmak istemektedir. Ayr\u0131ca, b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 pazarlara ula\u015ft\u0131racak boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede ekonomi, stratejik etkinlik kurman\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir arac\u0131 olmas\u0131, ABD i\u00e7in bu hatlar\u0131n hangi \u00fclkelerden ge\u00e7ece\u011fi sorununun \u00f6nemini artt\u0131rmaktayd\u0131. Bu nedenle ABD, b\u00f6lgedeki iki temel rakibi; \u0130ran ve RF`yi eleyerek enerji kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fcretimini ve ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 kontrol etmeyi hedeflemektedir.<\/p>\n
\n`da 5 milyar metrek\u00fcp ve 2007-2008 y\u0131llar\u0131nda 6,6 milyar metrek\u00fcp olmak \u00fczere toplam 5 y\u0131l i\u00e7erisinde 23, 2 milyar metrek\u00fcp do\u011falgaz ihrac\u0131 planla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\n![](\"http:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/cc-turkiye\/arastirma\/images\/011.GIF\")
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\n\u0130NPEX-Japonya, CONOCO-PH\u0130L\u0130PS-ABD, AMERADA HESS-ABD<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\n![](\"http:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/cc-turkiye\/arastirma\/images\/012.GIF\")
<\/p>\n
\n\u0130TOCHU-Japonya, \u0130NPEX-Japonya, DELTA HESS-Sudii Arabistan, ABD<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\n![](\"http:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/cc-turkiye\/arastirma\/images\/013.GIF\")
<\/p>\n
\nLUKAG\u0130P- Rusya, \u0130talya, N\u0130CO-\u0130ran, TFE(TOTAL)-Fransa, TPAO-T\u00fcrkiye\u00a0 (84)<\/span><\/p>\n
\n75)\u00a0<\/b>M.P. Croissant, C.M, Croissant., \u201cHazar Denizi Stat\u00fcs\u00fc Sorunu: \u0130\u00e7eri\u011fi ve yans\u0131malar\u0131\u201d, T\u0130KA Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, Avrasya Et\u00fctleri, C.3, S.4, K\u0131\u015f 1997,s.27-28
\n76)\u00a0<\/b>S. \u00c7olako\u011flu, \u201c Uluslar aras\u0131 Hukukta Hazar\u2019\u0131n Stat\u00fcs\u00fc Sorunu\u201d, A.\u00dc. SBF Dergisi, Ocak- Aral\u0131k 1998, C.53, NO-1-4, s. 108
\n77)\u00a0<\/b>M. Eziz, \u201c Hazar Kendisi Boyda Bir Oyundur\u201d, Zaman (Azerbaycan), Bak\u00fc,
\n11-12 Ocak
\n78)\u00a0<\/b>Z. Veliyev, \u201cHazarda Petrol Aray\u0131\u015flar\u0131\u201d, Kanun Yay\u0131m evi, Bak\u00fc, 2003, s. 15
\n79)\u00a0<\/b>525. Gazete, 3 A\u011fustos 2001.
\n80)\u00a0<\/b>www.orduworld.compuserve.com\/homepages\/usazerb\/casp.htm
\n81)\u00a0<\/b>H.Kissenger, \u201cDiplomasi\u201d, T\u00fcrkiye \u0130\u015f Bankas\u0131 Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, \u00e7ev. \u0130brahim H. Kurt, Ankara, 1998, s.675
\n82)\u00a0<\/b>Aliyev, D\u00fcnya Siyasetinde Azerbaycan Petrol\u00fc, s. 46
\n83)\u00a0<\/b>Fouskas, Balkanlar, Ortado\u011fu, Kafkasya, s. 40
\n84)\u00a0<\/b>http:\/\/socar.az\/btc-az.html 20.04.2008<\/span><\/p>\n
\n
\nEyl\u00fcl 1993\u2019teki AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019nun Moskova\u2019daki toplant\u0131s\u0131ndan her hangi bir sonu\u00e7 \u00e7\u0131kmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. S\u00f6z konusu toplant\u0131da Azerbaycan, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f Ermenilerini taraf olarak kabul etmeye zorlanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. (88<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nG\u00fcney Osetya, G\u00fcrcistan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde \u00f6zerk bir b\u00f6lgedir. B\u00fcy\u00fck Kafkas Da\u011flar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n g\u00fcney yama\u00e7lar\u0131nda yer al\u0131r. Toplam y\u00fcz\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcm\u00fc 3. 900 km\u00b2 kadard\u0131r. Y\u00f6netim merkezi Tskhinvali\u2019dir. (93 Orta Kafkaslarda, Kafkas da\u011flar\u0131n\u0131n kuzey ve g\u00fcney yama\u00e7lar\u0131nda ya\u015famakta olan Osetler, Hint-Avrupa \u0131rk\u0131na mensup \u0130ran k\u00f6kenli bir Kafkas halk\u0131 olarak bilinmektedir. (94 G\u00fcney Osetya, Rusya Federasyonu s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde yer alan Kuzey Osetya ile bir b\u00fct\u00fcnd\u00fcr. G\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde Kafkasya\u2019da s\u00fcregelen G\u00fcney Osetya sorunu G\u00fcrcistan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7erisinde yer alan G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n Rusya Federasyonu i\u00e7erinde yer alan Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015fmek istemesinden kaynaklanmaktad\u0131r. B\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu Ortodoks Hristiyan olan Osetlerin bir k\u0131sm\u0131 da M\u00fcsl\u00fcman\u2019d\u0131r. M\u00fcsl\u00fcman Osetler\u2019den bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bilinmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de ya\u015fayan Oset n\u00fcfusun bir k\u0131sm\u0131 1877-1878 Osmanl\u0131- Rus Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131nda, bir k\u0131sm\u0131 ise \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan sonra T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye gelmi\u015ftir. (95<\/p>\n
