{"id":9435,"date":"2019-03-14T14:35:11","date_gmt":"2019-03-14T14:35:11","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/circassiancenter.com\/tr\/?p=9435"},"modified":"2019-03-14T14:35:11","modified_gmt":"2019-03-14T14:35:11","slug":"dunden-bugune-rusya-ekonomisi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/dunden-bugune-rusya-ekonomisi\/","title":{"rendered":"D\u00dcNDEN BUG\u00dcNE RUSYA EKONOM\u0130S\u0130"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/span><\/p>\n

C. Erman<\/strong>
\n<\/span> \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck D\u00fcnyas\u0131 Sosyalist Teori ve Politika Dergisi<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Ekim Devrimi sonras\u0131nda sosyalizmi in\u015fa s\u00fcreciyle, ekonomik ve sosyal alanda d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda i\u015flere imza atan, 2. D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019nda Fa\u015fist Hitler Almanya\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 ve i\u015fgalini p\u00fcsk\u00fcrterek, onlar\u0131 65 y\u0131l \u00f6nce Berlin\u2019e dek kovalayan, d\u00fcnya ilerici g\u00fc\u00e7lerine ve halklar\u0131na, Avrupa\u2019ya bar\u0131\u015f ve \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck getiren; sava\u015f sonras\u0131 y\u0131k\u0131l\u0131p tahrip olan \u00fclkesini, sosyalist ekonomisi sayesinde ikinci kez in\u015fa eden SSCB; 1950 sonras\u0131nda d\u00fcnyan\u0131n ikinci b\u00fcy\u00fck ekonomisi durumuna y\u00fckseldi\u011fi gibi, birinci olan ABD\u2019yi baz\u0131 sekt\u00f6rlerde, bilimsel teknik geli\u015fmeler, uzay teknolojisi vb. alanlarda ge\u00e7mesini de bildi. Ayr\u0131ca e\u011fitim, sa\u011fl\u0131k, sosyal g\u00fcvenlik, ki\u015fisel refah\u0131n y\u00fckseltilmesi ve payla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131nda, sosyalizmin \u00fcst\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131z t\u00fcm d\u00fcnyaya g\u00f6stererek, yank\u0131 uyand\u0131rd\u0131 ve bir \u00e7ekim merkezi oldu.<\/p>\n

Emperyalist g\u00fc\u00e7leri ve ba\u015fta ABD\u2019yi korkutan bu geli\u015fme, onlar\u0131n \u201cso\u011fuk sava\u015f\u201d s\u00fcreci ba\u015flatmas\u0131na ve giderek Stalin sonras\u0131nda, Marshall yard\u0131mlar\u0131, NATO, Gladyo vb. \u00f6rt\u00fcl\u00fc sava\u015f \u00f6rg\u00fctleri arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla SSCB\u2019ni ku\u015fatarak teslim almaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Parti ve \u00fclke y\u00f6netimini Stalin sonras\u0131nda devralan revizyonist Kru\u015f\u00e7ev \u2013ve ard\u0131ndan Brejnev\u2013 kli\u011fi, partinin ve sosyalist ekonominin dinamik g\u00fc\u00e7lerini tahrip ederek sosyalist yoldan zaten sapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. SSCB\u2019den arta kalan bi\u00e7imsel sosyalist kal\u0131nt\u0131lara ise, Bat\u0131 i\u015fbirlik\u00e7isi Gorba\u00e7ov eliyle son darbeler indirilerek, \u2018Sosyalizmin y\u0131k\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019 ilan edilmi\u015fti. Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019la ba\u015flayan Bat\u0131 emperyalizmiyle entegrasyon s\u00fcreci, Yeltsin\u2019le Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ge\u00e7mi\u015f ekonomik birikim ve kazan\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n Bat\u0131 sermayesinin talan ve ya\u011fmas\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f; \u00fcretim ara\u00e7lar\u0131 ve altyap\u0131 \u00e7\u00fcr\u00fcmeye terkedilmi\u015f, Rusya, IMF k\u0131skac\u0131nda teslim al\u0131nmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

Putin\u2019le birlikte, merkezi y\u00f6netimi sa\u011flamla\u015ft\u0131rma s\u00fcreci, yeni palazlanan burjuvazinin pazar hakimiyeti sa\u011flamas\u0131na, mafyac\u0131 kapitalizmi tasfiyesine ve emperyalist h\u00fclyalar\u0131n ger\u00e7ekle\u015fmesine giden yollar\u0131n ta\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00f6\u015femeye hizmet etti, ediyor. D\u00fcnyan\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7lerinin kriz i\u00e7inde bocalamas\u0131 devam ederken, \u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck darbeler yemesine, a\u011f\u0131r yaralar almas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131n, petrol ve do\u011fal gazdan elde etti\u011fi d\u00f6viz birikimine yaslanan Rusya, Putin\u2019le ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ge\u00e7mi\u015fteki etki alanlar\u0131na d\u00f6nme stratejine h\u0131z vermi\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Rusya G\u00fcrcistan, \u00d6zbekistan gibi alanlarda ABD\u2019nin ku\u015fatma planlar\u0131n\u0131 bo\u015fa \u00e7\u0131kararak, onun kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131na bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak dikilmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Yine son olarak, Ukrayna se\u00e7imleri ve K\u0131rg\u0131zistan\u2019daki karga\u015fa sonras\u0131nda, kendi etkisine daha a\u00e7\u0131k y\u00f6netimlerin i\u015fba\u015f\u0131na geldi\u011fi -getirildi\u011fi- g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Son olarak, Rusya Devlet ba\u015fkan\u0131 Medvedev\u2019in Ortado\u011fu b\u00f6lgesine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gezi ve M\u0131s\u0131r, Suriye, \u0130srail ve T\u00fcrkiye yetkilileriyle yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131 rol\u00fcn; yap\u0131lan konu\u015fmalar, imzalanan yeni ekonomik ve siyasi antla\u015fmalar\u0131n i\u015faret etti\u011fi y\u00f6n de; Putin\u2019le birlikte girilen NATO ku\u015fatmas\u0131n\u0131 k\u0131rma ve eski etki alanlar\u0131na yeniden d\u00f6nme s\u00fcrecinin s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclece\u011fini g\u00f6steriyor.<\/p>\n

Geli\u015fmelerin k\u0131sa \u00f6zeti b\u00f6yle olmakla birlikte, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n toparlanma s\u00fcrecinde, arka planda i\u015flevsel olan etkenleri kavrayabilmek i\u00e7in; \u00f6nemli d\u00f6neme\u00e7lerde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n temel ekonomik g\u00f6stergelerine ve ge\u00e7mi\u015ften devral\u0131nan ekonomik ve toplumsal birikime bakmak zorunlu olmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

EK\u0130M DEVR\u0130M\u0130 VE SOSYAL\u0130ST \u0130N\u015eA YILLARINDA RUSYA EKONOM\u0130S\u0130
\n<\/b>
\nEkim devrimi ve sosyalist in\u015fa, ku\u015fkusuz ki, Rusya halklar\u0131na, tarihinin en b\u00fcy\u00fck ekonomik ve toplumsal s\u0131\u00e7ramas\u0131n\u0131 yapt\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 1950\u2019lerde ve sonras\u0131nda d\u00fcnyan\u0131n ikinci b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fcc\u00fc olan Rusya, d\u00fcnya \u00fcretiminin % 20\u2019den fazlas\u0131n\u0131 \u00fcretmekteydi. 1. b\u00fcy\u00fck sava\u015f d\u00f6neminde, devrim \u00f6ncesi y\u0131llarda ise, emperyalist-kapitalist zincirin zay\u0131f bir halkas\u0131 haline gelmi\u015fti. Her y\u0131l 200 milyar Ruble yabanc\u0131 sermaye giri\u015fi olan \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya’s\u0131, ancak, d\u00fcnya \u00fcretiminin % 2.5 d\u00fczeyinde \u00fcretim kapasitesine sahipti.<\/p>\n

1917 Ekim Devrimi sonras\u0131, emperyalist g\u00fc\u00e7lerin Rusya \u00fczerinde kaybettikleri n\u00fcfuzu yeniden tesis etmek hedefiyle planlad\u0131klar\u0131 provokasyonlar ve i\u00e7 gericili\u011fe verdikleri desteklerle uzayan i\u00e7 sava\u015f s\u00fcrecinde; Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ekonomik durumu \u00e7ok gerilere gitmi\u015f, ekonomik geli\u015fme 5 y\u0131l s\u00fcreyle adeta durmu\u015f ve ancak, ekonomiyi canland\u0131rma ama\u00e7l\u0131 NEP (Yeni Ekonomik Politika)\u2019in uygulanmas\u0131ndan sonra; 1928 y\u0131l\u0131nda, 1914 y\u0131l\u0131 d\u00fczeyine ula\u015f\u0131labilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

22 Haziran 1941\u2019de, Hitler Almanya\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n SSCB\u2019ne sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131yla, Rusya ekonomik planlar\u0131n\u0131, derhal sava\u015f\u0131n gereklerine \u2013Hitler Almanyas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n eninde sonunda SSCB\u2019ne sald\u0131raca\u011f\u0131 a\u015fikar oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in, asl\u0131nda Sovyetler Birli\u011fi daha \u00f6nceki y\u0131llardan itibaren, bu b\u00fcy\u00fck sava\u015fa haz\u0131rl\u0131k olarak, y\u00fcksek bir \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma temposuyla genel ekonomik plan hedeflerini zaman\u0131ndan \u00f6nce ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011finden.\u2013 uyarlayabildi. Alman i\u015fgali ve sava\u015f esnas\u0131nda, altyap\u0131 tesisleri, demiryolu \u015febekesi, yol ve k\u00f6pr\u00fcler, k\u00f6y, \u015fehir ve kasabalar, maden ocaklar\u0131 \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde tahrip olmu\u015ftu. \u0130nsan kayb\u0131 20 milyon olup, ayr\u0131ca 25 milyon insan evsiz kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Sava\u015f y\u0131llar\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ekonomisini \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde daraltm\u0131\u015f ve geriletmi\u015fti. 1940 y\u0131l\u0131na oranla, sava\u015f\u0131n bitiminde ulusal gelir %17, sanayi \u00fcretimi %8, elektrik \u00fcretimi %11, k\u00f6m\u00fcr \u00fcretimi %11, petrol %40, \u00e7elik %33, \u00e7imento %68, pamuklu dokuma %60, \u015feker \u00fcretimi %78, tar\u0131msal \u00fcretim ise % 40 d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. SSCB, sava\u015f\u0131n yaralar\u0131n\u0131 sar\u0131p, SBKP \u00f6nderli\u011finde \u00fclkeyi ikinci kez yeniden in\u015fa ederek; 1940 y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131n \u00fcretim d\u00fczeyini, 1950 y\u0131l\u0131nda yakalad\u0131. Ama bu, ikinci sava\u015f\u0131n da Rusya ekonomisine, bir on y\u0131l daha kaybettirmesi anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Kapitalist-emperyalist d\u00fcnyan\u0131n engellemelerine ve sava\u015flara kar\u015f\u0131n, devrim sonras\u0131ndaki elli y\u0131ll\u0131k tarihi i\u00e7inde Sovyet Rusya, g\u00f6r\u00fclmedik ekonomik ve toplumsal ba\u015far\u0131lara ve \u2018ilk\u2019lere imzas\u0131n\u0131 atan bir \u00fclke oldu. 1918\u2019den itibaren, sanayideki y\u0131ll\u0131k geli\u015fme h\u0131z\u0131, ortalama olarak % 10\u2019nu a\u015ft\u0131. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
TABLO 1- Sovyet Rusya sanayisinin ortalama y\u0131ll\u0131k geli\u015fme h\u0131z\u0131<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\u00a01952-1958<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
SANAY\u0130 \u00dcRET\u0130M\u0130<\/td>\n87<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00dcretim mallar\u0131 \u00fcretimi \u00a0(I. Kesim)<\/td>\n+12.8<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
T\u00fcketim mallar\u0131 \u00fcretimi (II. Kesim)<\/td>\n+10.7<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Sanayide emek verimlili\u011fi art\u0131\u015f\u0131<\/td>\n+7.6<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Kaynak: <\/strong>OECD Rusya Raporu ve Economist dergisi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Ayr\u0131ca bat\u0131l\u0131 kaynaklar da, bu d\u00f6nem Sovyet ekonomisinin ola\u011fan\u00fcst\u00fc geli\u015fme d\u00fczeyini do\u011frulamaktad\u0131r. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ekonomisi \u00fczerine \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131yla tan\u0131nan Prof. Abran Bergson\u2019a g\u00f6re, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin sabit fiyatlarla milli geliri, 1928-1937 d\u00f6neminde y\u0131lda %5 ile % 5.5 aras\u0131nda, 1950-1955 d\u00f6neminde de % 7.5 ile % 7.6 artm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu oranlar, o d\u00f6nemin d\u00fcnya ekonomilerinin b\u00fcy\u00fcme h\u0131zlar\u0131yla k\u0131yasland\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, en y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme h\u0131z\u0131d\u0131r. D\u00f6nemin SSCB ekonomisinin b\u00fcy\u00fcme h\u0131z\u0131, ayn\u0131 d\u00f6nem Amerika\u2019n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fcme h\u0131z\u0131ndan iki ile \u00fc\u00e7 kat daha fazlad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

SSCB, devrim sonras\u0131nda ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirdi\u011fi h\u0131zl\u0131 kalk\u0131nmayla, az geli\u015fmi\u015f bir \u00fclke olmaktan \u00e7\u0131k\u0131p, sanayi \u00fcretim hacmi bak\u0131m\u0131ndan d\u00fcnyada ikinci s\u0131raya yerle\u015fmi\u015f ve birinci s\u0131radaki ABD sanayisini, baz\u0131 alanlarda ge\u00e7mi\u015ftir.3 Ayr\u0131ca bilimsel teknik alanlarda, bilimsel ara\u015ft\u0131rmalarda, dikkat \u00e7ekici bir geli\u015fme g\u00f6stermi\u015ftir. Bir\u00e7ok alandaki rakamlar\u0131, ABD\u2019le ayn\u0131 d\u00fczeyde g\u00f6z\u00fckse de, e\u011fitim-\u00f6\u011fretim ve sa\u011fl\u0131k hizmetlerinin yayg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve paras\u0131z olmas\u0131nda, k\u00fclt\u00fcrel vb. faaliyetlerin t\u00fcm \u00fclke sath\u0131na yay\u0131lmas\u0131nda onu a\u00e7\u0131k ara ge\u00e7mi\u015ftir. Rusya\u2019da her 100.000 ki\u015fiye d\u00fc\u015fen doktor say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n, ABD\u2019dekinden % 12 daha fazla oldu\u011fu ya da ayn\u0131 say\u0131daki hastahane yata\u011f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen doktor say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n, ABD\u2019ye oranla % 20 daha fazla oldu\u011fu belirtiliyor. (Bkz. Bernard P.J: Sovyetler Birli\u011finde Planlama, Londra, \u0130ngilizceye \u00e7eviren: I. Nove)<\/p>\n

Sosyalizmin in\u015fa d\u00f6nemine ili\u015fkin olarak, sosyalist y\u00f6netimin yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 merkezi kalk\u0131nma planlar\u0131n\u0131n, \u00fclke kalk\u0131nmas\u0131, ki\u015fisel t\u00fcketimin art\u0131\u015f\u0131 ve halk\u0131n refah\u0131 \u00fczerine yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 olumlu etkiler ba\u011flam\u0131nda daha bir\u00e7ok \u00f6rnek verilebilir. Ama SSCB\u2019nin bu ba\u015far\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131 hazmedemeyerek korkuya kap\u0131lan emperyalist Bat\u0131 d\u00fcnyas\u0131, ba\u015fta ABD olmak \u00fczere, elbirli\u011fi ile \u2018so\u011fuk sava\u015f\u2019\u0131 ba\u015flatt\u0131lar. SSCB\u2019ne asl\u0131 astar\u0131 olmayan propaganda materyalleriyle sald\u0131rarak; kendi eli kanl\u0131 y\u00fczlerini, azami k\u00e2r i\u00e7in d\u00fcnya \u00fclkeleri ve halklar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6m\u00fcrme ve ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k alt\u0131na alma \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 gizlemek i\u00e7in, Sovyetleri \u201c\u00f6c\u00fc\u201dolarak g\u00f6stererek; silahlanmalar\u0131n\u0131 ve NATO\u2019nun faaliyetlerini me\u015frula\u015ft\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131lar. Be\u015finci kol ve gladyo faaliyetleriyle, \u201cye\u015fil ku\u015fak\u201d vb. projelerle Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ku\u015fatarak teslim almay\u0131 hedeflediler.<\/p>\n