\n<\/b>
\nSSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131, daha \u00f6nce d\u00fcnya g\u00fcndeminde yer almayan Kafkasya, Orta Asya gibi b\u00f6lgeleri g\u00fcndeme ta\u015f\u0131m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. SSCB\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131 sonras\u0131nda, RF \u2018Yak\u0131n \u00c7evre\u2019sini kendi \u00e7\u0131kar alan\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f, bunu ortaya koyan bir\u00e7ok belge yay\u0131nlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD ise ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta RF\u2019nin uluslararas\u0131 sisteme sorunsuz olarak kat\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f, b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleriyle olan ili\u015fkilerini RF \u00fczerinden y\u00fcr\u00fcterek, RF\u2019ye \u00f6ncelik verdi\u011fini g\u00f6stermi\u015f ve RF\u2019yi \u00fcrk\u00fctmemeye gayret etmi\u015ftir. ABD y\u00f6netiminin bu politikas\u0131, ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131\u2019n\u0131n Orta Asya ve Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131 \u2018\u00e7\u0131kar \u00e7evresi\u2019 de\u011fil \u2018sorumluluk alan\u0131\u2019 olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne ili\u015fkin yeni politikas\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamas\u0131yla birlikte, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 da de\u011fi\u015fime u\u011fram\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu a\u00e7\u0131klamadan sonra, b\u00f6lgede ABD ile RF aras\u0131nda rekabet ya\u015fanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. 2001 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n Eyl\u00fcl ay\u0131nda ya\u015fanan ABD\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik ter\u00f6r sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan, ABD ter\u00f6rizme kar\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc sava\u015fla, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya\u2019da b\u00fcy\u00fck kazan\u0131mlar elde etmi\u015f, normal \u015fartlarda yerle\u015fmesinin imkans\u0131z oldu\u011fu bu b\u00f6lgelere askeri \u00fcsler kurmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. RF ABD\u2019ye ter\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc sava\u015fta destek vermi\u015f, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye yerle\u015fmesi kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda olumsuz bir reaksiyon g\u00f6sterememi\u015ftir. Ancak Amerikan y\u00f6netiminin askeri alanda Kafkasya\u2019ya yerle\u015fmesi biraz daha g\u00fc\u00e7 olmu\u015ftur. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019la olan ili\u015fkilerinde hayli ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 olan Amerikan y\u00f6netimi, yakla\u015f\u0131k on y\u0131ll\u0131k bir s\u00fcre sonunda, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc bir \u015fekilde, iktidar\u0131 Kadife bir Devrim\u2019le de\u011fi\u015ftirmeyi ba\u015farm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerinden Azerbaycan ise Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir politika izlemesine ra\u011fmen, RF\u2019 ye de s\u0131rt\u0131n\u0131 d\u00f6nmemi\u015f, ABD\u2019yle RF aras\u0131nda bir denge politikas\u0131 izlemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sorunu nedeniyle Ermenistan\u2019la sava\u015fan ve halen topraklar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fczde yirmilik k\u0131sm\u0131 i\u015fgal alt\u0131nda olan<\/p>\n
\n86)<\/b>\u00a0N. Motfeev\u201cAvrupa ve Rusya G\u00fcney Do\u011frultusundaki Problemler\u201d,ROSSPEN, Moskova,1999,s.105
\n87)\u00a0<\/b>UN Security Council Resolution, 30 April, 29 July,14 October,12 November, 1993.
\n88)\u00a0<\/b>Hatem Cabbarl\u0131, \u201cBa\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k Sonras\u0131 Ermenistan \u2013 Rusya \u0130li\u015fkileri\u201d, http:\/\/www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr\/turkce\/makaleler\/bagimsizlik_sonrasi_ermenistan_
\nrusya_iliskileri.doc, 04 \u015eubat 2005.
\n89)<\/b>\u00a0Kas\u0131m Kamer, \u201cBa\u015flang\u0131c\u0131ndan Bar\u0131\u015f S\u00fcrecine Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131\u201d, http:\/\/www.eraren.org\/tur\/makale\/ozet_kam_kasimbasbarsurdagkar.htm, 04 \u015eubat 2005.
\n90)<\/b>\u00a0http:\/\/www.zaman.com.tr\/2002\/03\/17\/dis\/h6.htm, 04 \u015eubat 2005.