Kru\u015f\u00e7ev ve Brejnev kli\u011finin i\u00e7eriden y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fckleri y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 da besleyerek, sosyalizmi raydan \u00e7\u0131kartma \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 ba\u015flatm\u0131\u015f olan emperyalistler; 1980\u2019lerin ortas\u0131nda Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019un sosyalizmin bi\u00e7imsel kal\u0131nt\u0131lar\u0131na son bir darbe indirmesiyle de, a\u00e7\u0131k kapitalist bi\u00e7imleri egemen k\u0131lma ama\u00e7lar\u0131na ula\u015fm\u0131\u015f, \u2018sosyalizmin yenilgisi ve \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc\u2019, \u2013g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fczde art\u0131k bu palavraya inanan kalmasa da\u2013 kutupla\u015fman\u0131n sona erdi\u011fini, tek kutuplu d\u00fcnyan\u0131n kuruldu\u011funu ilan ettiler!<\/p>\n

D\u00dcNYA KR\u0130Z\u0130 \u00d6NCES\u0130NDE RUSYA EKONOM\u0130S\u0130
\n<\/b>
\nGorba\u00e7ov\u2019un ba\u015flatt\u0131\u011f\u0131 Bat\u0131 sermayesine entegre s\u00fcrecini, Yeltsin\u2019in SSCB\u2019ni emperyalistlere pe\u015fke\u015f \u00e7ekme politikas\u0131 izledi. \u00dclkenin ge\u00e7mi\u015f birikimleri ya\u011fmaland\u0131, eski KBG ajanlar\u0131, devlet b\u00fcrokrasisindeki b\u00fcy\u00fck memurlar, i\u015fletme m\u00fcd\u00fcrleri vb. \u00f6nemli i\u015fletmelerin m\u00fclklerini ellerine ge\u00e7irerek, milyarder konumuna y\u00fckseldiler. Bu, bir t\u00fcr mafyac\u0131 kapitalizmin do\u011fu\u015fuydu. Yine bu d\u00f6nemde, Bat\u0131l\u0131 emperyalist g\u00fc\u00e7ler taraf\u0131ndan, borsa spek\u00fclat\u00f6rleri taraf\u0131ndan k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rt\u0131lan yapay 1998 kriziyle, \u00fclke ekonomisi iyice \u00e7\u00f6kertildi ve Bat\u0131 kapitalizmine teslimiyetin yolu a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f oldu. Yeralt\u0131 kaynaklar\u0131, Bat\u0131l\u0131 emperyalistlerin s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fc ve ya\u011fmas\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131. Alt yap\u0131ya yeni yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yap\u0131lmayarak, bir\u00e7ok i\u015fletme ve kurulu\u015f \u00e7\u00fcr\u00fcmeye terkedildi, fabrikalar, maden ocaklar\u0131 kapat\u0131ld\u0131…<\/p>\n

Gorba\u00e7ov\u2019la ba\u015flayan a\u00e7\u0131k kapitalistle\u015fme s\u00fcreci, Yeltsin\u2019le \u00fclkenin i\u00e7eriden ve d\u0131\u015fardan ya\u011fmalanmas\u0131na d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Rusya IMF k\u0131skac\u0131na al\u0131narak, \u00e7\u00f6kme ve k\u00f6lele\u015ftirilme yoluna sokuldu. Bu mafyac\u0131 kapitalist gidi\u015fe; Putin\u2019le birlikte darbeler indirildi, tutuklama, baz\u0131 i\u015fletmeleri kamula\u015ft\u0131rma vb. y\u00f6ntemlerle, devlet otoritesi peki\u015ftirilerek, yeni palazlanan Rus burjuvazisinin yolu a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131, ekonomi, normal yoldan kapitalistle\u015fme s\u00fcrecine sokuldu. Petrol ve do\u011fal gaz fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n art\u0131\u015fa ge\u00e7ti\u011fi olumlu konjonkt\u00fcr\u00fcn r\u00fczgar\u0131n\u0131 arkas\u0131na alan Putin, i\u00e7eride ya\u011fma ve r\u00fc\u015fveti azaltarak, istikrar sa\u011flayarak, merkezi y\u00f6netim ayg\u0131t\u0131na belli bir prestij kazand\u0131rd\u0131, ekonomi iyile\u015fme rotas\u0131na girince de, halk\u0131n yan\u0131lsamal\u0131 deste\u011fine mazhar oldu. 2008 d\u00fcnya krizi, Rusya\u2019y\u0131, ekonomiyi iyile\u015ftirme ve alternatif g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc sekt\u00f6rler yaratarak, d\u00fcnya g\u00fc\u00e7leri ile rekabete giri\u015fme planlar\u0131 yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir kav\u015fakta yakalad\u0131. Bununla birlikte, krizin, mali a\u00e7\u0131dan Rusya\u2019y\u0131 da vurmas\u0131, ek olarak petrol fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131 da d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmesi; Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nu, bir gecede y\u00fcz milyarca dolar kayba u\u011fratt\u0131. Bu s\u00fcrece biraz daha yak\u0131ndan bakmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fal\u0131m:<\/p>\n

Yeltsin d\u00f6neminde, 1990-1998 y\u0131llar\u0131nda izlenen ekonomik politikalarla, sosyalist d\u00f6nemden kalan baz\u0131 uygulamalar hedefe konmu\u015f, zaten \u00e7ok \u00f6nceden terkedilmi\u015f merkezi planlaman\u0131n yerine ge\u00e7irilmi\u015f olan serbest piyasa ekonomisine ivme kazand\u0131racak \u00f6nlemler al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f; fiyatlar serbest b\u0131rak\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, \u00fclkeye yabanc\u0131 sermayeye giri\u015finin \u00f6n\u00fcndeki son yasal engeller de kald\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu politikalar, ekonomik gidi\u015fat\u0131 daha da k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015ftirmi\u015f, enflasyon artm\u0131\u015f, talep daralm\u0131\u015f, \u00fcretim d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f, yat\u0131r\u0131m ve tasarruflar azalm\u0131\u015f, i\u015fsizlik artm\u0131\u015f, gelir da\u011f\u0131l\u0131m\u0131 bozulmu\u015f, devletin ekonomi \u00fczerindeki kontrol\u00fc kalkt\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in, mafyaya ve karaparac\u0131lara g\u00fcn do\u011fmu\u015ftu. Sonu\u00e7 olarak, \u00fclkenin ekonomik ve politik y\u00f6netimi, do\u011fal olarak bir avu\u00e7 oligark\u0131n eline d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Merkez Bankas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n para politikalar\u0131yla d\u00f6viz kurunu dengelemesi ve enflasyonu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrerek, \u00fc\u00e7 haneli rakamlardan a\u015fa\u011f\u0131 \u00e7ekmesiyle birlikte, makro dengelerin k\u0131smen sa\u011fland\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir anda; bu kez 1998 A\u011fustos krizi patlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Asya krizinin Rusya\u2019ya yans\u0131mas\u0131, yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131n paralar\u0131n\u0131 alarak yurtd\u0131\u015f\u0131na ka\u00e7mas\u0131 sonucu, Merkez bankas\u0131, Rublenin istikrar\u0131n\u0131 koruyamayarak, Ruble de\u011ferini dalgalanmaya b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Moratoryum ilan edilerek, k\u0131sa vadeli bor\u00e7lar ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 1991-2000 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda, Yeltsin ve ekibi taraf\u0131ndan, ba\u015fta b\u00fcy\u00fckleri olmak \u00fczere, devlete ait olan t\u00fcm ticari i\u015fletmeler \u00f6zelle\u015ftirilmi\u015fti. Gaz, petrol, \u00fcretim ve pazarlama \u015firketleri devlete ait olmaktan \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, yabanc\u0131 kapitalistlere sat\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, ba\u015fta ABD olmak \u00fczere, Bat\u0131l\u0131 emperyalist devletler, \u00f6zellikle Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bankac\u0131l\u0131k, enerji ve g\u0131da sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc ele ge\u00e7irmeye d\u00f6n\u00fck faaliyet y\u00fcr\u00fctt\u00fcler. Bu d\u00f6nem, ulusal gelir % 40 azalm\u0131\u015f, n\u00fcfusun % 40\u2019\u0131 yoksulluk s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 alt\u0131na itilmi\u015fti. \u0130\u00e7 talep bask\u0131 alt\u0131na al\u0131narak ihracat\u0131 artt\u0131rma politikas\u0131 enflasyonu % 30\u2019lara indirse de, bu sonu\u00e7, ortalama ya\u015fam s\u00fcresinin erkeklerde 60 ya\u015f\u0131na inmesi ve \u00f6l\u00fcmlerin do\u011fumlardan % 50 daha fazla artmas\u0131 pahas\u0131na elde edildi. 1998 krizinin, Rusya ekonomisinde ne gibi tahribatlar yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve Rusya ekonomisinin i\u00e7ine d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc durumu en yetkili a\u011f\u0131z olarak Putin, \u00fcnl\u00fc milenyum konu\u015fmas\u0131nda \u015f\u00f6yle ortaya seriyordu:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u00dclkenin milli geliri,yar\u0131 yar\u0131ya azald\u0131. Ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na ulusal gelir, G-7 \u00fclkeleri ortalamas\u0131n\u0131n be\u015f kat alt\u0131na d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Rusya ekonomisinin yap\u0131s\u0131 de\u011fi\u015fti. Kilit sekt\u00f6rler, petrol, enerji m\u00fchendisli\u011fi ve metal\u00fcrji oldu. Bunlar ulusal gelirin %15\u2019ine, genel ulusal \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131n\u0131n %50\u2019sine ve ihracat\u0131n %70\u2019ine denk d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyordu. Reel sekt\u00f6rde verimlilik d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Hammadde ve elektrik \u00fcretiminde d\u00fcnya ortalamas\u0131n\u0131n \u00fczerinde, ama di\u011fer sekt\u00f6rlerde ABD\u2019nin % 20-24\u2019\u00fc kadar. Makine ve ekipman\u0131n % 70\u2019i on ya\u015f\u0131ndan b\u00fcy\u00fckt\u00fcr. (Bu geli\u015fmi\u015f \u00fclkelerinkinin iki kat\u0131ndan fazlad\u0131r.) Bilim yo\u011funluklu \u00fcretim alan\u0131nda Rusya d\u00fcnyan\u0131n % 1\u2019nden sorumlu, ABD bunlar\u0131n % 36\u2019s\u0131n\u0131, Japonya % 30\u2019unu sa\u011fl\u0131yor.\u201d<\/p>\n

Rusya ekonomisi, bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te bor\u00e7 k\u0131skac\u0131na al\u0131nm\u0131\u015f, normal b\u00fct\u00e7e gelirleriyle bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6deyemez duruma d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f, s\u00fcrekli bor\u00e7 ertelemesine gitmi\u015fti. Enflasyon 1999 y\u0131l\u0131 itibariyle %85 d\u00fczeyine \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Rusya, 1999\u2019da 156.6 milyar dolar olan bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6deyebilmek i\u00e7in, 2008 y\u0131l\u0131na de\u011fin, her y\u0131l, 13-19 milyar dolar anapara ve bor\u00e7 faizi \u00f6demek zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Rusya Federe Devleti\u2019nin 20 milyar dolar civar\u0131ndaki b\u00fct\u00e7esiyle bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 zaman\u0131nda \u00f6demesi olanakl\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan, bir\u00e7ok devletle bor\u00e7 ertelemesi ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda petrol ve do\u011fal gaz fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n % 100 y\u00fckseli\u015fi, Rublenin deval\u00fcasyonu ile birle\u015fince, ihracat bundan olumlu etkilenmi\u015f, ihracat\u0131n art\u0131\u015f\u0131 d\u0131\u015f ticaret a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kapatm\u0131\u015f ve Rusya 2001 b\u00fct\u00e7esini denk olarak haz\u0131rlam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ekonominin b\u00fcy\u00fcme s\u00fcrecine girdi\u011fi, i\u00e7 talebin canland\u0131\u011f\u0131, vergilerin art\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bu s\u00fcre\u00e7te, Rusya 2000 y\u0131l\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcmesini % 8.3, d\u0131\u015f ticaret fazlas\u0131n\u0131 ise (petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki art\u0131\u015fa ba\u011fl\u0131yd\u0131) 60.9 milyar dolar olarak a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nem ger\u00e7ekle\u015fen toplam d\u0131\u015f ticaretin % 35\u2019i Avrupa Birli\u011fiyle, % 18.5\u2019u Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011fuyla, % 15\u2019i do\u011fu Avrupa \u00fclkeleriyle, yine % 15\u2019i de Asya-Pasifik \u00fclkeleriyle yap\u0131lmaktayd\u0131.<\/p>\n

Ekonominin bu g\u00f6reli iyile\u015fmesinde, Putin\u2019in siyasi istikrar\u0131 sa\u011flamas\u0131, ithal ekonomisini ikameye d\u00f6n\u00fck bir kalk\u0131nma plan\u0131n\u0131 uygulamaya sokmas\u0131 gibi etkenler rol oynam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ama bu fakt\u00f6rler, petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki art\u0131\u015f\u0131n getirdi\u011fi iyile\u015fme yan\u0131nda \u00e7ok tali kalmaktad\u0131r. Bir\u201a \u2018ba\u015far\u0131\u2019 vard\u0131; ama bu, esas olarak petrol ve do\u011fal gaz fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fckselmesine ve ihracat gelirlerinin art\u0131\u015f\u0131na endeksli olan bir ba\u015far\u0131yd\u0131. Rusya ekonomisine bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, ekonominin yap\u0131sal, temel \u00f6nemdeki sorunlar\u0131na \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulunamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ya da uygulanan \u2018yeni tedbirler\u2019in sonucuna vard\u0131r\u0131lamad\u0131\u011f\u0131, k\u0131sacas\u0131 viraj\u0131n tam olarak d\u00f6n\u00fclmedi\u011fi; sorunlar\u0131n ve aray\u0131\u015flar\u0131n da devam etti\u011fi g\u00f6zlenmektedir.<\/p>\n

Yap\u0131sal de\u011fi\u015fim ve d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm ge\u00e7iren Rusya ekonomisine, bug\u00fcn i\u00e7in en b\u00fcy\u00fck katk\u0131y\u0131, yine petrol, do\u011fal gaz ve silah sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131 sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. Yine bu de\u011fi\u015fim s\u00fcrecinde g\u00f6zlenen bir olgu da, Rusya\u2019daki yabanc\u0131 yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n kompozisyonunda ve sahiplerinde de bir de\u011fi\u015fiklik olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Rusya\u2019ya yap\u0131lan yabanc\u0131 sermaye yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131nda a\u011f\u0131rl\u0131k, giderek ABD\u2019den Avrupa Birli\u011fi \u00fclkelerine do\u011fru kayma e\u011filimine girerken; Rus sermayesinde ise, d\u0131\u015far\u0131ya sermaye yat\u0131rma e\u011filimi g\u00f6zlenmektedir. \u00d6rneklersek, ABD\u2019nin Rusya\u2019daki yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131ndan 10 kat daha fazla d\u00fczeyde Rus sermayesi, ABD\u2019de bulunmaktad\u0131r. Yine son kriz \u00f6ncesi bir ba\u015fka e\u011filim de, Alman ve \u0130ngiliz sermayesinin Rusya pazar\u0131na giri\u015finde g\u00f6r\u00fclen art\u0131\u015flard\u0131r. 2008 krizi \u00f6ncesi Rusya ekonomisi, uzun y\u0131llar s\u00fcren eksi b\u00fcy\u00fcmeleri geride b\u0131rakarak, art\u0131ya ge\u00e7mi\u015fti. Ama yine de bu d\u00f6nemde, sekt\u00f6rler aras\u0131ndaki dengesizli\u011fin s\u00fcrmesi bir yana, yeni yap\u0131lan yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n k\u00e2rl\u0131 bir alan olan enerji sekt\u00f6r\u00fcne (yani, n\u00fckleer santral, do\u011fal gaz ve petrol \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131m\u0131 ve ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131na) yap\u0131lmas\u0131 nedeniyle, tek yanl\u0131 bir ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcme ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirildi\u011finden; ekonominin i\u00e7 a\u00e7\u0131c\u0131 bir konumda bulundu\u011fu s\u00f6ylenemez.<\/p>\n

Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti, 2002\u2019de, sadece yiyecek end\u00fcstrisi, enerji kompleksi, ve yak\u0131t alanlar\u0131nda b\u00fcy\u00fcme oldu\u011funu, ama di\u011fer sekt\u00f6rlerde ya durgunluk ya da ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Devlet \u0130statistik Komitesi, o d\u00f6neme ili\u015fkin olarak, i\u015fsizli\u011fin d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc, \u00fcretimin artt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, sermaye yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n % 12 y\u00fckseldi\u011fini, y\u0131ll\u0131k enflasyonun % 12 oldu\u011funu, \u00f6demeler dengesinin kritik olmay\u0131p b\u00fct\u00e7e fazlas\u0131 bulundu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