\n91)\u00a0<\/b>http:\/\/www.turan.tc\/haber\/2002ekim.htm, 04 \u015eubat 2005.
\n92)<\/b>\u00a0http:\/\/www.yenimesaj.com.tr\/index.php?sayfa=guncel&haberno=5748&tarih=2004-08-02 , 04 \u015eubat 2005
\n93)\u00a0<\/b>Ramazan \u00d6zey, \u201cKafkasya ve Kafkas \u00dclkeleri\u201d, Avrasya Et\u00fcdleri, (\u0130lkbahar Yaz 2000),s. 31
\n94)\u00a0<\/b>Ufuk Takvul,\u201d Etnik \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n G\u00f6lgesinde Kafkasya\u201d, \u0130stanbul, 2002,s. 76
\n95)<\/b>\u00a0Nihat Kas\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 ve Hasan Y\u0131lmaz Aras\u2019tan, \u201cVolga\u2019ya Kafkaslar\u201d (\u00dclkeler-\u015eehirler-\u0130z B\u0131rakanlar),2000,s. 150
\n96)<\/b>\u00a0Kafkasya ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n D\u00fcn\u00fc-Bug\u00fcn\u00fc-Yar\u0131n\u0131, Harp Akademileri Komutanl\u0131\u011f\u0131
\nYay\u0131nlar\u0131ndan, \u0130stanbul, 1995,s. 119
\n97)\u00a0<\/b>Esra Hatipo\u011flu: \u201cAfter Empire: Georgia-Russia Relations And The Prospects For Stability In The South Caucasus\u201d,s. 182
\n98)<\/b>\u00a0Ufuk Takvul,op.cit., 77\u2019den naklen Sefer E. BERZEG: \u201c G\u00fcney Osetya-Kuzey Osetya ve G\u00fcrc\u00fc \u015eovenizmi \u00dczerine D\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnceler\u201d, Kafkas Ger\u00e7e\u011fi 3, (Ocak 1991),s. 2
\n99)<\/b>\u00a0Kafkasya ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n D\u00fcn\u00fc-Bug\u00fcn\u00fc-Yar\u0131n\u0131, Harp Akademileri Komutanl\u0131g\u0131
\nYay\u0131nlar\u0131ndan, \u0130stanbul, 1995, s.120
\n100)<\/b>\u00a0Hakan Kantarc\u0131, K\u0131ska\u00e7taki B\u00f6lge Kafkasya, \u0130stanbul, 2006, s.88\u2019den naklen Okan MERT:\u201cT\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Kafkas Politikas\u0131 ve G\u00fcrcistan\u201d, IQ K\u00fclt\u00fcr-Sanat Yay\u0131nc\u0131l\u0131k, \u0130stanbul, 2004,s. 61- 88
\n101)\u00a0<\/b>Takvul,op.cit,s. 78\u2019den naklen Elizabeth FULLER: \u201cGeorgian Parliament Votes to
\nAbolish Osetian Autonomy\u201d, Report on the USSR, 2 (51), December 1990, s.8
\n102)\u00a0<\/b>Ufuk TakvulL,op.cit.,s. 79
\n103)\u00a0<\/b>Mitat \u00c7elikpala\u201d D\u00fcnden Bug\u00fcne Kuzey Kafkasya:Sosyal, Siyasal Yap\u0131 ve Etnik
\n\u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u201d, Der. Ali Ahmetbeyoglu ve ba\u015fk., \u0130stanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakf\u0131 Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, 2006, s.118
\n104)\u00a0<\/b>Esra Hatipo\u011flu: \u201cAfter Empire: Georgia-Russia Relations And The Prospects For StabilityIn The South Caucasus\u201d, s.178-179
\n105)\u00a0<\/b>Ufuk Takvul,op.cit. , s.,80-81
\n106)\u00a0<\/b>Kafkasya ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n D\u00fcn\u00fc-Bug\u00fcn\u00fc-Yar\u0131n\u0131, Harp Akademileri Komutanl\u0131g\u0131
\nYay\u0131nlar\u0131ndan, \u0130stanbul, 1995, s.,121
\n107)\u00a0<\/b>Hakan Kantarc\u0131,op.cit, s.,89
\n108)<\/b>\u00a0Ufuk Takvul,op.cit., s.,82
\n109)\u00a0<\/b>Hakan Kantarc\u0131,op.cit ,s., 90
\n110)\u00a0<\/b>\u201cPutin, K\u0131br\u0131s \u00d6rne\u011fini Sevdi\u201d, http:\/\/www.rusya.ru\/tur\/index\/.news?id=1212 , (26 Ekim 2006)
\n111)\u00a0<\/b>Esra Hatipo\u011flu, op.cit, s.,180
\n112)<\/b>\u00a0Mitat \u00c7elikpala,op.cit,s., 119
\n113)<\/b>\u00a0Ufuk Takvul,op.cit., s.,82
\n114)\u00a0<\/b>Ufuk Takvul,op.cit ,s., 83
\n115)<\/b>\u00a0G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019da Neler Oluyor?\u201d, http:\/\/www.diplomatikgozlem.com\/haber_oku.asp?id= 1674. 10.12.2006<\/p>\n
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