A\u00e7\u0131klamada b\u00fcy\u00fcyen ekonomik sekt\u00f6rler \u015fu \u015fekilde belirtilmi\u015fti: Yak\u0131t (% 9.4), demir orijinli metal (% 8.9), metal\u00fcrji (% 8.5), demir d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki metaller (% 6.1), g\u0131da (% 5), elektrik enerjisi (% 2.5), ormanc\u0131l\u0131k, a\u011fa\u00e7 ve ka\u011f\u0131t (% 12). Ayr\u0131ca ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z ekonomik sekt\u00f6r olarak ilan edilen hafif sanayide (% 2.5) d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f g\u00f6sterilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

Rusya\u2019n\u0131n istatistikleri, \u00fclke d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda, genellikle g\u00fcvenilmez olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ama IMF raporlar\u0131 da, Rusya ekonomisindeki g\u00f6rece iyile\u015fmeyi saptam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. IMF, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ulusal gelirinin 1999\u2019dan beri artt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda % 10, 2001\u2019de % 5, 2002\u2019de % 4.3, 2003\u2019te % 6 artt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nem, belirgin art\u0131\u015f olmayan Rusya\u2019n\u0131n d\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7lar\u0131, 150.8 milyar dolarla, 1995\u2019teki 133.2 milyara yak\u0131n bir d\u00fczeydedir. Rusya ekonomisinin, bu d\u00f6nemdeki k\u0131smi iyile\u015fme g\u00f6stergelerine kar\u015f\u0131n, petrole ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 artm\u0131\u015f, devletin b\u00fct\u00e7e hesaplar\u0131n\u0131 ve ekonomik stratejilerini, petrol\u00fcn varil ba\u015f\u0131 fiyat\u0131n\u0131 baz alarak olu\u015fturdu\u011fu bir s\u00fcrece girilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

Ayr\u0131ca Rusya, i\u00e7eride emperyalist tekeller ve yerli i\u015fbirlik\u00e7isi gruplar aras\u0131nda petrol do\u011fal gaz ve enerji kaynaklar\u0131 \u00fczerinde keskin rekabetinin s\u00fcrd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, gelir da\u011f\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n alabildi\u011fine bozuldu\u011fu, dolar milyarderlerinin mantar gibi yerden bitti\u011fi bir \u00fclke durumuna gelmi\u015fti. Rusya \u00c7al\u0131\u015fma ve Sosyal G\u00fcvenlik Bakan\u0131 Galine Karelova\u2019ya g\u00f6re, yoksulluk s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 (ayda 65 dolar) alt\u0131nda ya\u015fayan insan say\u0131s\u0131 30 milyonun \u00fczerindeyken, bu d\u00f6nemde Rusya\u2019daki dolar milyarderlerinin say\u0131s\u0131, Forbes dergisinin her y\u0131l yay\u0131nlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 listeye g\u00f6re, 17\u2019den 25\u2019e y\u00fckselmi\u015fti. Rus milyarderlerinin birle\u015fik toplam serveti, bir y\u0131l i\u00e7inde 35.5 milyar dolardan 79.4 milyar dolara f\u0131rlam\u0131\u015f ve Moskova, \u015fehir olarak, New York\u2019tan daha fazla dolar milyarderinin ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir kent haline gelmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n

KR\u0130Z S\u00dcREC\u0130NDE RUSYA EKONOM\u0130S\u0130 VE ALINAN \u00d6NLEMLER
\n<\/b>
\nSon d\u00fcnya krizinin Rusya\u2019y\u0131 fena \u015fekilde vurdu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Rusya\u2019da kriz, t\u0131pk\u0131 di\u011fer d\u00fcnya \u00fclkeleri gibi, sadece borsa ve bankac\u0131l\u0131k alanlar\u0131nda ya\u015fanmad\u0131. Ek olarak petrol fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fmesi, krizin etkisini katlad\u0131. 2008 Temmuz\u2019unda varil ba\u015f\u0131na 147 dolar\u0131 bulan petrol\u00fcn fiyat\u0131, 2008\u2019in sonunda 50 dolar\u0131n alt\u0131na d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. B\u00fcy\u00fck bir enerji ihracat\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 \u00fclke konumunda bulunan Rusya, \u00fcretim yelpazesini \u00e7e\u015fitlendirip, di\u011fer sekt\u00f6rlerde ihracat yapmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece, oynak petrol fiyatlar\u0131na ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 duruma geliyordu. Kriz s\u0131ras\u0131nda borsan\u0131n % 70 de\u011fer kaybetmesi, ekonomiyi durma noktas\u0131na getirmi\u015f, Rusya Merkez Bankas\u0131, d\u00fc\u015fen ruble de\u011ferini korumak i\u00e7in, \u00fclke rezervlerinin yakla\u015f\u0131k %25\u2019ine denk d\u00fc\u015fen bir kayna\u011f\u0131 (150 milyar dolar\u0131) bir \u00e7\u0131rp\u0131da harcamak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

Yine 2008 Ocak ay\u0131nda, 2007 Ocak ay\u0131na oranla, sanayi \u00fcretimi %16 azalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00fct\u00e7esini petrol fiyat\u0131na endeksli olarak yapmas\u0131, ekonomisini istikrars\u0131z k\u0131lmakta, planlar hassa dengeler \u00fczerinde y\u00fcr\u00fcmektedir. B\u00fct\u00e7enin yar\u0131dan fazlas\u0131n\u0131 petrol ve do\u011fal gaz sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131ndan elde edilen gelirler olu\u015fturdu\u011fu i\u00e7in, b\u00fct\u00e7e planlar\u0131nda hedefi tutturmak \u015fansa kalmaktad\u0131r. \u0130hracat, petrol, do\u011fal gaz, maden gibi, do\u011fal kaynaklara dayanmaktad\u0131r. \u00d6yle ki, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bu enerji sekt\u00f6r\u00fc ihracat\u0131 d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki ihracat miktar\u0131, k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck bir \u00fclke olan \u0130sve\u00e7 kadar bile de\u011fildir. Enerji fiyatlar\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce, enerjiden elde etti\u011fi vergi gelirleri de d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyor ve Rusya b\u00fct\u00e7esi a\u00e7\u0131k veriyor. Ayr\u0131ca i\u015fvereni h\u00fck\u00fcmet olan milyonlarca kamu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan\u0131 memur ve i\u015f\u00e7i bu durumdan etkileniyor ve maa\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 alamamakla y\u00fczy\u00fcze kalabiliyor…<\/p>\n

Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kriz ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda kaybetti\u011fi servet miktar\u0131, milyarderlerin say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n azalmas\u0131 olarak da kendini g\u00f6sterdi. 2009 \u015eubat\u2019\u0131 baz al\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, milyarderlerin say\u0131s\u0131 yar\u0131 yar\u0131ya azald\u0131. 2007 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Rusya 101 dolar milyarderine sahipti. Milyarderler, hem say\u0131s\u0131 azalarak 49\u2019a indi, hem de mal varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7te ikisini kaybettiler.<\/p>\n

Bir\u00e7ok g\u00f6zlemci ve ekonomist, krizin Rusya\u2019y\u0131 iyice \u00e7\u00f6kertece\u011fi beklentisindeydi. Fakat Putin, g\u00f6reve ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131, devlet ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6nemde de, sadece petrol ve do\u011fal kaynaklar ihracat\u0131n\u0131n getirdi\u011fi gelirle, Rusya ekonomisinin d\u00f6nmeyece\u011fi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00e7evre \u00fclkeler \u00fczerinde abi rol\u00fc oynayamayaca\u011f\u0131 ve Bat\u0131n\u0131n Rusya\u2019y\u0131 ku\u015fatma palanlar\u0131n\u0131n bo\u015fa \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmayaca\u011f\u0131, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bir s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak, eski g\u00fcc\u00fcne kavu\u015famayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131n bilincinde g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyordu. Ba\u015fbakanl\u0131k koltu\u011funa oturdu\u011funda da, gerek i\u015fadamlar\u0131 gerekse yetkililerle yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 toplant\u0131larda, s\u00fcrekli olarak, petrol ve do\u011fal gaza ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olarak ya\u015famaktan kurtulmaya, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n \u00fcretim yelpazesinin \u00e7e\u015fitlendirmesine ve \u00f6zellikle y\u00fcksek teknolojili \u00fcretim sekt\u00f6rlerine y\u00f6nelinmesine vurgu yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.6<\/p>\n

Kriz ba\u015flay\u0131nca, Rusya, petrol ve do\u011fal gaza ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131ktan kurtulma y\u00f6n\u00fcnde, gelece\u011fe y\u00f6nelik ekonomik kararlar ald\u0131 ve program yapt\u0131. Rusya H\u00fck\u00fcmeti\u2019nin Resmi Gazete\u2019de yay\u0131nlanm\u0131\u015f, \u201d2009 y\u0131l\u0131 k\u00fcresel mali krizle m\u00fccadele\u201d adl\u0131 program\u0131na g\u00f6re; \u201cRusya on y\u0131ll\u0131k bir ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcmenin ard\u0131ndan ekonomik bir darbo\u011fazla kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131.\u201d saptamas\u0131ndan sonra, al\u0131nacak ekonomik \u00f6nlemler \u015f\u00f6yle s\u0131ralan\u0131yordu:<\/p>\n

– Sosyal politikalarla, kamu t\u00fcketimleriyle, i\u015fsizlikle m\u00fccadele,<\/p>\n

– End\u00fcstriyel ve teknolojik b\u00fcy\u00fcme e\u011filimi s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclmeli,<\/p>\n

– Devletin talepleri ile birlikte \u00f6zel sekt\u00f6r taleplerinin konut yap\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131larak art\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131 ve i\u00e7 talebin canland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131,<\/p>\n

– Uzun vadeli ekonomik modernizasyon programlar\u0131, krizden etkilenmemesi. Petrol yerine ekonominin \u00e7e\u015fitlenmesini sa\u011flayacak uygulamalar\u0131n s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclmesi,<\/p>\n

– Ekonomiler, g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc yerel finans sistemine dayanmal\u0131. H\u00fck\u00fcmet, bankac\u0131l\u0131k sekt\u00f6r\u00fc ve mali piyasalar i\u00e7in, kredi sa\u011flamaya devam etmeli,<\/p>\n

– H\u00fck\u00fcmet ve Merkez Bankas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n, makro ekonomik istikrar i\u00e7in, sorumlu uygulamalar ortaya koymas\u0131 gerekiyor. Yat\u0131r\u0131mlar cazip hale getirilmeli, enflasyon d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclmeli.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc gibi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n ald\u0131\u011f\u0131 tedbirler, di\u011fer \u00fclkelerin anti-kriz tedbirlerinden epeyce farkl\u0131yd\u0131. Bu tedbirleri, sosyal desteklerle ekonomiyi canland\u0131rmak, yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek, ekonomiyi \u00e7e\u015fitlendirme do\u011frultusunda zaten \u00f6nceden girilmi\u015f yoldan sapmamak, ama sosyal bir patlamaya da m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011funca yol a\u00e7mamak olarak de\u011ferlendirmek m\u00fcmk\u00fcnd\u00fcr.<\/p>\n

Krizin Rusya\u2019y\u0131, \u00f6nceden girdi\u011fi iyile\u015fme ve ekonomiyi \u00e7e\u015fitlendirme s\u00fcrecinde yakalamas\u0131n\u0131, onun bir avantaj\u0131 olarak g\u00f6rebiliriz. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc d\u00fcnya genelinde krizden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131l\u0131rken, yeni teknolojiler kullanarak, emek \u00fcretkenli\u011fini, art\u0131-de\u011feri ve k\u00e2r kitlesini artt\u0131ran sekt\u00f6rlerin ve \u00fclkelerin avantajl\u0131 konuma ge\u00e7ece\u011fi ger\u00e7e\u011fini, di\u011fer emperyalist \u00fclkeler gibi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da iyi ve \u00f6nceden kavrad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylenebilir. Son aylarda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n imzalad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik antla\u015fmalara bak\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda da, bu g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Rusya, tarihinde ilk kez, d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda avantajl\u0131 oldu\u011fu n\u00fckleer santral yap\u0131m\u0131 gibi stratejik bir sekt\u00f6rde \u00fclke d\u0131\u015f\u0131na a\u00e7\u0131larak, T\u00fcrkiye ile Akkuyu N\u00fckleer Santral Antla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 imzalad\u0131. Benzer bir atom santrali yap\u0131m\u0131 i\u00e7in Suriye ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yapmas\u0131 da, bu \u00e7er\u00e7evede de\u011ferlendirilebilir.<\/p>\n

Kriz s\u00fcrecinde, gerek Putin, gerekse Medvedev, al\u0131nan anti-kriz \u00f6nlemlerin titiz bir takip\u00e7isi oldular ve ekonomik kriz s\u00fcrecini ve politik s\u0131kandallar\u0131 ve \u201cter\u00f6rizme\u201d kar\u015f\u0131 eylemleri, bir\u00e7ok d\u00fcnya liderinin aksine yerinden, bizzat y\u00f6netmeyi bir al\u0131\u015fkanl\u0131k haline getirdiler. Rusya y\u00f6neticileri, ald\u0131klar\u0131 ekonomik \u00f6nlemlerle krizdeki kritik e\u015fi\u011fi atlatm\u0131\u015f, ekonomiyi olumlu bir geli\u015fme ray\u0131na sokmak i\u00e7in \u00e7abalar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rm\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcyor. Putin\u2019in son a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fc\u00e7 y\u0131ll\u0131k planda da, artan i\u015f\u015fizli\u011fi azaltacak yat\u0131r\u0131mlara odaklan\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. H\u00fck\u00fcmetin ba\u015fkan\u0131 s\u0131fat\u0131yla Putin, 4 May\u0131s 2010\u2019da Devlet Duma\u2019s\u0131nda, 2009 ve 2010\u2019un ilk \u00e7eyre\u011findeki H\u00fck\u00fcmetin \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131 ve izleyecekleri hatt\u0131 \u015f\u00f6yle de\u011ferlendirdi:<\/p>\n

\u201cGe\u00e7en y\u0131l temmuzla ba\u015flayan ve global krizle ilerleyen durgunluktan \u00e7\u0131k\u0131lm\u0131\u015f, bunun yerini s\u00fcrekli iyile\u015fme alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.(..) 2011 y\u0131l\u0131 ba\u015f\u0131nda, karar verdi\u011fimiz anti-kriz subvansiyonlar\u0131, ay\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131m\u0131z tahsisat ve fonlar durdurulabilir, kriz esnas\u0131nda h\u0131zl\u0131 karar almak gerekiyor, tahsisat fonlar\u0131 gerekliydi, bu nedenle h\u00fck\u00fcmet bu g\u00f6revi \u00fcstlendi, h\u00fck\u00fcmet, \u015firketlerin malvarl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n 374 milyar rublelik miktar\u0131n\u0131 garanti alt\u0131na alarak yard\u0131m etti, parasal destek verdi, son y\u0131l bu tahsisatlar\u0131n getirisi 19 milyar rubleyi a\u015ft\u0131, ama bir sonraki y\u0131l, bu destek uygulamas\u0131na art\u0131k son verebiliriz\u201d diye konu\u015ftu. Putin, ek olarak; \u201cverimlili\u011fin y\u00fckseltilmesi, yeni teknik ekipman \u00fcretimi, ge\u00e7ici olarak i\u015f\u00e7i \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131lmas\u0131na yola\u00e7abilir. Bu nedenle, rand\u0131mans\u0131z i\u015fler i\u00e7in kavga etmek anlams\u0131z olur. Yeni i\u015fler bularak ve yeniden e\u011fitim f\u0131rsatlar\u0131 yaratarak, insanlar\u0131 ilerletebiliriz. H\u00fck\u00fcmet \u015fimdi bunu yap\u0131yor. 2010\u2019da, yeni i\u015f yarat\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 hedefleyen projeler i\u00e7in, 40.5 milyar Ruble harcad\u0131k, Rusya\u2019da yoksulluk s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 alt\u0131nda ya\u015fayan emekli bulunmuyor, bir\u00e7ok \u00fclke sosyal harcamalar\u0131 azalt\u0131yor, emekli ve memur maa\u015flar\u0131n\u0131 donduruyor, oysa biz o prati\u011fe girmiyoruz, resmi g\u00f6revli ve emekli maa\u015flar\u0131 bizde art\u0131yor. (..) Bir sonraki iki y\u0131l i\u00e7inde, sa\u011fl\u0131k alan\u0131ndaki modernle\u015fmeyi tamamlamak ve \u00fclke \u00e7ap\u0131nda bir sa\u011fl\u0131k a\u011f\u0131 olu\u015fturmak i\u00e7in, 300 milyar Ruble destek sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131z.\u201d dedi. (Bkz. Pravda)<\/p>\n

Ayr\u0131ca, devlet ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 koltu\u011funda oturan Medvedev de, 2009 sonunda Ekonomist\u2019in D\u00fcnya Ajandas\u0131\u2019nda yay\u0131nlanan makalesinde; \u201cRusya\u2019da \u00f6nceliklerimiz, yeniden ba\u015flayan ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcmeyi garanti etmek, bu b\u00fcy\u00fcmeyi ayakta tutarak, onu daha dengeli bir ekonomik yap\u0131lanma \u00fczerinde temellendirmektir. 2010\u2019da da elbette ekonominin modernle\u015fmesini, yenilenmesini ve \u00e7e\u015fitlenmesini te\u015fvik edece\u011fiz. Global d\u00fczeyde Rusya enerji kaynaklar\u0131na ve di\u011fer hammaddelerine g\u00fcvenmeyi s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecek. 2010\u2019da h\u00fck\u00fcmetin \u00e7abalar\u0131 daha \u00e7ok kriz sonras\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcme \u00fczerine odaklanmak olacak. Yeni ekonomik kurulu\u015fu, acil olarak ba\u015flataca\u011f\u0131z\u201d diyordu.. (Bkz. The Economist, The World in 2010, Dmitry Medvedev, \u2018\u00c7alkant\u0131l\u0131 d\u00f6nemde Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Rol\u00fc\u2019 adl\u0131 makale, sf. 50)<\/p>\n

IMF\u2019ye ge\u00e7mi\u015f bor\u00e7lar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6demi\u015f olan ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc d\u00f6viz rezervlerine g\u00fcvenen Rusya, IMF\u2019nin d\u00fcnyada krize d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f, zordaki ekonomilere destek sa\u011flamak amac\u0131yla, \u2018acil destek fonlar\u0131\u2019n\u0131 artt\u0131rma talebine; 1 milyar dolarl\u0131k bor\u00e7la katk\u0131da bulunaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131. Bu, IMF\u2019ye bor\u00e7 verme i\u015fi; Pravda\u2019da, \u201cIMF\u2019nin Rusya \u00fczerinde ge\u00e7mi\u015fte uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 diktat\u00f6rl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn \u00f6c\u00fcn\u00fcn al\u0131nmas\u0131\u201d ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131yla yorumland\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bor\u00e7 d\u00fczeyinde belirgin bir de\u011fi\u015fme olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi, d\u00f6viz rezervleri, krizdeki ani d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015ften sonra, tekrar y\u00fckseli\u015fe ge\u00e7mi\u015ftir. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n d\u00f6viz rezervleri, 400 milyar dolarla \u015fu an d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en iyi \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u00fclke rezervi konumunda bulunuyor. 2009 Nisan ay\u0131nda rezervlerin erimesinin durmaya ba\u015flamas\u0131, Rusya\u2019daki bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin de bu arada g\u00fc\u00e7lendi\u011fini g\u00f6steriyor. D\u00fcnyan\u0131n belliba\u015fl\u0131 ekonomistleri ve uzmanlar\u0131 da, Rusya ekonomisindeki iyile\u015fmeyi onayl\u0131yorlar.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n
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TABLO 2- Rus ekonomisinin, kriz \u00f6ncesi ve sonraki y\u0131llardaki temel ekonomik g\u00f6stergeleri<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
YILLAR<\/td>\n2005<\/td>\n2008<\/td>\n2010
\n(Tahmini)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Gayrisafi ulusal has\u0131la (milyar Ruble olarak)<\/td>\n21.598<\/td>\n41.668<\/td>\n1.41
\n(Trilyon Dolar)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fen ulusal gelir (Dolar)<\/td>\n5.332<\/td>\n11.811<\/td>\n10.030<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Mal ve hizmet ihracat\u0131 (milyar dolar olarak)<\/td>\n268.1<\/td>\n522.9<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u0130thalat<\/td>\n164.7<\/td>\n368.2<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Merkez Bankas\u0131 d\u00f6viz rezervleri (milyar dolar olarak)<\/td>\n182.2<\/td>\n427.1<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
D\u0131\u015f bor\u00e7lar\u0131n ulusal has\u0131laya oran\u0131 (%)<\/td>\n10.8<\/td>\n2.0<\/td>\n <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\n\u00a01 Dolar = 28.8 Ruble<\/td>\n\u00a01 Dolar =
\n24.9 Ruble<\/td>\n		<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Kaynak: <\/strong>OECD Rusya Raporu ve Economist dergisi<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Rusya, kriz sonras\u0131ndaki ekonomik toparlanmas\u0131n\u0131, siyasi etki alanlar\u0131n\u0131 geni\u015fletmeye d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmektedir. ABD\u2019nin krizle birlikte kaybetti\u011fi ekonomik itibar, Irak vb. yerlerdeki askeri itibar kayb\u0131 ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n krizden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f pozisyonu; ku\u015fkusuz ki, Rusya\u2019ya, Asya, Ortado\u011fu ve Avrupa\u2019daki eski etki alanlar\u0131na d\u00f6nme, SSCB d\u00f6neminde Sovyet Cumhuriyeti olan, ama bug\u00fcn ayr\u0131 devletlerin \u015fekillendi\u011fi co\u011frafyada n\u00fcfuzunu yeniden peki\u015ftirme, Ortado\u011fu, Akdeniz ve Latin Amerika gibi epey bir s\u00fcre \u00f6nce terketti\u011fi n\u00fcfuz sahalar\u0131na yeniden girerek oralarda \u00fcslenme y\u00f6n\u00fcnde avantajlar sa\u011flayacakt\u0131r. Ekonomik g\u00fc\u00e7 ve etkinin, eninde sonunda siyasi ve g\u00fc\u00e7 ve etkiyle ta\u00e7lanaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131; bu konuda deneyimli bir ge\u00e7mi\u015fi bulunan Rusya stratejistleri iyi bilmektedirler. Rusya, krizden \u00f6nce ve sonraki silah sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131yla7, petrol, do\u011fal gaz ve madenler gibi do\u011fal kaynak zenginli\u011fine sahip olarak, petrol boru hatlar\u0131n\u0131n vanas\u0131n\u0131 ve ge\u00e7i\u015f yollar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funu elinde tutman\u0131n avantaj\u0131n\u0131 kullanarak; bu ba\u011flamda b\u00fcy\u00fck projeler yaparak (son olarak, Asya \u00fczerindeki etkisini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirecek olan \u00c7in\u2019le yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 100 milyar dolarl\u0131k Kuzey-G\u00fcney Petrol ve Do\u011fal Gaz Boru Hatt\u0131 projesi ve Ortado\u011fu\u2019daki pozisyonunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirecek Akkuyu N\u00fckleer Santral projesinin ad\u0131 an\u0131lmaya de\u011fer) ve y\u00fcksek teknoloji \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc silah sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131n\u0131, diplomatik silah olarak da kullanarak; siyasi n\u00fcfuzunu artt\u0131rmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

Ayr\u0131ca, kriz dolay\u0131s\u0131yla itibar kayb\u0131na u\u011frayan ABD\u2019yi ele\u015ftirerek, moral al\u0131yor ve puan topluyor. G-8 gibi zirvelerin uluslararaas\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerde yetersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ileri s\u00fcrerek, sadece b\u00fcy\u00fck kapitalist devletlerin de\u011fil, orta d\u00fczeyde geli\u015fmekte olan kapitalist devletlerin de kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 G-20 zirvesini uygun ara\u00e7 olarak \u00f6ne \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131yor (asl\u0131nda buray\u0131, ABD\u2019nin tam etkisinden uzak, kendi etkisine a\u00e7\u0131k ve \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in daha uygun ve y\u00f6netilebilir bir arena olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcyor). Daha krizin ilk patlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnlerde ve akabinde, gerek Putin gerekse Medvedev; s\u00fcrekli olarak yapt\u0131klar\u0131 konu\u015fmalarda; krizin ana sorumlusu olarak ABD\u2019yi ve onun uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 yanl\u0131\u015f ekonomik politikay\u0131 i\u015faret ettiler. \u00d6rne\u011fin, \u015e\u0130\u00d6 ve G-20 Zirvesi ve BR\u0130C \u00fclkeleri ile yap\u0131lan toplant\u0131larda; ABD\u2019yi krizin sorumlusu olarak g\u00f6steren temay\u0131 i\u015flediler ve dolar kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 bir cephe yaratma y\u00f6n\u00fcnde ad\u0131mlar at\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131lar.8 Gelinen yerde, dolar\u0131n yerine yeni bir uluslararas\u0131 rezerv para saptanmas\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncesi, ABD d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki \u00fclkeler taraf\u0131ndan daha y\u00fcksek sesle dillendirilmeye ba\u015fland\u0131.<\/p>\n

SONU\u00c7 OLARAK
\n<\/b>
\n1929 d\u00fcnya krizi ko\u015fullar\u0131nda, kapitalist \u00fclkelerin ekonomilerinin derin bir \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fcnt\u00fc ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u0131llarda; Rusya, g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc, dengeli, b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fckl\u00fc ve \u00fclke sath\u0131na yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015f sosyalist ekonomisini in\u015fa ediyor, \u00fcretim ve \u00fcretkenlik alanlar\u0131nda d\u00fcnya rekorlar\u0131 k\u0131rarak, d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en b\u00fcy\u00fck tesislerinin a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131 yap\u0131yor; y\u00fcksek b\u00fcy\u00fcme h\u0131zlar\u0131 ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirerek, krizden etkilenmedi\u011fini d\u00fcnya \u00e2leme g\u00f6steriyordu. Ama bug\u00fcnk\u00fc Rusya\u2019n\u0131n manzaras\u0131 \u00f6yle de\u011fil. Son krizin iyice d\u0131\u015fa vurdu\u011fu sekt\u00f6rler aras\u0131 dengesizlik, ekonominin do\u011fal kaynaklara ba\u011fl\u0131 olarak nefes al\u0131\u015f\u0131; i\u015fsizlik, yoksulluk, salg\u0131n hastal\u0131k vb. \u2018kapitalizmin yol arkada\u015flar\u0131\u2019n\u0131n an\u0131nda Rusya semalar\u0131n\u0131 da kaplamas\u0131; Rusya emek\u00e7ilerinde, sosyalist ekonominin \u00fcst\u00fcn oldu\u011fu bilincinin tazelenmesine yol a\u00e7arak, sosyalizme duyulan \u00f6zlemi \u00e7o\u011faltmakta, sermaye d\u00fczenine olan nefreti ise artt\u0131rmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Ekim Devrimi\u2019nden 1956\u2019ye, SSCB\u2019nin sosyalist in\u015fas\u0131 s\u00fcrecinde, zorluklar\u0131 a\u015fmada kazan\u0131lan ekonomik birikim ve moral yap\u0131lanman\u0131n, t\u00fcm tahrip edilme \u00e7abalar\u0131na ra\u011fmen, krizli s\u00fcre\u00e7leri a\u015fmada, halka birazc\u0131k y\u00fcz\u00fcn\u00fc d\u00f6nen y\u00f6netimlere, halen bir avantaj sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131 da g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. Sosyalist in\u015fa d\u00f6neminde, ekonomik zemin \u00fczerinde toplumun \u00f6z\u00fcmsedi\u011fi, ku\u015faktan ku\u015fa\u011fa al\u0131\u015fkanl\u0131k \u00f6zelli\u011fi kazanm\u0131\u015f bu moral de\u011ferler bir \u00e7\u0131rp\u0131da yok edilemiyor.<\/p>\n

G\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir sanayi ve altyap\u0131 temeli ve bunun \u00fczerine bina edilen, sa\u011flam bilimsel teknik e\u011fitimle yeti\u015fmi\u015f insan g\u00fcc\u00fc, 2. D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndaki fa\u015fit i\u015fgale kar\u015f\u0131 olu\u015fmu\u015f direni\u015f ve zafer an\u0131lar\u0131 kolayca kaybolup silinecek t\u00fcrden de\u011fildir. Yeni Rus burjuvazisinin Putin ve Medvedev ikilisinin ve Rusya b\u00fcrokrasisinin; emperyalist d\u00fcrt\u00fc ve emellerle de olsa; sosyalizm d\u00f6neminden kalan bu \u2018ekonomik\u2019 ve \u2018moral\u2019 birikime yaslanarak, onu kullanmaya ve olu\u015facak tepkileri \u00f6nlemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131; kriz s\u00fcreci zorluklar\u0131n\u0131 a\u015farken geleneksel olarak halk\u0131n devlet otoritesine duydu\u011fu g\u00fcvenden yararlanma olarak tan\u0131mlanabilir. Ama d\u00fcnyan\u0131n di\u011fer kapitalist b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7leri ile, kapitalist rekabet ve hegemonya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na haz\u0131rlanan ve bir ucundan bu s\u00fcrece girmi\u015f bulunan Rus burjuvazisinin emperyalist emellerini, plan ve hedeflerini; emek s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc artt\u0131rmaks\u0131z\u0131n ve proletarya\u2013burjuvazi ve di\u011fer s\u0131n\u0131fsal \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmeksizin ba\u015farabilme olana\u011f\u0131 da yoktur.<\/p>\n

Rus halk\u0131, ge\u00e7mi\u015fte s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fcc\u00fc s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n gerici hedeflerinin, planlar\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmad\u0131. Kendi gelece\u011fini kendi ellerine alma, yeni bir d\u00fcnya kurma amac\u0131n\u0131n pe\u015finden ko\u015ftu, zor zamanlarda neler yapabilece\u011fini, devrimci enerjisini g\u00f6sterdi. Bu nedenle emek\u00e7ilerin ve halk\u0131n refah ve mutlulu\u011funu g\u00f6zetmeyen ve s\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fcc\u00fc burjuva s\u0131n\u0131flar\u0131n temsilcisi olan, gerici ama\u00e7lar pe\u015finde ko\u015fan Putin-Medvedev ikilisinin, halk\u0131n ge\u00e7mi\u015fte b\u00fcy\u00fck tarihsel eylemler yaparak ba\u015f\u0131ndakileri att\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hat\u0131rlamalar\u0131nda say\u0131s\u0131z yarar var! <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

C. Erman Özgürlük Dünyası Sosyalist Teori ve Politika Dergisi Ekim Devrimi sonrasında sosyalizmi inşa süreciyle, ekonomik ve sosyal alanda dünya çapında işlere imza atan, 2. Dünya Savaşı’nda Faşist Hitler Almanya’sının saldırısı ve işgalini püskürterek, onları 65 yıl önce Berlin’e dek kovalayan, dünya ilerici güçlerine ve halklarına, Avrupa’ya barış ve özgürlük getiren; savaş sonrası yıkılıp tahrip […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"ocean_post_layout":"","ocean_both_sidebars_style":"","ocean_both_sidebars_content_width":0,"ocean_both_sidebars_sidebars_width":0,"ocean_sidebar":"0","ocean_second_sidebar":"0","ocean_disable_margins":"enable","ocean_add_body_class":"","ocean_shortcode_before_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_after_top_bar":"","ocean_shortcode_before_header":"","ocean_shortcode_after_header":"","ocean_has_shortcode":"","ocean_shortcode_after_title":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_widgets":"","ocean_shortcode_before_footer_bottom":"","ocean_shortcode_after_footer_bottom":"","ocean_display_top_bar":"default","ocean_display_header":"default","ocean_header_style":"","ocean_center_header_left_menu":"0","ocean_custom_header_template":"0","ocean_custom_logo":0,"ocean_custom_retina_logo":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_width":0,"ocean_custom_logo_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_tablet_max_height":0,"ocean_custom_logo_mobile_max_height":0,"ocean_header_custom_menu":"0","ocean_menu_typo_font_family":"0","ocean_menu_typo_font_subset":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_size":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_font_size_unit":"px","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_font_weight_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_tablet":"","ocean_menu_typo_transform_mobile":"","ocean_menu_typo_line_height":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_line_height_unit":"","ocean_menu_typo_spacing":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_tablet":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_mobile":0,"ocean_menu_typo_spacing_unit":"","ocean_menu_link_color":"","ocean_menu_link_color_hover":"","ocean_menu_link_color_active":"","ocean_menu_link_background":"","ocean_menu_link_hover_background":"","ocean_menu_link_active_background":"","ocean_menu_social_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_bg":"","ocean_menu_social_links_color":"","ocean_menu_social_hover_links_color":"","ocean_disable_title":"default","ocean_disable_heading":"default","ocean_post_title":"","ocean_post_subheading":"","ocean_post_title_style":"","ocean_post_title_background_color":"","ocean_post_title_background":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_image_position":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_attachment":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_repeat":"","ocean_post_title_bg_image_size":"","ocean_post_title_height":0,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay":0.5,"ocean_post_title_bg_overlay_color":"","ocean_disable_breadcrumbs":"default","ocean_breadcrumbs_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_separator_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_color":"","ocean_breadcrumbs_links_hover_color":"","ocean_display_footer_widgets":"default","ocean_display_footer_bottom":"default","ocean_custom_footer_template":"0","ocean_post_oembed":"","ocean_post_self_hosted_media":"","ocean_post_video_embed":"","ocean_link_format":"","ocean_link_format_target":"self","ocean_quote_format":"","ocean_quote_format_link":"post","ocean_gallery_link_images":"off","ocean_gallery_id":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[12],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9435","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-rf-ticaret","entry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9435","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9435"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9435\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9436,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9435\/revisions\/9436"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9435"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9435"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.circassiancenter.com\/tr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9435"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}